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Abstract
Like an elephant, while it may be difficult to describe, corruption is generally not difficult
to recognize when observed (Tanzi, 1998, p. 564). Many countries have been, or are
currently typified by both lethal conflict and massive corruption. Historically, postconflict development programs have imposed policies of zero corruption, yet they
routinely fail. Initial research into “corruption” also identified significant ambiguities and
self-contradiction with the definition of corruption, itself. This study used an Existential
Phenomenological methodology with 8 participants from Iraq, Afghanistan, Uganda,
South Sudan and Sudan to: 1) redefine and model corruption within a global construct, 2)
examine the current doctrine mandating zero tolerance for corruption, and 3) examine the
potential for tolerating moderate levels of corruption in favor of reduced lethal violence.
Corrupt behavior is alleged by this research to include financial as well as non-financial
mechanisms, and is motivated by Human, Institutional and Cultural Factors of
Corruption. This research robustly redefines corruption, and develops new
theories/models to better explain corrupt behavior. These include the Corruption
Hierarchy, the Corruption Pyramid and the Universal Corruption Model. The research
was inconclusive with respect to the tolerance of corruption mitigating lethal conflict, but
confirmed strong support for policies of zero tolerance. In redefining corruption, many
political, social and cultural norms currently exhibited by nation states, including the
United States, are corrupt if/when properly classified. I’m desperate about my country.
You’ve got to be strong in my country. If you are weak, they will take you. (Jeremy from
Iraq)

xi
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Chapter One: Introduction
Statement of Problem
Protracted lethal conflict and unrest have occurred in Afghanistan, South Sudan,
Iraq, Sudan, Uganda, and other countries around the world for decades (Crocker,
Hampson, & Aall, 2005, pp. 2-4). Regions of lethal conflict, extreme poverty, terrorism,
genocide and illegal arms sales are also commonly associated with extraordinarily high
levels of corruption (Vogl, 2012, pp. 107-127). Similarly, “corruption that often pervades
war-torn environments—both in host nation institutions and those of international
actors.” (United States Institute of Peace, 2009, p. 3-17). The United States and western
foreign policy commonly insist upon zero corruption within post-conflict society, yet the
collective success of these efforts has been poor (Roberts, 2011, p. 2535). Further
compounding the situation, the foundational definition of corruption and its key drivers is
ambiguous (Chun, 2009, p. 173; Harrison, 2007, p. 672).
Background
The world is constantly experiencing the effects of societal, governmental,
economic, and cultural pressures where lethal conflict commonly occurs. These conflicts
result in millions of casualties and fatalities, economic regression and cultural
eradication. Associated periods of violence can be tumultuous and short-lived, while in
other instances they can become protracted, continuing for months, years or decades.
Associated with most or all of these conflicts are government regimes and cultural norms
that are generally proclaimed as corrupt by the United States, European states, and
western entities such as the United Nations, the World Bank, Transparency International
and a host of other global entities and not-for-profit governmental organizations (NGO’s)
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where a direct relationship between corruption and war, misery, and/or any undesirable
outcome has been asserted. According to Amundsen (1999), “Democratisation and
liberalization has increased the level of corruption to unmanageable proportions in Russia
and several other formerly communist countries, as well as a number of erstwhile oneparty regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 29). As a result of these assertions,
organizations as well as western and European society, as a whole, aggressively endorse
and promote policies of minimized and/or zero corruption as a requisite for growth,
development and reconstruction of post-conflict regions. Yet, “these indices [from
Transparency International and others] are inadequate if the issue of causation between
corrupt and social and political indicators is to be addressed” (Jain, 2011, p. 5).
Post-conflict development programs have a track record of routine failure.
Roberts (2011) confirms this by stating, “Peacebuilding is considered failed by many, but
those who preach such failure do not have an alternative” (p. 2535). Despite efforts from
NGO’s and government officials denying the failure of their own programs as well as the
inadequacy of their own capabilities, new ideas and methodologies are required. Jabareen
(2013) asserts that the “current doctrine is suboptimum, and new approaches are
warranted” (p. 107). The failure of these post-conflict development efforts raises
questions about the validity of a zero-tolerance corruption mandate. Although
controversial, we must also pragmatically realize that “each of the possible sources that
can curtail corruption is also a possible source of corruption” (Amundsen, 1999, p. 29).
The effects of corruption are surprisingly complex. For example, the direct and
indirect effects of corruption include “significant economic degradation, civil rights
degradation, decreased government effectiveness, and an overall detriment to political

3
stability and legitimacy [Doig & Theobald, 2000; La Porta et al., 1998; Mauro, 1995;
Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Seligson 2002]” (as cited in Tavits, 2010, p. 1258).
Corruption also “increases transaction costs, reduces investment incentives, and
ultimately results in reduced economic growth” (Seligson, 2002, p. 408).
Current academic studies as well as government policies, by virtue of their
collective absence of corruption tolerance, all mandate zero corruption within governance
and structure for optimized reconstruction and oversight. For example, the United States
Institute of Peace report, “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” is
based upon various studies from the United Nations, Rand Institute, World Bank and
other well recognized westernized and/or Eurocentric agencies. This document has been
widely used as the overall governing doctrine for post-constructive activities promoting
numerous activities and methodologies to limit corruption (2009). However, it is
interesting to note that nowhere within this comprehensive document is corruption ever
defined, despite being mentioned 32 times throughout the text. Instead, the definition of
corruption is ironically assumed to be inviolate and clearly understood, which is
dramatically not true.
Lederman (2011) states, “Corruption is commonly regarded as one of the most
serious obstacles to social development” (as cited in Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 569). This
is primarily because corruption has “grave social and human consequences such as
sluggish economic growth, shoddy law enforcement, unequal provision of public
services, and a distorted social morality” (Gong & Wang, 2013). Vogl (2012) goes on to
place nearly all of the world’s woes upon the shoulders of corruption as the primary
culprit and states, “Corruption is a political, social and economic issue of global
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proportions. Today, as never before, it is a major cause of the global crises of poverty,
human rights, justice, and security. It impacts us all” (p. 12). There are extremely few
examples of successful campaigns against corruption. In most instances, “a reduction in
corruption accompanies economic growth in open societies, where the cost of corruption
begins to exceed the ability of those who benefit from it to purchase compliance from
other politicians and bureaucrats” (Jain, 2011, p. 7).
International motives and involvement are not always altruistic, and are allegedly
sometimes corrupt within some contexts. Fiske-Rusciano (2014) states, “If we are to
strengthen global alliances for business, education, and peace-building purposes, we need
to study and understand the meanings of each other’s behavior, and formally recognize
the parallel hidden alliances that work not for the public good, but for a narrower, more
immediate or more divisive intent” (p. 259). So, corruption potentially exists within the
very programs that are intended to improve other cultures and entities, while mandating
and superficially insisting upon zero tolerance. The irony is cruel, true, and prolifically
commonplace.
Humanity lives within a global, intertwined society that thirsts for unambiguous
syntax concerning intellectual property, financial investment, and civil rights. Corruption
is similarly global and intertwined, to some degree, within each and every society. Yet,
its definition is currently vague, ambiguous and often self-contradictory. Despite
enormous attention and financial commitment being focused upon anti-corruption
programs and objectives, any and all generalizations concerning corruption are alleged,
by virtue of this dissertation, to be skewed, out of context and/or simply incorrect because
of the nature of corruption being defined by westernized (e.g. the United States, Europe,
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etc.) lenses, diction and paradigm. Specifically, what is defined as corruption by one
party or culture is often acclaimed as noble and appropriate by another, while a third
party might be ambivalent and without opinion: “Like the heads of Hydra’s dragon,
corruption presents itself in many shapes . . . [and may] differ from one another in terms
of both the source of power that is exploited and the impact they have on the economy
and the society” (Jain, 2001, p. 3). In fact, a universally reconciled definition of
corruption does not exist. How can such a critical metric as corruption be considered as
inviolate for peacebuilding and conflict resolution if the term’s meaning is so drastically
different within context and cultural perspective? Vogl, Lederman and others are
superficially correct, but are unfortunately neither academically nor pragmatically
accurate. What one person defines as corrupt has been, and continues to be, vastly
different than what another person might attest within a different culture, society and/or
geography.
Hence, current intentions may be admirable, but the syntax defining subsequent
action vis-à-vis anti-corruption programs is ambiguous at best and undefined at its worst.
Instead of accurately defining the problems, western society has superficially labeled the
rest of the world as corrupt within its/our own context and definition of what is proper,
ethically correct, and socially acceptable within its own westernized paradigm.
Understanding corruption is challenging, and requires full understanding of its
“idiosyncrasies” (Chun, 2009, p. 173). Harrison (2007) suggests, “There is a need to
avoid using the stereotypical assumptions about what corruption is and how it operates.
This means generating an understanding of how meanings of corruption vary, and how
this variation is determined by the social characteristics” (p. 672).
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Corruption is rarely addressed with caveats accounting for cultural bias. Instead,
scholars and policy-makers focus upon corruption’s superficial, financially centric
definition (i.e., the personal financial gain at the expense of others) rather than upon
contextual and/or cultural modification. Despite this ambiguity, most researchers overtly
refer to the importance of rule of law, cultural empathy, cross-border empathy, and a
plethora of principles that would otherwise infer that corruption was a focus of their
research. This paradox is exceptionally perplexing when nearly all governments, NGO’s,
and peace-building agencies zealously promote zero corruption policies.
What is defined as unethical or immoral for some people is defined as acceptable
by others. Historically, the United States is arguably guilty of countless atrocities, such as
slavery, torture, child mistreatment, women mistreatment, labor law violations and a host
of human rights violations. Each of these instances was ethically and morally justified
within its respective cultural context. Yet, in each instance, these justifications directly
contradicted the opposing parties’ definitions of morality and civility. The world contains
billions of people, with the vast majority having religious, customs, work ethic and
cultures vastly different from the United States. Hence, one might ask, “How can the
United States claim to have all the answers about corruption when this same country, in
the not-so-recent past, has been guilty of so many atrocities?
It is also interesting to note that people and governments rarely associate these
mandates for minimized corruption with promises of minimal violence, unrest and/or
lethality. To be sure, nearly everybody relates corruption to economic growth, foreign
investment and long-term stability. However, to date, only limited research has focused
on the effects of corruption upon shorter-term violent, ancillary fatalities or upon feelings
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of physical security.
The source of these problems may stem from the ambiguous, self-contradictory
definition currently assigned to corruption. This is akin to Kuhn’s (2012) observation that
“further development [of an existing paradigm] calls for . . . the development of an
esoteric vocabulary” (p. 64). Nuclear physics is best understood using the language of
nuclear physics, and civil rights is best understood using the language of civil rights. In
each case scholars within each respective field agree upon definitions, syntax and
meaning. Similarly, corruption should be best understood by using an appropriately
defined syntax, verbiage and language. However, to date, no such agreement exists. As
predicted by Kuhn, this ambiguity otherwise leads to confusion, failure and an inevitable
challenge to the current paradigm. Specifically, Kuhn (2012) states that, “Discovery
commences with the awareness of [an] anomaly [within the current paradigm] . . . that
nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern [the] normal
science [of corruption theory]. It then continues . . . [and] closes only when the paradigm
theory [concerning corruption] has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the
expected” (p. 53). This dissertation directly challenges corruption theory, and by so
doing, will hopefully help to create and/or shift the science of corruption study to a new,
non-anomalous paradigm.
This situation can also be compared to the drivers and facets of war. Although
significant research has been conducted on the relationship between war, fatalities and
conflict, the vast majority of these studies focus upon quantitative issues and metrics.
Past studies focusing on variables such as “political system” and “cultural distance” are
rare (Gantzel, 1981, p. 39). The “usefulness [of existing/past research] for practical peace
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policy seems negligible,” perhaps because past quantitative studies have fallen short “due
to the fact that it is not based on a systematic frame of reference offering substantial
categories for analysis” (Gantzel, 1981, p. 39). These same deficiencies are seen within
the topic of corruption.
The focus of identified research to date does not factually or pragmatically
support how and why lowest levels of corruption are currently mandated by the United
States and Europe for highest levels of post-conflict stability. Instead, such focus is
simply ignored in pursuit of supporting the current westernized paradigm, syntax and
context of corruption. Said differently: though difficult to prove, this current attitude
among NGO’s and academics might be based upon political motivations oriented towards
preserving the status quo of the NGO’s and universities’ major sources of anti-corruption
funding, namely, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Moyo (2009) states,
“Donors, development agencies and policymakers have, by and large, chosen to ignore
the blatant alarm signals . . . when it has become apparent that aid, under whatever guise,
is not working.” (p. 27). Yet,
Aid has failed to deliver the promise of sustainable economic growth and poverty
reduction . . . At every turn over the past five decades, policymakers have chosen
to maintain the status quo and furnish Africa with more aid, … despite the fact
that there are very compelling reasons to show that it perpetuates the cycle of
poverty and derails sustainable economic growth (Moyo, 2009, p. 28).
A small portion of existing research has examined the positive, catalyst-based role
of corruption with respect to economic, cultural and social transformation. These
potential constructive benefits of corruption within the context of the current westernized
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paradigm notwithstanding, formal research in this facet has neither disproven, nor rarely
focused upon, what superficially appears to be self-contradictory, non-ethical, and, as a
result, highly controversial; that is, the potentially positive role contextually tolerable
corruption may play in regions of deadly conflict to reduce lethality and/or enhance
feelings of safety from life threatening issues. This group of research, though nearly
negligible, also supports a broader definition of corruption focused upon corruption
providing an individual or entity positive utility, such utility above, beyond and/or in
place of personal financial gain.
Purpose of Study
The primary purpose of this study was to resolve the current confusion and
ambiguity associated with the definition of corruption, and by so doing, establish a new
doctrine and foundation from which future research can be more effectively performed.
This research was also intended to clarify if, when, and how various levels of corruption
within leadership and governance directly and/or indirectly affect lethal violence and
associated feelings of safety among the general populace within regions of violent
conflict. A better understanding of the effects of corruption upon the affected
community’s impressions and behavior within regions of deadly conflict was desired,
with such understanding intended to allow policy, programmatic interventions and
international assistance to be tailored and optimized for minimal fatalities. This, in turn,
would have significant positive effects upon all other peacebuilding processes.
This research intended to ensure that the current doctrine promoting zero
corruption was not exacerbating conflict and deadly violence. Wallensteen & Sollenberg
(1996) suggest that the general policy promoting zero-corruption is “potentially
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accelerating intrastate conflict to interstate conflict [war]” (p. 357). Restated for
emphasis, despite the best intentions of countries like the United States and others in
having an anti-corruption policy, we might be making matters worse by insisting upon
zero tolerance for corruption, or by continuing to impost such constraints when
corruption is so poorly and ambiguously defined. As a result, this study intended to
identify the potential benefits, if any, of short-term toleration of various forms of
corruption, as well as the contextual, cultural and perspective-based nuances associated
with defining corruption, such benefits defined as minimizing lethal violence and/or
enhancing feelings of physical security from lethal violence.
It is critically important to note, from the onset, that this study precluded any and
all arguments that might have supported the contortion, delay or manipulation of the
democratic and/or electoral processes that are optimistically envisioned and desired.
These democratic processes have long-term repercussions, and so were academically,
professionally and personally considered to be inviolate.
Foundational Definitions
Corruption. There is neither a universally agreed definition of corruption, nor is
there an easy way to alleviate confusion on this issue. The lack of consensus is, in fact, a
core element of the basis for this dissertation. There are dozens of definitions; many are
individually succinct, concise and purportedly clear within their respective context. The
preponderance of these definitions is financially-centric. Yet, despite this commonality,
these definitions often contradict each other. Further compounding the ambiguity, each
definition is completely discredited when context, culture, and non-financial motivations
are introduced.
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Nonetheless, many researchers have intensely studied corruption. Despite the
immensity of research, and despite a degree of academic self-denial, massive ambiguity
persists. One candid researcher admits, “Like an elephant, while it [corruption] may be
difficult to describe, corruption is generally not difficult to recognize when observed”
(Tanzi, 1998, p. 564). Sometimes, the simplest approach is the best approach. The World
Bank defines corruption as, “The abuse of public office for private gain” (Haller & Shore,
2005, p. 2). Jain (2011, p. 3) defines corruption as an “act in which public power is used
for personal gains in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game (Jain, 2001, p. 73).”
By comparison, this dissertation alleges that corruption is much more complex, and
should be based upon contextual aspects of positive utility from any fiduciary situation,
as opposed to the current parochial definitions involving only personal financial gain
from those holding public office. Researching and universally defining corruption is the
primary focus of this dissertation, and so the definitions provided above are admittedly
superficial. Chapter Two will address this situation in detail.
Violence. Fiske-Rusciano (2014) defines violence as “any condition that takes
away human rights; violence therefore includes such conditions as poverty,
disenfranchisement, silencing, intimidation, and lack of access to education, healthcare,
housing, food, water, respect, and physical security” (p. 261).
Lethal Violence. Violence that results in death.
Genocide. Genocide, as described by Michael Mann, is “murderous ethnic
cleansing” (as cited in Shaw, 2007, p. 11). Genocide is treated as a special category with
special definitions outlined by the United Nations, as originally authored by Raphael
Lemkin. According to Lemkin and Article II of the United Nations Convention on the
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Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC), genocide has two phases:
(1) Destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group, and (2) Imposition of the
national pattern of the oppressor (Campbell, 2013, p. 118).
Genocide is formally defined by Article II of the UNGC of 1948 as
Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethical racial or religious group: (a) Killing members of group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions designed to destroy the group in
whole or in part, (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Campbell,
2013, pp. x).
Although researchers’ opinions vary, it is generally agreed that genocide requires intent
as well as an action (Campbell, 2013). Genocidal intention mandates the “cultural
destruction, but also destruction of biological patterns of the oppressed group”
(Campbell, 2013, pp. x).
Terrorism. Terrorism has a wide number of definitions used within government
and literature. All definitions center upon the following three common themes: “(1) the
use of violence (2) an agenda concerning political objectives, and (3) the intention of
sowing fear in a target population” (Merari, 2007, p. 14). In the vernacular, terrorism is
defined as the willful activities that cause fear within a civilian populace through deadly
violence. Because the nature and drivers of fear are each a function of culture and time,
so too is the general working definition of terrorism. The British legal definition of
terrorism is defined by Schmid & Jongman (2005) as “the use of violence for political
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ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section
of the public in fear” (as cited in Merari, 2007, p. 14).
By comparison, the United States defines terrorism as “the unlawful use or threat
of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is
generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individual or groups to modify
their behavior or policies” (Merari, 2007, p. 14). Summarized in a contrarian fashion,
“[Terrorism] just boils down to an idea of a just war that legitimates violent action since
western tradition considers violence legitimate only when it is practiced by the state”
(Chalian & Blin, 2007, p. 7).
Terrorism has also been defined by Laquer as “the substate application of
violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even
overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change” (as cited in Crenshaw,
2012, p. 5). Although Laquer and the majority of academics limit the labeling of
terrorism to only non-state actors, others have expanded its application to include statesponsorship, claiming, “top down [state] terrorism has been far more prevalent through
history” (Chalian & Blin, 2007, p. 6).
War. Oxford’s Dictionary defines war as “a state of armed conflict between
different countries or different groups within a country” (2017). Yet, Merriam-Webster
defines war as “a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states
or nations” (2017). The key issue to note here is that war, by Merriam’s definition, results
in violence and death as a result of armed conflict activities between two or more
different states or nations, as opposed to conflict with a group that is not officially
representing a country or nation. Similarly, groups that represent countries or nations not
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officially recognized by the United States as a legitimate country or nation would not be
categorized as a party of war. We should also note that war, by Merriam’s syntax, is a
conflict between the armed forces and combat-trained personnel of respective states and
does not target or involve civilians or non-combatants. The nuances excluding terrorists,
non-state actors and noncombatant civilians are critical, since no such exclusion exists
when using the Oxford definition. War is also described as “the most acute form of
hostile interaction among political entities”, but is actually a subset of conflict
(Wilkenfeld & Brecher, 2012, p. 271). War is also defined as a “conflict involving at
least one member of the interstate system on each of the [conflict], resulting in a total of
1000 or more battle deaths” (Wilkenfeld & Brecher, 2012, p. 272).
Research Questions
This dissertation answers the following three Research Questions.
Research question one. How should corruption be properly, accurately and
pragmatically defined? Rusciano (2014) states that “one society’s corrupt practices might
be another society’s standard” and that “corruption, in short, becomes a concept that, to
quote Joseph Joubert, is ‘like glasses [that] obscure everything they do not make clear’”
(p. 27). Corruption, as currently defined, is often inadequate, as its definition makes it
challenging to discern corruption from general incompetency, ignorance and/or naiveté.
Hence, fully describing and understanding the contextual nature of corruption is
paramount. If the definition and overall notion of corruption is, in fact, ambiguous, or just
simply incorrect in some instances, then the concept posed by Research Question Two
attains a modest degree of credibility. Research Question #1 also includes the academic
need and desire to unify and reconcile existing corruption research within a foundational
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concept, definition and model that bridges current gaps of paradigm, culture, syntax and
context.
Research question two. Is zero corruption required for maximizing feelings of
safety during and/or post-conflict while concurrently minimizing associated lethal
violence? Restated by a leading corruption scholar, and the essence of this dissertation,
“Can certain situations involve non-zero-sum games, where corruption benefits all (and
hence loses the moral stigma attached to the term)” (Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 15)?
The statement is an interesting adjunct to corruption, whereby actions might be defined as
corrupt only because they violate some law or regulation, but not because of harming any
person or parties, and, concurrently, not because of providing utility or advantage to
somebody in public office or public trust. Hence, what might be abhorrently defined as
corrupt in the United States might be benevolently acceptable in another part of the
world. An argument can be made that such forms of corruption have justifiable positive
elements by extending the criteria of a just war: “In short, the question we are facing
today is whether sensitivity to context and cultural traditions could be combined with the
need for shared concepts” (Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 19).
Research question three. Is there an optimum, positive level of tolerable
corruption associated with maximizing feelings of safety from violent death and/or
minimizing lethal violence? This study uniquely focuses upon endorsed or tolerable
corruption as a potential constructive driver within foreign policy, such behavior being
nearly non-existent within published research. The vast majority of notable texts and
research on the topic of war and peacebuilding fail to mention the (potential) importance
of context upon corruption. Maslow and scores of subsequent studies support the
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necessity for attaining feelings of at least adequate physical safety and security prior to
the onset of nominal peacebuilding efforts (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011, pp.
13-14, 43-44, 47-48).
Peacebuilding also requires the inclusion of “people and cultural modalities in the
setting. In addition, considerable attention must be given to discovering and building on
the cultural resources for conflict resolution that exist within the context” (Lederach,
1997, p. 97). This dissertation differentiates between true, physical security and the
notion of “feeling” secure. Without such assurances of security, and/or resolving nearterm crises, various peacebuilding policies and programs are severely affected to the
point of being negligible. Lederach (1997) suggests an integrated approach to
peacebuilding and discourages “quick fixes to situations of protracted conflict” (p. 78). It
is important to understand if and how corruption within governance and structure affects
the severity of post conflict notions of insecurity and associated violent fatalities. Until
such an understanding occurs, other post-conflict programs and policies cannot be
optimized, as “Building sustainable peace in the absence of minimal levels of public
security is next to impossible” (Donais, 2004, p. 943).
Pre-Research Impressions
This dissertation’s Proposal Defense, as well as the associated Institutional
Review Board (IRB) submission, were based upon several qualitative suppositions. Some
of these notions were supported by subsequent research and data analysis. However,
some were also proven to be unfounded and/or inconclusive. The candid disclosure of
these details and initial misconceptions are provided to confirm the objectivity and
rigorous application of scientific methodology by the Principal Investigator, and by so
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doing, hopefully enhance the credibility of this dissertation’s admittedly controversial
findings.
Pre-research impression one. Corruption as currently defined is ambiguous, and
does not properly account for culture or context. My research and dissertation support
this initial impression. New theories were developed, as well as a universal definition of
corruption.
Pre-research impression two. The pursuit and requirement for zero corruption
within post-war environments in regions of extreme conflict is detrimentally affecting
security and feelings of safety. This dissertation fails to provide solid support for this
assumption. The data gathered on this issue is generally inconclusive, and includes
instances supporting as well as refuting this assumption.
Pre-research impression three. If low or moderate (culturally acceptable) levels
of corruption occur in pursuit of other far-reaching objectives, then feelings of lethal
insecurity and associated violent fatalities will be minimized in regions of conflict and
post-conflict. This dissertation fails to provide solid support for this assumption. The data
gathered on this issue is generally inconclusive, and includes instances supporting as well
as refuting this assumption.
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Supporting Theories
The potential for positive effects of corruption upon minimized lethal violence
and enhancing feelings of security are currently unknown, with little to no past research
on the topic. As a result, theories supporting such behavior are also nascent to nonexistent. Nonetheless, some potential theories for consideration are outlined below. These
theories were considered as phenomenological interviews were conducted, post-interview
coding performed and trends identified. References to existing theories explaining
corruption are also included. Unfortunately, existing theories must be heavily discounted
since they are used to explain corruption as currently defined, and the current definitions
of corruption are being challenged.
It is also critical to note that academia does not have a unified voice on what
corruption is, nor why it occurs. One group refers to “actors being regarded as
autonomous agents making (bounded) rational means-end calculations” while the other
describes “corrupt behavior by cause[s] beyond individual control” (De Graaf, 2007, p.
41). There is enormous confusion surrounding the drivers of corruption. A variety of
theories has been developed, but none are robustly and universally applicable. “Instead of
synthesizing the theory groups, one could look for an alternative causal theory. By
combining macro and micro factors and everything in between, it would be well suited as
a theoretical model” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 42). The following theories are presented and
discussed, after which my research tries to develop a single, unified universal theory.
Justwar theory. This theory provides a moral and policy basis justifying state
sponsored lethal violence, armed conflict and war. Comerford (2001) discusses President
Bush and his “crusade” against terrorism (p. 1). Similarly, “The Crusades found their
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initial justification as offensive action aimed at protecting Christian pilgrims to
Jerusalem, but quickly took on the characteristic of the jihad or Muslin holy war”
(Comerford, 2001, p. 1). Although justifying the Crusades and/or recent U.S. military
activities in Iraq may seem inappropriate, both are justified within the context of Justwar
theory. Specifically, a war is deemed justified by Justwar theory if each of the following
seven mandated characteristics is satisfied: “1) There must be a just cause, 2) War must
be waged by a legitimate authority, 3) It must be formally declared, 4) Those waging it
must have a right intention, 5) It must be the last resort, 6) There must be reasonable hope
for success, and 7) It must be a due proportion between the benefits sought and the
damage done” (Comerford, 2001, p. 3).
In a just war, most scholars and policymakers attest that “non-combatants must be
guaranteed safety. The mandated conditions for a just war do not allow us to dismiss
large-scale death of civilians as mere ‘collateral damage’” (Comerford, 2001, p. 3).
However, there are also opposing positions where violence against noncombatants is
permitted: “Aristotle, who coined its name, originated Justwar theory. The theory was
then further refined by Saint Augustine, who tried to justify and explain when Christians
might take part in war in good conscience” (Comerford, 2001, p. 3). Comerford (2001)
comments that Saint Augustine felt “all wars remained sinful and could only be waged in
a ‘mournful’ sprit. War involved resorting to a lesser evil only in the hope of preventing a
greater evil and of restoring justice” (p. 2).
This theory has application to corruption since one of the tenants of a just war is
that the conflict be based upon the right intention. Since states are governed by people,
and because people as well as groups can be tempted and/or coerced into acting for
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personal or collective benefit at the expense of their fiduciary responsibility, it appears
very likely that many wars may have been un-just and waged as a result of corrupt
leadership, corrupt governments and/or an ambiguous definition of what was, and what
was not, corrupt. However, this situation is complicated by corruption’s current definition
being so ambiguous and allegedly context agnostic. Hence, an evaluation of the criteria
for a just war is clearly warranted.
Prospect theory. Prospect Theory is based on changes in assets and how people
react to risk and associated reward in the form of enhancing or detracting from these
assets. By comparison, Expected Value (i.e. Rational Utility) Theory is based upon total
assets and taking whatever actions might be necessary to maximize these assets. Until the
introduction of Prospect Theory in 1979, Expected Value theory was generally agreed to
govern the behavior of decision making under risk. It assumed that “all reasonable people
would wish to obey the axioms of the theory, and that most people actually do, most of
the time” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 263).
Prospect Theory is based upon the notion that people are more sensitive to gains
than losses. More specifically, people are risk averse to gains and risk seeking with
respect to losses. This means that gains are undervalued and losses are overvalued, if an
analogy to either Rational or Expected Utility Theory were to be overlaid (Levy, 2012, p.
194). In fact, 80% of all people tend to overvalue losses with respect to gains, all other
issues being equal (Campbell, 2015). For example, “If I have something in hand, I am
willing to take a risk to avoid losing it. However, if I don’t already possess something I
am not willing to take a risk to obtain it. People value things they already have more than
what they do not have or want” (Campbell, 2015).
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In Prospect Theory, emphasis is placed upon: 1) Guarantees, with respect to
gains, even though logic dictates that some risk should be taken for statistically greater
gains, and 2) Taking risks, with respect to losses, even though logic dictates that by
taking risks, greater losses will be incurred than would have otherwise occurred by
accepting the guaranteed loss. In Expected Value Theory, people “overweight outcomes
that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable; a
phenomenon [called the] certainty effect” (Khaneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 265). By
comparison, Prospect Theory claims, with supporting evidence, that people violate the
Expected Value Theory principles and generally go with a non-guaranteed loss, even
though they might lose a lot more by taking the risk. “In [situations] where wining is
possible but not probably, most people choose the prospect that offers the larger gain”
(Khaneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 265). Hence, they are risk seeking with respect to losses,
where emphasis is being placed on retention or maintaining their position (or perceived
position) whereby nothing is lost (Levy, 2012, pp. 193-196).
In Prospect Theory, renormalization occurs more quickly for gains than for losses.
This leads to an “Instant Endowment Effect” when gains occur (levy, 2012, p. 197).
However, when losses occur, an individual will rationalize the situation and frame their
current situation about a past reference point. This behavioral theory is built upon
“Reference Dependence.” Reference Dependence is the ability to make a particular
decision is based upon a standard when making a decision (Levy, 2012, pp. 196-198).
The individual will refer back to past decisions and results, and will take this data into
account before making future and additional decisions. For example, after a series of
losses, people will not adjust or renormalize easily to the new situation but, instead, will
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frame around the old situation (or reference point). They perceive improvement of their
now worsened situation to be any point less than where they used to be, or remember
themselves being as unacceptable, and as a loss. Hence, they will engage in risk-seeking
behavior, even though such behavior might be destructive (Levy, 2012, pp. 193-200).
Framing is the term describing the process about which an individual or party
defines a reference. Framing above the status quo defines status quo as a loss. Declining
relative power is typically framed as a loss, as the individual or entity reflects upon a time
where they had more power (Levy, 2012, pp. 193-200). Hence, people will be risk
seeking in this instance, since they are looking at the current situation (i.e. status quo) as
a loss (Levy, 2012, p. 197). The past state of affairs and/or power is often the goal, which
unfortunately leads to illogical and destructive behavior, since people are risk seeking
with respect to losses. Incremental gains in power or civil rights will be avoided, as this
will appear to be a gain, and people are risk averse with respect to gains. Instead, people
or entities tend to go all-in, and will attempt to re-achieve a past state of affairs. Anything
less is perceived as a loss, as people are risk seeking writ to losses. By comparison,
framing below the status quo defines the status quo as a gain (Levy, 2012, p. 197).
The implications of Prospect Theory to international relations and foreign policy
are analogous to their application to individuals and states vis-à-vis corruption behavior.
Specifically, states have a “greater tendency to defend/support status quo than expectedutility theory would predict” (Levy, 2012, p. 200). The costs of moving away from the
status quo will be considered a loss, and the benefits of moving away from status quo
considered a gain. The latter places over-consideration on the effects of the loss, and so
people will be biased to support the status quo since we are risk adverse to gains. Hence,
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the status quo is defended, even at the expense of war. When states experience a decline
in relative power, they frame their reference points to a past situation above the current
status quo, which allows them to perceive inaction as a guaranteed loss. This makes the
alternative of war a better choice. This behavior is otherwise described as “risk seeking
for losses” (Levy, 2012, p. 200). If both sides see themselves in the domain of losses,
then each is more likely to engage in risk seeking behavior, which increases the chances
of war (Campbell, 2015).
Incentive theory. The most common explanation of individual corruption from
an economic perspective is Incentive Theory. Incentive theory is based upon “costbenefit analysis of a particular individual . . . and factors such as wage incentives, job
security and (job) promotion (e.g. whistle blowing) in curbing the motivation of public
officials to engage in corruption” (Tavits, 2010, p. 1261). Tavits (2010) further finds that
“empirical models demonstrate that both public officials as well as citizens are motivated
by their perception of what is acceptable and commonplace. At the same time, the general
views of government and other people as trustworthy and fair, remains inconsequential”
(p. 1272). Incentive Theory shares several characteristics with Rationalist, Utilitarian or
Expected Utility/Value theory. Incentive Theory has its origin with corruption defined
from an individualistic perspective, while Expected Utility Theory is universally applied
to both individuals as well as to groups and entities.
Rational-expected utility-value theory. This theory is most commonly known as
Expected Value Theory, and is based upon a rationalist approach whereby an entity or
individual, either consciously or subconsciously, estimates the collective probabilities for
payoff and reward. A discount is not applied for ethical violations, emotional stress or
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other intangibles. Similarly, a premium is not applied for comparable non-financial
and/or non-specific rewards. This theory focuses on the overall value of the assets, while
Prospect Theory focuses upon gains, or the change in assets (Levy, 2012, p. 194).
Expected Value Theory is very closely aligned with Incentive Theory. The
primary difference is that Expected Value Theory can be applied to any person, group,
entity, state or situation, while Incentive Theory is generally applicable to individuals.
Expected Value Theory is also closely related to Prospect Theory. The key differences
between these two theories involve Prospect Theory’s premise that people and/or groups
are, with an 80% majority, risk seeking for losses and risk adverse for gains (Campbell,
2015; Levy, 2012, p. 195). By comparison, Expected Value Theory mandates that neither
premium nor discount be applied to the evaluation of risk and reward other than the
variables already being measured as a metric for increasing utility.
Rationalized irrationality. This approach is a semi-formalized subset of
Expected Value Theory, and is based upon rationally estimated gains versus losses while
following the consensus of popular opinion, without accounting for effects of morality,
long term reputation and other conditions. “If we had to name one reason why petty
corruption is so difficult to tackle, it has to be that it makes sense for people to engage in
than not” (Nagano, 2009). Although not an academic theory per se, Rationalized
Irrationality theory is pragmatically correct, but does not provide causal basis. This
theory contents that neither structure nor personal morality are the strongest drivers for,
or against corrupt behavior. Instead, “individual opinion doesn’t seem to matter much
[either]. In theory, most people believe that corruption is wrong. But in practice, the
incentive that motivates an individual’s behavior in a corruption-prone situation is their
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perception of what everyone else would do in a similar situation” (Nagano, 2009). It
simply makes no sense to try to do the right thing at the expense of your own family,
security, peer reputation, and, perhaps at the expense/peril of your own life. John
Maynard Keyes in “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” makes an
analogy between behavior and competition, and suggests that to win “one’s task was to
choose the outcome which you think others will select, regardless of your personal
opinion. ‘This means that attempts to act responsibility and achieve a cooperative
solution cannot be sustained, because they leave you vulnerable to exploitation by
others’” (as cited in Nagano, 2009).
Proponents of Rational Irrationality Theory point out the futility of a top-down
approach being used to fight corruption. This is because the additional rules and
regulations imposed by an external organization “in an effort to ensure that private and
public interest are brought into line have doubtful applicability . . . [because it is this]
very behavior . . . that has been made an integral part of the [game theory based] game”
(Nagano, 2009).
Balance of power and power cycle theory. These theories are based upon the
notion that no nation (or party) will escalate behavior against another party similarly
capable of causing harm unless they perceive a mismatch between their own power,
measured on an absolute basis, compared to their own power ranked against others, as
measured on a relative basis. As states gain military, economic or resource advantages,
the balance of power shifts. So, one state might choose to preempt the previous balance
of power through war, while the other state, now declining in power, may want to
continue enjoying the privileges and status it once had as the dominant state. The key
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factor promoting war or deference is the degree of mismatch between a state’s absolute
power and its relative power, as compared to other states (Doran, 2012, pp. 332-338).
Extensive quantitative analysis using multi-variable regression analyses were performed
over the past 150 years, and arguably support a relationship between status and war. For
example, the greatest propensity and strongest correlation between status mismatch and
conflict occurs at the 15-year point (Wallace, 1971, p. 30).
Thousands of years ago, Plato criticized Thrasymachus for adopting the opinion
that “internal to the state, only justice meant that the strong should rule” (Doran, 2012, p.
349). However, Doran (2012) points out,
Ironically, external to the state, in injustice that has precipitated the most massive
wars is more egregious than that of Thrasymachus. It is the injustice of unearned
privilege. The decreasingly powerful want to claim all of the perquisites, status,
and influence that they had enjoyed when they were at the top of their power
cycle. The increasing powerful [capable], because they foolishly postponed
assuming responsibility [for leadership] until too late, or because the system
refused to adjust for them . . . have been denied an appropriate role. This is a
recipe for structural catastrophe (p. 349).
Although widely utilized by the United States, Russia and other nuclear capable
countries as justification for the development of nuclear weapons, “despite studies by
Kim and Ferris . . . a significant amount of evidence suggests that we should also have
serious doubts about the traditional balance-of-power hypothesis that equality of power
leads to peace” (Cashman, 1998, p. 253). This is likely because once the capability and
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threat of offensive activity is created, retraction becomes problematic, and at great risk to
the first party to agree to such arms reduction.
Complex systems theory. A Systems Theory approach can be used to describe
and/or explain everything and anything. This being said, it is not always the most
appropriate choice. Complex Systems Theory describes the interactions of the various
inputs, resources and drivers of a particular system or problem, with such interactions
resulting in a particular behavior. By understanding these drivers, inputs, resources and
inter-relationships, the resulting behavior should be better understood. If proven valid,
then the manipulation of these various nodes or modules within a complex system should
also be capable of selectively modifying the outcome.
Complex Systems Theory is based upon Complexity Science, which is the “study
of phenomena which emerge from a collection of interacting objects” (Johnson, 2009, p.
3). Essentially, complexity is defined as a “collection of objects competing for some kind
of limited resource; food, space, energy, power, or wealth” (Johnson, 2009, p. 4). The
“Holy Grail of Complexity Science is to understand predict and control such emergent
phenomenon; in particular, potentially catastrophic crowed-like events such as . . . human
conflicts” (Johnson, 2009, p. 5).
Corruption is a particularly complex phenomenon, and so it is well suited for
description and modeling using Complex Systems Theory. South Sudan, in Sub-Saharan
Africa, is well known for corruption, lethal violence and unrest. In stable regions, the role
of institutions and governance are “distortions of the system”, but in regions like South
Sudan, “corruption and patronage are the system. There may be bubbles of integrity, due
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to the efforts of committed and influential individuals . . . but they are fragile and
subordinate to the kleptocratic operation of the broader system” (De Waal, 2014, p. 348).
Kantian, utilitarian and virtue ethics theory. Three additional approaches (i.e.
theories) can be used to describe and explain corruption. These include Kantian Theory,
Utilitarian Theory and Virtue Ethics Theory (Chun, 2009, p. 173). Utilitarian and Kantian
theories are both based upon a rationalist approach for general behavior, but have some
slight differences. Kantian Theory is based upon abiding by specific, well defined moral
principles for human behavior, leaving little room for interpretation or objectivity. By
comparison, Utilitarian Theory has the same rational-based foundation as Kantianism, but
overlays a “businesslike cost-benefit relationship” (Chun, 2009, p. 173). Virtue Ethics
Theory is significantly different from the Kantian and Utilitarian approaches since it
“captures the emotion and . . . concern for happiness of the self as well as of others.
Virtue Ethics looks to motivate aspirational values and seeks to answer the question,
‘what kind of society should we be?’” (Chun, 2009, p. 173).
Specialized corruption theories. There has been enormous effort expended to
describe the causes of corrupt behavior simply and universally. Although concrete,
confirmed explanations do not exist, quite a bit of other common ground has, in fact been
established. For example, “Research shows that a conglomerate of social, economic,
political, organization and individuals causal factors are important to explain cases of
public corruption (Huberts, 2002, p. 8)” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 43).
De Graaf (2007) provides an excellent review and summary of the six different
categories currently typifying corruption theory. These theories are summarized by
Tables 1 and 2, and include: 1) Public choice Theory, 2) Bad apple theories, 3)
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Organizational culture theories; 4) Clashing moral values theories, 5) Ethos of public
administration theories, and 6) Correlation theories (De Graaf, 2007, p. 46).
Public Choice theory is based upon “an individual making a (bounded) rational
decision that leads to a predetermined outcome” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 46). Public Choice
theory is further supported by Expected Utility Theory. Here, the corrupt individual is
akin to an autonomous agent, and internally calculates and compares the benefits of
performing the corruption against the penalties of being caught. It is important to note
that this theory does not directly account for organizational, cultural, contextual and/or
environmental effects. Hence, autonomous agents are “assumed to make more or less
rational means-end calculations,” contrasting with other theories where “behavior is
explained by causes beyond individual control” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 47).
Bad Apple theories place the causes for corrupt behavior upon the individual’s
predisposition to act “with faulty moral character” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 47). This approach
has numerous flaws and ambiguities, not because of what is stated, but because of the
enormous spectrum of factors and issues left unstated: “In the past, there was a tendency
to think of corruption as a temporary, exceptional ‘problem’ to be removed by ‘surgical’
treatment…. [but we now see] corruption as near universal and as forming a permanent
concern” (Punch, 2000, p. 317).
Organization Culture theories mandate a “causal path from a certain culture . . .
[whereby] a certain group culture leads to a certain mental state . . . and that mental state
leads to corrupt behavior.” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 51). An individuals’ personal gains are no
longer driven by individual desire for reward, nor are these actions predisposed by
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Table 1
A. Corruption Theories

Note. part 1 (De Graaf, 2007, p. 45)
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genetics. Instead, “If we scan these activities then it is plan that we are no longer dealing
with individuals seeking solely personal gain, but with group behavior rooted in
established arrangement and/or extreme practices that have to be located within the
structure and culture” (Punch, 2000, p. 304). This does not mean that everybody within a
certain culture or organization acts corruptly. Instead, this group of theories “describe
certain conditions under which corruption occurs. It is a matter of describing ‘facilitating
factors which . . . strengthen a causal chain’” (De Graaf, 2007, pp. 51-52). This group of
theories implies that corruption is contagious, and infer that people associating with
corrupt organizations run the risk of becoming corrupt themselves. They also suggest that
corruption itself seems to be the cause of corruption, and that “not becoming corrupt in
certain organizational cultures means betraying the group” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 52).
Clashing moral values theories are based upon the role of society and its
culturally specific behavioral nuances. There is also difficulty differentiating between
behavior in the private realm, and behavior while holding public office and/or working as
a fiduciary. For example, “In the private sector, gift giving is pervasive and highly
valued, and it seems natural to provide jobs and contracts to one’s friends and relations”
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 91). Yet, this particular behavior would be defined as corrupt
as well as potentially illegal in many part of the world, including the United States.
Localized values and customs can also lead to corrupt behavior. For example, “Out of
obligations to friends or family, officials take bribes. Thus, it is not so much selfish
personal gain the corrupt official is after, but rather the agent feels a need to fulfill
important personal (moral) duties, like ensuring loyalty to friends and family. As stated in
Latin American countries . . . “for my friends everything, for my enemies nothing, and
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for strangers the law” (De Graaf, 2007, pp. 53-54). Although many people agree that
“patrimonial character is the root cause of corruption in the third world . . .Theobald
(1999, p. 473) warns that ‘we are simply describing symptoms rather than identifying
underlying causes’” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 55).
Table 2
B. Corruption Theories

Note. part 2 (De Graaf, 2007, p. 46)
The ethos of public administration theories posits that “officials’ performance has
a causal path from societal pressure through the level of organizations. This, combined
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with a lack of attention to integrity issues, leads to a focus of the official on
‘effectiveness,’ making him or her corrupt” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 56). This group of
theories is very closely related to the third group on organizational cultures. There is also
a greater-good mentality implied, whereby activities are justified as long as the objective
is attained; that is, the ends justify the means. Empirical research within this particular
group is nearly non-existent, “probably because the causal link . . . is so indirect that the
claim, as true as it may be, is hard [or impossible] to support empirically” (De Graaf,
2007, p. 58).
The sixth category of existing corruption theories are collectively called
Correlation theories. This group of theories “does not start from an implicit or explicit
theoretical explanation model [as do the other groups], but from specific factors. Certain
social, political, organizational or individual factors are highlighted. Then, it is often
claimed that these factors are somehow ‘causes’ of corruption” (De Graaf, 2007. p. 59).
These studies are often quantitatively based, with conclusions derived upon statistical
analysis metrics. These types of correlation theories and analyses typify the current
approaches from organizations like Transparency International, the World Bank and
other agencies associated with post-conflict aid. As De Graaf (2007) points out, “In
general, of course, we must be careful when concluding causality from correlations. [For
example], the frequent correlation between ‘income’ and ‘corruption’. It seems that the
lower the income of a country, the higher the occurrence of corruption” (p. 60). This type
of conclusion has enormous contingencies, and if true, would lead us to conclude that
monks and other religious orders taking an oath of poverty are likely to be corrupt.
Again, this may be true, but to assume such a correlation from the onset is equally
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ludicrous. These types of contingencies, combined with a definition of corruption that is
ambiguous and argumentatively defined, typify the current academic landscape vis-à-vis
corruption.
Pre-research new theories. Two of the three Research Questions focus upon the
possibility of tolerable and/or non-zero levels of corruption mitigating lethal conflict.
Finding conditional benefits within a characteristic so universally detestable and critical
as corruption is controversial as well as challenging. This being said, a shift of
perspective for the corruption paradigm similarly justifies a shift in applicable theory.
The existing theories discussed earlier in this Chapter did not directly apply but were
useful as supplementary thought-drivers as new theories were developed.
Three preliminary theories were developed pre-research, and are graphically
shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
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Figure 1. Preliminary Theory -- Effects of Corruption upon Post-Conflict Stability
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Financial Corruption and Post Conflict Reconstruction
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Figure 3. Preliminary Theory -- Financial Corruption versus Conflict and Stability
These theories are rough and purposefully incomplete. Explanations and details
developed are not provided, nor is such detail appropriate. Instead, these pre-research
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theories served as a catalyst from which phenomenological interview questions were
developed, posed and subsequently analyzed. These theories also played a crucial role in
this dissertation’s subsequent development of the Corruption Pyramid, Corruption
Hierarchy and Universal Corruption theories, which are explained in greater detail in
Chapter Five.
Justifying the Dissertation
This dissertation topic was developed, reviewed, and confirmed by my
Dissertation Committee, as well as by the Nova Southeastern University Institutional
Review Board (IRB). I developed the topic using the guidelines provided by Dr. Elena
Bastidas (2015) for the desired characteristics and associated research worthiness of
Ph.D. research. These are further described by the following two sections. The IRB
approval letter is included as Appendix F.
Required characteristics for research. Guidelines and respective justifications
describing an acceptable dissertation topic are presented in each paragraph below. The
research guideline is first quoted, after which evidence is provided supporting the
guideline:
“The research must be justified by evidence of problem being significant to the
professional field” (Bastidas, 2015). Protracted lethal conflict and unrest have continued
in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Sudan, Uganda and other countries around the world
for decades. Perhaps not without coincidence, each of these countries has extraordinarily
high levels of corruption. The United States and western foreign policy insist upon zero
corruption within post-conflict society, yet the collective success of these efforts has been
poor, thus this dissertation challenges the necessity for a zero-corruption mandate.
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Compounding this issue, the foundational definition of corruption and its key drivers are
ambiguous and often self-contradictory, and so robustly defining corruption as well as
understanding the drivers and relationship (if any) between corruption and continued
lethality and/or associated feelings of insecurity during and after conflict is highly
desired.
“The research must be justified by statistics and documentable discrepancies that
confirm the urgency of the problem” (Bastidas, 2015). Thousands of NGO’s as well as
the United Nations, USAID and other countries’ relief agencies are continuously
involved with providing relief to regions affected by violent fatalities and concurrently
insist upon zero corruption within the targeted populations. Despite enormous effort and
financial commitment expended, results range from suboptimum at best, to dismal failure
at worst.
“The research must be grounded in the literature where the problem must be
framed in such a fashion that existing research can be used as a foundation, or a target for
contradiction” (Bastidas, 2015). Considerable research exists on corruption, war and
violence. These findings will be used as a foundation for this dissertation. However,
research justifying or refuting zero corruption as required for minimal post-conflict
lethality and for maximized feelings of security is extremely limited. Additionally, the
academic standards and definition associated with corruption are ambiguous, confusing
and often self-contradictory.
“The research must be grounded in the literature whereby a theoretical or
conceptual framework is used, if possible. Ideally, new findings must build upon past
findings, except in situations of contradiction” (Bastidas, 2015). This dissertation used an
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Existential-based, Phenomenological approach to confirm the relationships (if any)
between corruption, violent fatalities and feelings of security However, since past
research on this topic was lacking, there were no directly applicable theoretical models on
which to base rationale or theory. Suggestions and hypotheses on the development of new
theories and rationale were made using an approach that reconciled the selfcontradictions inherent with the current definition of corruption and also used several
existing, well accepted theories.
“The research must be original, and be needed to fill gaps in existing literature”
(Bastidas, 2015). This topic did not appear to be covered very well by past research, nor
by associated literature. In fact, there initially appeared to be a fair chance that this topic
has never been studied, at all. Ever. Further exacerbating this issue, the current definition
of corruption was confirmed as ambiguous, self-contradictory and neither applicable nor
relevant within a global context. A new definition and model for corruption were needed.
“The research must have an associated necessity for a methodological, scholarly
process being applied to study the problem” (Bastidas, 2015). The nature of this study
and availability of data on violent fatalities initially pointed towards a quantitative or
mixed methods approach. However, defining the corresponding metrics of corruption was
found to be impossible due to corruption’s ambiguous definition and context-driven
interpretation. Qualitative approaches, such as Grounded Theory and various types of
Phenomenological methodologies are ideally suited to identify key drivers, metrics and to
develop foundation theories where an existing paradigm is being challenged. These
approaches also require access to unique, vetted individuals as interview Participants.
Fortunately, the Principal Investigator has access to several subjects living/working in
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regions of post conflict, such as Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Uganda and Afghanistan, and
recruited Participants from this population. Hence, an Existential-Phenomenological
methodology was considered the most appropriate, and was used.
“The research must ensure that bias and pre-ordained conclusion must be
avoided” (Bastidas, 2015). Specific mid-stream checkpoints were established within and
between interviews to ensure pre-ordained conclusions and bias were avoided. The
interview questions were thoroughly vetted by the Dissertation Committee and by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Subjects were identified from the Principal
Investigator’s (PI) pre-existing network of friends and contacts, and also from these same
individuals making further introductions (i.e. snowballing). Additionally, bias was further
excluded through the PI’s generation of this topic, and through the rigorous application of
the dissertation process. In other words, were significant bias to ever have existed, it
seems unlikely that this topic would have ever been considered. This logic provided the
investigator a small degree of confidence that objectivity would prevail over bias as
research was performed.
“The research must ensure that systematic inquiry and processes are used, thereby
permitting possibility for a variety of conclusion, despite initial inclinations and
opinions” (Bastidas, 2015). Inquiry was systematic and iterative, while also based upon
conflicts in various regions of the world personally experienced and well known by the
PI, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Interviews and inquiry
avoided using multiple subjects from the same family. Multiple layered coding was
performed several times, each time using a different coding approach. The Qualitative
Data Analysis software, MAXQDA, was used to assist and manage this coding,
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evaluation and analysis process. The Dissertation Committee and the IRB provided
appropriate oversight. All of these factors, combined with iterative theory development
via an existential phenomenological perspective, ensured systematic inquiry with
minimized predisposed opinions and bias.
Research worthiness. The following attributes of acceptable Ph.D. research are
provided in the following paragraph. In each instance, a required trait is quoted, after
which justifying support is provided.
“Will a known gap in the body of knowledge be filled” (Bastidas, 2015)? Yes.
Past research and literature on this topic was very limited, and was actually non-existent
for a good portion of the literature search. Additionally, the current definition of
corruption was and is ambiguous, and potentially erroneous as a result of the definition’s
apparent independence from culture and context.
“Will previous research be replicated and expanded by looking at a different
category of participants, environment and/or constructs/variables” (Bastidas, 2015)? Yes,
where possible. However, previous research on this exact topic did not effectively exist.
Research on corruption, violent conflict and mortality was, instead, used as a foundation
and subsequently further expanded upon using a phenomenological methodology. A
variety of environments and variables were examined to resolve this ambiguity. Research
on corruption, violent conflict, and mortality was used as a foundation.
“Will previous research be expanded by more thoroughly examining some
identifiable aspect” (Bastidas, 2015)? Yes. Existing research on stability, durations of
peace between conflicts, degree of mortality, etc. for many types of conflicts was
examined. This research was extensive, but was lacking within the context of how
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corruption affects (if at all) post conflict violence and associated feelings of security. Past
research has also occurred on various types and magnitudes of corruption over time, and
within various regions of the world. Indirect and direct effects of war and lethal and nonlethal violence have also been studied. This dissertation related corruption to post-conflict
lethal violence and associated feelings of insecurity within the context of cultural
tolerance, and by so doing, expanded upon existing research. This research also examined
the repercussions of corruption within post-conflict environments. Furthermore, the
research examined the unfortunate and counter intuitive possibility of how minimizing
corruption, if promoted as current foreign and NGO policy dictates, may occur at the
direct expense of increased lethality and/or at the direct expense of heightened feelings of
insecurity. Perhaps most importantly, though, was the development of a more robust
definition, syntax and paradigm vis-à-vis corruption that accounts for corruption’s
relationship(s) to/with context, culture and other non-absolutistic variations.
“Are there specific, identifiable, and documented problems with the currently
available solutions” (Bastidas, 2015)? Yes. Violent, deadly conflicts continue to occur in
the form of insurgency, terrorism, rioting, war and general unrest. Each of these
occurrences has sporadic instances of superficial resolution. However, peace is either
short-lived and/or incomplete, with violence and fatalities continuing after the formal
declaration of peace, and despite (or because of) the insistence of zero corruption by
external parties. The current definition of corruption is/was also ambiguous, and is not
universally applicable due the current definition ignoring the effects of context and
culture. Hence, by general observation and general public knowledge, the existing
processes for minimizing conflict and post-conflict violent and non-violent fatalities had
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enormous room for improvement. Similarly, the mandated requisite of zero corruption
within post conflict programs was problematic as a result of corruption’s current
definition having such enormous ambiguity and self-contradiction. More importantly, and
highly controversially, an argument was posited supporting the selective, short-term use
and/or toleration of contextually acceptable corruption (e.g. utility-based corruption
which include financial as well as non-financial benefits) in pursuit of minimizing and/or
avoiding overall fatalities in the interest of enhancing feelings of physical security which,
in turn, would enhance the effectiveness of other post-conflict resolution activities.
Structure of Dissertation
Chapter One, Introduction, included general background information on the
dissertation topic such as the statement of problem, research question, pre-research
impressions and governing theories. Chapter Two, Literature Review, outlines, as well as
discusses, all of the relevant literature reviewed. Chapter Three, Methodology, discusses
options as well as the decision process used for selecting an Existential-based,
Phenomenological Analysis approach to performing the research. Chapter Four,
Presentation and Analysis of Data, summarizes the coding process and analysis of the
data gathered through phenomenological interviews. Chapter Five, Discussion, Findings
& Conclusion, describes the respective emergent themes, associated development of
theoretical models and research conclusions. Each chapter includes an introductory
section as well as a chapter summary. References and Appendices are included at the end
of the document.

43
Chapter Two: Literature Review
Introduction
A comprehensive literature review was performed with an overall focus upon the
identification of war, violence, lethality and corruption within a contextual perspective. It
was also critically important to find or confirm instances where corruption and/or the
absence of a zero-tolerance policy for corruption resulted in positive benefits, specifically
with respect to lethal violence. Although not commonly stated or admitted by most
people, “corruption . . . is present within all governments,” and so, not surprisingly, “It
would be very difficult to obtain a visa to a developing country in order to study
corruption” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). This paradoxical statement is essentially true, and is
directly analogous to this dissertation’s hypotheses about corruption.
Of greatest importance to this research is properly defining the syntax of the topic.
Specifically: Corruption, Culture, Context & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of
the Effects of Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme
Conflict. Hence, the focus of this literature study is upon: 1) Defining corruption, 2)
Identifying individual drivers and motivations for corruption, 3) Understanding cultural,
social and contextual drivers of corruption, 4) Examining the relationship between war
and corruption, 5) Examining the relationship between terrorism and corruption,
6) Examining the relationship between genocide and corruption, and 7) The potential for
corruption having beneficial aspects within either reducing fatalities and/or enhancing
feelings of physical security. War, terrorism and genocide are discussed since all three
activities include lethal violence, and corruption has been, and continues to be, theorized
as directly related to violence.
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Defining Corruption
The definitions of corruption are not nearly as concise as we might think. There
are legal, informal, formal, and cultural-specific nuances, all resulting in drastically
different interpretations and connotations of what the United States and Western society
typically defines as corruption. Corruption is widely misunderstood and misinterpreted.
This is not because of errors or incompetency, but instead is attributed to the multitude of
definitions currently surrounding the topic. Harsch (1993) describes corruption having a
“wide spectrum of practices, of varying forms and significance” (p. 33).
Mendilow and Peleg (2014), quoting Johan Goldberg, state that over the
centuries, “Corruption thus joined the club of terms like ‘terrorism,’ or ‘fascism,’ that
became banalities that disguise reality while impoverishing language and thought by
obliterating distinction” (pp. 1-2). Corruption becomes a buzzword or sound bite that, at
its uttering, conjures up images that may or may not be accurate. In fact, these images
may not only be less than accurate, they may be so completely incorrect as to be absurd
in the eyes of the contextual audience. The concept of corruption “in itself makes no
sense because the distinction [at its base] does not arise” (Clapham, 1985, p. 50).
Rephrased, corruption, as defined above, often becomes a catalyst for discussion and
focus illustrating the non-western nature of non-western cultures. Although seemingly
obvious, this latter observation is key, and therein potentially typifies one of the root
causes for miscommunication and misinterpretation of the constitution of corruption:
extreme ambiguity. One definition of corruption originated with James Madison, who
stated that,
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Corruption meant the overstepping for private gain of officially recognized
boundaries of public office . . . and the assumption it rests on is that the scope of
public office is delineated by clear boundaries, and that there are unambiguous
rules of conduct that assure that office holders will adhere to them. Should such
constraints lose their clarity, or become subject of controversy, the definition
would become inappropriate (as cited in Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 3).
This is a very common definition that has permeated society throughout the world.
Similarly, and in the vernacular, corruption is often defined as the actions of public
officials in pursuit of private financial gain.
Corruption is most commonly defined by Nye (1967) as “behavior, which
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal,
close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (p. 419). Nye discusses
corruption within the context of government, since this is where the vast majority of
research and use of the syntax currently resides. It is important to note that Nye expands
what is notionally defined as financial gains as a result of deviation from “formal duties
of public role” to include status gains also. Nye’s definition, upon an out-of-context
literal translation, leaves open the possibility that such positive utility can be applied to a
non-individualized entity, such as a regime, country and/or state. In other words, Nye
supports corruption as being the deviant behavior that results in any type of positive
utility for the perpetrator, such utility being financial or non-financial, and such
perpetrator being an individual, group, community or party.
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An argument further supporting corrupt behavior extending to state as well as
civil society is suggested by Harsch (1993), who claims that a “legalistic definition has its
limitations. It assumes a differentiated society in which public office is considered
separate from private interest. Yet, in much of the Third Word, the actual distinctions
between the state realm and ‘civil society’ are far from clear” (p. 34).
Mushtaq Khan (as cited in Amundsen, 1999, p. 2) defines corruption in a manner
very similar to Nye, and states that corruption is “behavior that deviates from the formal
rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority
because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power or status”. Nye’s definition
was not intended to allow cultural adaptability in its application to other cultures and
context. Nonetheless, it is “the most widely used in the English language literature” (Sun
& Johnson, 2009, p. 2).
In Uganda, the Public Serve Review and Re-Organization Commission defined
corruption as “conduct or practice by a public official or private individual done in
flagrant violation of existing rules and procedures for the realization of personal or group
gains” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 188). This definition initially appears to be widely
applicable, as it transcends financial issues as well as a government-centric focus.
However, upon closer review, we note that this definition avoids cultural and contextual
nuances, and instead establishes “rule and procedures” as the basis for normative
comparison. Cultural and contextual nuances are hypothesized and supported by this
dissertation as essential.
We must also keep in mind that corruption is not always performed and/or
condoned by a person on behalf of his or her gain of utility. Instead, corruption can be
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considered the collective actions or policies of groups, communities, political parties and
other such collectives of individuals where the benefits of such corrupt practices benefit a
group or common cause, rather than a singular individual. Of course, by its very nature
and connotation, these benefits cannot occur without an associated and direct expense of
some other individual, group or cause. Mendilow and Peleg (2014) supports this
relationship between benefits, and expenses by stating, “The authoritative distribution of
resources in society invariable results in winners and losers. Where and how are we to
draw the line between policy and corruption” (2014, p. 4)?
Tanzi (1998) has performed considerable research on corruption, and defines it
through the following commonsense phrase: “Like an elephant, while it [corruption] may
be difficult to describe, corruption is generally not difficult to recognize when observed”
(p. 564). Sometimes the simplest approach is the best approach. This may correctly
describe the tactic by the World Bank, where it defines corruption as “the abuse of public
office for private gain” (Haller & Shore, 2005, p. 2).
A corrupt act can be defined as an action against the expected behavior of not
only an office, but also contrary to established laws and rules. De Sardan defines
corruption as “a form of secret social exchange through which those in power (political or
administrative) take personal advantage, of one type or another, of the influence hey
exercise in virtue of their mandate or their function” (as cited in Amundsen, 1999, p. 2).
This particular definition is very broad reaching, and unlike others, has broad application
to both the public as well as private sectors if read out of context. However, the proper
context in which De Sardan defined corruption intended to limit its application to public
office: “In sum, almost every definition (or rather conceptualization) of corruption has a
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principal focus on the state and politics (“the corrupted”) and a “demand side”
perspective” (as cited in Amundsen, 1999, p. 2). Here, demand side refers to those in a
position to be corrupted, while supply side would refer to those enticing officials to act
corruptly as a result of payment, favors, and other incentives. Amundsen (1999)
recognizes that there may be corruption within the private sector, and/or “without any
state agency or state official being involved. However, most definitions of corruption will
exclude this intra-societal corruption, and emphasizes corruption as a state-society
relationship” (p. 3).
Most people use legal definitions and connotations to define corruption
(Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 4). However, this definition avoids the application of
context and culture when defining and evaluating corruption issues. Yet, since legal
definitions are supposed to lack ambiguity, they also infer tolerance of types of
corruption that are not defined by rules or by law, but are nevertheless perceived by
society as immoral, unethical and/or improper. As a result, laws that do exist “may arise
from corrupt processes and lack legitimacy and consistent meaning” (Johnston, 1997, p.
62).
In the vernacular, some have divided corruption into categories of a narrow or
legalistic approach, and a public interest approach. These
two [approaches] assume that existence of a public interest that rises above the
law, despite the fact that it is not necessarily defined in clear terms or encoded in
legal documents. Such a public interest serves not only to direct behavior but to
validate or censure the performance of power holders and the law itself. Forms of
behavior that are considered corrupt by universal schema may be judged
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otherwise by the public at large, while the behavior of power holders that is
popularly believed to sacrifice the public interest would be considered corrupt
regardless of its legal definition (Mendilow, & Peleg, 2014, p. 6).
Some scholars have attempted to use other senses, such as color, to further define
and refine the context of corruption. For example, Heidenhemier used a color-coding
system to visualize corruption as it relates to mass public opinion, and to what is legally
defined (Gong & Wang, 2013, pp. 571-572). Black indicates consensus between both
definitions: gray is ambiguous and white signifies agreement by the public that an action
that is legally defined as corrupt is not (Heidenheimer, Johnston, & Levine, 1970, pp.
149-164; Mendilow, & Peleg, 2014, p. 6).
Tavits aggregates the commonly agreed opinions and findings of academic
experts such as Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Sandholtz
and Koetzle (2000) and Treisman (2000) by stating, “Corruption is usually understood as
a ‘misuse of public office for private gain’” (2010, p. 1258).
As previously stated, the World Bank’s definition of corruption is “the abuse of
public power for private benefit” (Haller & Shore, 2005, p. 2). By comparison, the
definition provided by Transparency International, one of the world’s largest scholarly
entities, focused entirely upon corruption is, “The misuse of entrusted power for private
gains” (Mendilow & Peleg, 2014, p. 2). Both of these are very similar in their intent, as
both mandate that corruption be within the context of a governmental or publicly
entrusted position, and that the result of such improper behavior be private gains or
benefit. The choice of words here is critical, since many other definitions focus upon
financial benefits. Here, the private benefits alluded to by Transparency International and
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the World Bank’s definition for corruption can clearly be non-financial, and might
include such benefits as influence, prestige, favors, power and status. However, drawing
this conclusion would be wrong and against the both entities’ intentions, each being
tightly focused upon financial wrongdoing and/or associated inappropriately obtained
financial benefits.
Burke (2007) divided corruption into two categories. First, corruption can be
interpreted as “undue influence: the use of political authority to extend social and
economic power beyond the limits set by the constitutional principles for the authoritative
distribution of resources and the resolution of societal conflicts” (p. 398). Burke’s (2007)
second form of corruption is the “use of social and economic power to gain political ends
in breach of the basic principles by which political resources [including political power]
are distributed. As wealth, is power” (p. 398).
Burke’s concerns about political and state corruption are further confirmed by
Dobel (1978), who alleges the “corruption of state theorists, such as Thucydides, Plato,
Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau”, and feels that “corruption was not a particular
behavior, but a situation that grew out of permanent and extensive inequalities of wealth
or political power [or both] that erode common moral commitments. The loss of the sense
of civic duty and loyalty means that the primary attitude among citizens is wary
competition to preserve what one possesses, and to gain more if possible” (p. 960).
Burke (2007) further defines corruption as “erosion”, where such erosion is “a
state of inflammation” that results from authoritative individuals, groups or institutions
that exploit their power to increase the share prescribed to them at the expense of others”
(p. 344). This particular definition deserves some comment, since here, Burke has opined
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that corruption is not necessarily obtaining private gains as a result of abusing public trust
or position. Rather, he specifically makes it clear that such private gains are at the
expense of others. This is different than other, more absolute definitions of corruption,
since Burke has purposefully used a relativistic approach. Said differently, if such private
gains were to occur as a result of abusing the power of public office, and such gains were
not previously available to anybody, then these actions would, under Burke’s definition,
not be defined as corrupt.
Burke’s observation is further confirmed by Mendilow and Peleg (2014), who
state that corruption involves a “shift in the manner in which resources are distributed,
and hence is discerned by members of society that are not implicated in it first and
foremost by the denial of resources. By definition, then, corruption involves winners, but
all [other options and all other actions as well] involve losers” (p. 15). Sandholtz and
Koetzle (2000) provide a potential core definition of corruption as,
A distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere is a recognition
that corrupt acts involve an exchange, in which one party offers inducements
[frequently but not necessarily monetary] to a public official in return for special
policy or administrative advantages, or ‘political goods’ . . . [and] the sense that
such exchanges are improper, that, they violate established norms (pp. 34-35).
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) also argue that corruption “refers to practices that are
considered improper under Western norms” (p. 34). This is clearly an absolutism
perspective.
Aggregated definitions of corruption abound. One such definition postured by
Mendilow and Peleg (2014) suggests defining corruption as, “The use of public office to

52
undermine the norms delineating the boundaries separating social and economic power
from political authority in order to advance individual, group or institutional benefits”
(pp. 14-15). This is an interesting attempt to define corruption within a universal context.
However, casual observation disproves the utility of this aggregate definition, since it
avoids any type of cultural or socially embodied factors.
Corruption can also be defined through inference, as a result of specific intended
consequences. For example, “According to its [The Supreme Court] verdict in Citizens
United v. Federal Elections Commission, the only permissible restrictions on free speech
are those necessary to prevent ‘corruption or the appearance of corruption’” (Mendilow
& Peleg, 2014, p. 16). Since the definition of corruption is both ambiguous as well as
controversial, by extension, the right to free speech in the United States might also be
made ambiguous. This particular definition has an unintended consequence since this free
speech, as granted by the United States Constitution, is considered so inviolate that likely
infringement upon the Federal Election Commission appears to be expected. In other
words, corruption, perhaps in the form of burning a flag, and/or non-violently expressing
various opinions of hatred, might be condoned when, according to the court’s findings,
such behavior might otherwise be prohibited. Making this particular legal finding even
more challenging to interpret is the context and definition of corruption within the syntax.
The field of corruption, as well as the syntax, verbiage and idioms used to
describe and communicate thoughts are themselves, suboptimum, since corruption is
currently so perfectly ill defined, ambiguous, and contextual. Mendilow and Peleg (2014)
make an argument that the “corruption of which governments are accused often cannot be
understood by the tools that are offered by the definition of corruption current in the
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literature,” and that corruption is, at its foundational core, “a conflict over the answers to
the fundamental questions of what is meant by good government and what constitutes
corruption” (p. 17).
In general, people and institutions often become what they are perceived to be. In
the case of corruption-ridden regions of the world, the people and entities within these
regions become corrupt if they perceive their own government and culture as similarly
corrupt. Mendilow and Peleg (2014) states that “societies with high social perception of
corruption have experienced a viscous cycle of social distrust, limited governmental
functioning and consequently, pervasive corruption” (pp. 18-19).
Fiske-Rusciano (2014) discusses the importance of trust and how corruption is
“characterized by the betrayal of such trust” (p. 258). Hence, corruption can be anything
that betrays such trust, be it between people, communities, governments, ethnicities, or
other demographic metrics. This broad definition of corruption is overly simplistic, and
clearly ambiguous. Nonetheless, this simplistic approach may prove useful as research
continues. Resolving current ambiguities and confusion requires thinking outside the box,
and the trust-based definition offered by Fiske-Rusciano represents a unique, objective
approach.
Corruption-based norms are “the misuse of public office for private gain”
(Sandholtz & Gray, 2003, p. 765). Rusciano (2014) notes that “international norms infers
interpretation driven by world opinion . . . but the role is unspecified, while ‘misuse’ and
‘private gain’ maintain their mystery” (p. 28). International Organizations and NGOs
have created anticorruption regimes, policies, and practices, but these entities’
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involvement within these efforts is generally dominated, as well as targeted, to the global
elite. (Sandholtz & Gray, 2003, p. 774).
Warren (2006) notes “where an exclusive elite simply holds to different norms
than the broader public, however odious, we would not usually say they are ‘corrupt’” (p.
804). Rusciano (2014) states, “If the public does not recognize norms supposedly
disseminated by international institutions then they are not aware whether elite follow
those norms; corruption implies a public evaluation of elite behavior that would not exist
here” (p. 28). Ivanov (2007) maintains that “The emotive term ‘corruption’ has masked
the gap between global and local discourse” and the effort to prescribe similar policies
from Nigeria to Bulgaria ended in various how-to’s but little of what to fight” (p. 28).
Current definitions for corruption are contradictory, ambiguous, and confusing. It is
amazing that such a superficially mature topic, like corruption, can be so immature,
undeveloped and in need of massive clarification.
Corruption and Contextual Considerations
Rusciano (2014) notes that the Business International (BI) measure of average
country scores for corruption indicators, as well as the Transparency International Index
of Corruption, have a critical and fundamental problem where the definitions upon which
the surveys are based vary across cultures, and that the indexes are produced primarily by
quantitative analysis of qualitative data. As a result, these purported absolute metrics
depend upon the perceptions of western analysts, rather than upon the local citizens
within the respective regions of study (p. 28). Rusciano (2014) attempts to define
corruption by looking at the problem in reverse, and starts with trying to figure out what
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people think about corruption; he then uses reverse engineering to determine what
attributes are inherent within these localized and culturally specific perceptions.
Rusciano (2014) quotes John Locke: “Words, in their primary or immediate signification
stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of [they] who use them” (p. 28).
Societal norms often dictate what is defined as corruption and what is not. In the
Middle East, “bestowing benefits on kin may confirm to social norms of loyalty to the
family” and thus, are viewed as non-corrupt behavior, regardless of legalities that would
define it otherwise (Gillespie & Okruhlik, 1988, p. 59). This is a common theme.
Mendilow (2014) further states that “A new approach is indeed required to escape the
assumption that all regimes are based, or should be based, on rational legal authority; the
proposition that the boundaries of public offices are unambiguous, or the premise that
public opinion is more or less uniform” (p. 7). Social norms provide excuses for
corruption, as currently defined, in various regions of the world. Many of these regions
have regimes and laws that are themselves ambiguous and do not stand up to the rigors of
time. As a result, they fail the standards of legal mandate. This observation could be
further expanded to imply that neither law nor legal basis has anything to do, whatsoever,
with corruption, and that the entire syntax is based upon abiding by social norms.
The existence of a democratic government has long been anecdotally related to
the degree of corruption, or lack thereof. However, extensive quantitative analyses show
that,
corruption has no affect upon economic growth in democracies, while nondemocracies suffer significant economic harm from corruption. This might be
because democracies and the rule-of-law as well as the electoral prevent the
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existence of corruption from becoming as institutionalized as it has been seen to
occur in non-democracies (Drury, Krieckhaus, & Lusztig, 2006, p. 121).
The issue of time is also critically imperative. The cultures and time sensitivities
of the United States and the majority of western and euro-centric culture are based upon
immediate gratification and fairly short time spans. By comparison, the timelines for
relationships, programs and government action is much longer in Asia. This is
particularly interesting, since a very strong relationship exists in Asia between corruption
and institutional trust. Trust, regardless of context, be it interpersonal or institutional,
requires time to develop, while “corruption is often considered as an absolute, and time
independent” (Chang & Chu, 2006, p. 259).
Rocha, Brown, and Cloke (2011) states, “The concept of corruption is frequently
represented as relating to social practices that violate established rules and norms” further
discusses societal norms (p. 159). However, “corrupt practices are often only possible
because they, in fact, draw on existing institutional mechanisms and cultural dispositions
that grant them a certain social approval and legitimacy (Rocha, et al., 2011, p. 159).
Locke suggests that a “nation’s foundation is based upon a constitution made by
the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions and moral, civil and social
habitudes of the people” (as cited in Burke, 2007, p. 398). This makes every nation
different from every other nation, which, by definition, makes the definition of corruption
both different for every context and also non-constant, as people within different nations
modify their respective positions on issues of moral, civil, and social habitudes. We need
look no farther than our own country to find examples of widespread agreement on
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corruption circa 2016 that, humorously and ironically, contradicts the same opinions of
just 10, 20 or 50 years earlier.
It is important to note that “Corruption can be a way of life in certain countries,
while it is a criminal activity in others” (Chun, 2009, p. 173). Nonetheless, Chun (2009)
further states that “not all the corruption seems to have the same effect; certain types of
corruption seem to have a less threatening effect than others” (p. 173). Fiske-Rusciano
(2014) points out that “Rosen (2010) asked the people of the Middle East what they
thought about corruption, and found that while the West thinks in terms of bribery and
nepotism, in the Middle east corruption is ‘the failure to share any largess you have
received with those with whom you have formed ties of dependence’” (p. 257). Clearly,
as a result of context, foreign definitions of corruption can be superficially concise, yet
ambiguous and contradictory when compared to alternative definitions (Brooks, 2010).
Cultural context endorsing corruption is contradicted by Rwandan President Paul
Kagame’s firing of his own cousin, “which has loss-of-face implications for a family as a
whole in Rwandan society” (Streeter & McNaught, 2008, p. 12). Despite challenges and
controversy, Rwanda is a success story, perhaps as a direct result of its anti-corruption
efforts and subsequent growth. Streeter and McNaught (2008) attribute Rwanda’s
exceptional GDP growth of 6.4% from 1996-2006, despite losing nearly 10% of its
population over the preceding 15 years to genocide, and claim, “Rwanda is heralded as a
country where anti-corruption efforts, security and accountability are consistently at the
forefront of the government’s attention” (p. 2). Transparency and openness is not
necessarily endemic to African or any other cultures. Yet, in Rwanda, President Kagame
created a Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) comprised of many members of the
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American and international business community (Street & McNaught, 2008, p. 17). As a
result, “Out the wreckage of the genocide, Rwanda is rapidly emerging as a model of
post-conflict recovery and progress. Many people are calling the Rwanda success a
‘model for others to follow’ because of its ‘demonstrated commitment to cleaning up
corruption’” (Streeter & McNaught, 2008, p. 20).
In the case of Sudan and the Janjaweed, the international audience is quick to
claim corruption and culpability of the Khartoum government and President Bashir.
Looking deeper, though, we need to remember that the military of Sudan is comprised of
full time soldiers, as well as volunteers, called the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). The
PDF “are volunteers who aid the armed forces but the Janjaweed are ‘gangs of armed
bandits’ with which the government has no relations whatsoever” (Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur, 2005, p. 3). However, the PDF are allegedly assisting and cooperating
with the Janjaweed. The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur stated, “When militias attack
jointly with armed forces, it can be held that they act under the effective control of the
Government,” and that “when militias are incorporated in the PDF and wear uniforms,
they acquire, from the viewpoint of international law the status of organs of the Sudan.
Their actions and their crimes could be legally attributed to the Government” (2005, p.
4).
Hence, in this particular case, the Government of Sudan has attempted to establish
a legal separation, and non-culpability, rather than social acceptability. These efforts have
not been received well by the international community, and so sanctions remain imposed
on Sudan, as international bodies tend to agree with the Darfur Commission (2005) that
“the large majority of attacks on villages conducted by the [Janjaweed] militia [in
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conjunction and/or in collaboration with the PDF) have been undertaken with the
acquiescence of State officials” (p. 5). The Commission further notes that the
Government of Sudan may claim that their activities were part of a tactic of war against
rebel groups and militants actively opposing the sovereignty of Sudan. This
notwithstanding, the Commission (2005) emphasized that “if it is established that the
Government used the militias as a ‘tactic of war’, even in instances where the Janjaweed
may have acted without evidence of Government support, Government officials may
incur criminal responsibility for joint criminal enterprise to engage in indiscriminate
attacks against civilians and murder of civilians” (p. 5).
In the instance of Sudan, has corruption occurred within individuals, or within the
government? Has an individual or individuals within the government benefited, in some
fashion, by the alleged genocidal efforts against the people of Darfur? Similarly, has the
government acted in a corrupt fashion by western and euro-centric standards in an effort
to favor one group of people over another? Further complicating this argument is whether
or not the Government of Sudan’s tactical efforts against insurgents, with or without the
assistance of the Janjaweed, are justified through Justwar theory. Allegations of genocide
have been frequently levied against President Bashir and the Sudan government by a
variety of states and NGO’s. However, genocide requires clear “intent” (Campbell,
2015), and can intent be clearly established if the Janjaweed militias are, as claimed by
the Sudanese government, operating to a substantial degree independent of the
government? The answers to these questions are not easily found unless and/or until
corruption can be properly defined and agreed upon by world actors.
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Rusciano (2014) postulates that the core definition of corruption includes key
elements, characterizes vis-à-vis world opinion from corruption’s victims’ perspectives,
and that “prominent among these elements is the identification of corruption by its costs
it incurs for its victims: the deliverable denial of goods and services to which they, [the
victims] feel entitled” (p. 29). Rusciano (2014) further states that confusion occurs as a
result of
the manner in which one measures world opinions. Hence, the opinions of nations
are often represented by the specific distribution of opinions on an issue within a
given nation, the leaders’ ‘official opinions’ on the issue, or media content
analyses, while the opinions of individuals are often represented by international
poll results from individual countries combined into an aggregate’ (p. 30).
This is the problem with surveys and quantitative methodologies when applied to
qualitative topics such as corruption, transparency, and other types of contextual issues.
In this case, “the combined survey cannot measure the variations introduced within the
various nations; it assumes that models must approach world opinion as the opinions of
individuals, [and] not the opinions of nations” (Rusciano, 2014, p. 30).
Page and Shapiro (1992) support using country-level aggregate public opinion
when analyzing issues and effects upon foreign policy (p. 8). Specifically, “What matters
for foreign policy makers and studies of public opinion and foreign policy is collective
public opinion, rather than individual public opinion” (Page and Shapiro, 1992, pp.1534). So, if public opinion is analogous to world opinion, what does “world opinion”
mean? Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano (1990) define world opinion as having the following
five components: 1) A moral component, a pragmatic component, 2) The power of the
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world opinion, 3) The nation’s image or reputation (in world opinion), 4) The world
considered as a unit, and 5) The threat of international isolation,” and further postulate
that “world opinion refers to the moral judgments of observers which actors must heed in
the international arena, or risk isolation as a nation” (pp. 305-322).
Haller and Shore (2005) take the stance that “anthropologists sometimes become
a part of the corrupt patterns of behavior, where such patterns are, perhaps, not seen as
corruption onsite in the field, but could be seen as such in one’s own society” (pp. 15-16).
This is further shown by western society and, more notably, the United States’ desire to
control Iraq's oil, and may justify and once again rest upon “corruption-based patronage
but aligned with US interests” (Le Billon, 2005, p. 685). Corruption in Iraq is well
known, but the United States has been equally complicit. Le Billon (2005) exposes the
United States’ motives to be themselves corrupt to a degree, in pursuit of foreign
relations goals that, in the opinion and judgment of the United States, supersede negative
repercussions of corruption (p. 685).
Corruption is not always a proactive, preplanned activity. Dereliction of duty, to
include lack of action and/or gross incompetency, could represent a form of corruption.
The same conclusion can be extended to policies, legislation and system (as well as those
who support such systems), and evokes Burke’s (2007) notion that “behavior of public
servants need not be illegal to be corrupt” (p. 398). In other words, corruption can
potentially be defined not only by what we do, but also by what is purposefully or
accidently left undone.
Corruption is often used to maintain the status quo, and is an alleged immoral tool
used by those in power to achieve these objectives. For example, in Iraq “Saddam
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Hussein resorted to corruption in order to prevent the development of civic groups that
could oppose his regime” (Jain, 2011, p. 4). This leads some to see, and potentially
conclude, that “some dictators have a benevolent side to them, [whereby] corruption is
accompanied by sharing some of the wealth” (Jain, 2011, p. 4).
Rusciano (2014) observes that “it is important to realize that many social
scientists do not equate illegality with corruption,” since, unless harm to public interest
can be proven, it is exceedingly difficult to conclude that a corrupt act has occurred on
basis of illegality, alone” (p. 248). Unfortunately, this latter element is, by far, the litmus
test used by the majority of American citizens, politicians, and western society when
conversationally defining corruption.
Tierney (2013) notes,
Iraqis frequently describe nepotism not as a civic problem, but as a moral duty.
Whoever gets a leadership position is expected to move members of his family
into available spots. The patriarch of one tribe south of Baghdad said, ‘I told my
children not to participate in any outside groups or clubs . . . We don’t want
distractions. We have a dynasty to preserve’ (n.p.).
This approach is further attested by Tierney (2013) with respect to Iraq, where “social
priority is the family, clan and tribe, not the civic professional groups that are so common
in America, the pillars of civil society that observers . . . have been crediting for the
promotion of democracy” (n.p.).
Succinctly identifying corruption with other people, parties, or groups, from time
to time, is a necessary requisite for western society where we seem to be socially
compelled to find corruption. Fiske-Rusciano (2014) supports this by stating,
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First, the ‘finding’ of the disturbing [bad] apples [of corruption] becomes
necessary to assure that all is well during times of economic distress . . . when
public confidence shows a deliberate demonizing of a sector of the economy or
citizenry, and can turn into a useful scapegoating. Two consequences of this
narrative are that there is a ‘silencing,’ a loss of rights, and a public betrayal, as
we are told who to fear and mistrust a home and abroad. Authorities are not held
accountable and there need not be any true problem solving; simply a distraction
from what is actually going on. A fearful citizenry is easily manipulated and
demand little, leaving an open door for the abuse of power (p. 250).
Corruption can, and does, permeate post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa
as well as other parts of the world. Arowosegbe (2011) discusses the relevance of Claude
Ake's political thought for state reconstruction in post-conflict Africa, and posits that a
complete “transformation of the state is a central component of peacebuilding and postconflict transition” (p. 651). Instead of attempting to rehabilitate or correct issues, a
complete rebuilding of the state from ground up is recommended as a requisite for
achieving a sustainable democratic reconstruction in post-conflict Africa (Arowosegbe,
2011).
State behavior, with respect to sharing and influencing other states’ cultures, has
changed a lot over the past 50 years. Since the Cold War, “we have experienced each
other and transmitted culture sometimes when and where there was little such
transmission before, and have done it at a much faster speed and higher volume. This is
not to say that we are homogenous . . . but rather that we must pay attention to culture
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transmission, shared experiences, and contextualized memory” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p.
254).
Having a narrow, focused belief in the prevalence of corruption is corrupting on
its own accord. This is, arguably, what has occurred, and continues to occur, in the
United States, Europe, and western society. Westernized practices and efforts sometimes,
arguably oftentimes, do more harm than good, and in many cases, achieve exactly the
opposite of what was intended. Case in point is the United States’ involvement in Iraq,
where, “worse than the waste and unfinished projects, is the culture of corruption that
was established. Through kickbacks, money laundering, theft and bribery, the country’s
development continues to be hindered as its resources are diverted and political patronage
alliances assume unstable control” (Wood, 2013).
Corruption, and/or any type of behavior that is non-constructive can promote and
accelerate continued and/or worsened negative behavior. Kahn (2003) refers to this as the
Logic of Reciprocity. More specifically, this refers to how “individual[s] who lack faith in
their peers can be expected to resist contributing to public goods, thereby inducing still
others to withhold their cooperation as a means of retaliating. In this self-sustaining
atmosphere of distrust, even strong [and costly] regulatory incentives are likely to be
ineffective in promoting desirable behavior” (pp. 71-72). Post-crisis Turkey “associates
corruption with historical and cultural specificities, and contradictory in terms of its
counter-productive anti-corruption strategies” (Bedı̇ rhanoğlu, 2007, p. 1239). Corruption
fosters distrust and encourages public cynicism. As a result, in some parts of the world a
cyclic and self-destructive feedback loop occurs. For example, in Mexico corruption is
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considered “so entrenched by the country’s citizens that, for many, stopping corruption is
neither attempted nor expected” (Morris, 1999, p. 623).
Nepotism, in many parts of the world, is not seen as corruption, but rather, it is a
family responsibility. In fact, “you are expected to give jobs to your kin; to not do so is
corrupt (Rosen, 2010)” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014. p. 257). As stated earlier in this chapter,
“Rosen (2010) asked the people of the Middle East what they thought about corruption,
and found that while the West thinks in terms of bribery and nepotism, in the Middle east
corruption is ‘the failure to share any largess you have received with those with whom
you have formed ties of dependence’” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2104, p. 257).
The role of media and how journalists have the power to support or modify the
truth with respect to a particular agenda can lead and/or enhance corruption that is
already occurring. Fiske-Rusciano (2014) discusses how using the media and the
purposeful betrayal of public trust “to incite riots through racist commentary or
purposeful lies” (p. 258). This example of serious corruption occurs nearly daily within
the United States’ media. Although these actions are not illegal, and although they cannot
be officially punished, manipulation of and by the media is a form of corruption. The
Polish media, like other media worldwide, exacerbate the confusion about proper
behavior, corruption, and lack thereof:
The lack of clear definition of corruption reinforces confusion even further since
corruption as a general term [in Poland] is used in connection with common
crimes committed by public officials, the police and customs officers, traders of
children. The lack of clarity concerning the definition of corruption is the cause of
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many misunderstandings concerning corruption and its remedies (Fuszara, 1999,
p. 281).
As a result, syntax and perspective are vitally important when discussing corruption, due
to its extremely broad spectrum and ambiguity of its defined meaning.
Leaders, just like people, can change as a result of circumstance. Hoge (2013)
writes about President Rousseff in Brazil, stating, “Some believe, however, that the new
rules changed once they gained power. Their goal became to keep power and to have
access to public funds for their own objectives, causing disillusionment among its
(Brazil’s government) supporters” (as cited in Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 260).
“Hong Kong has become one of the most corruption-free societies in the world,”
and has a corresponding very low tolerance for corruption (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 569).
Research indicates “a more significant impact of informal institution than formal ones on
corruption tolerance levels” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 569). Here again, we must note that
the definition of corruption used for research and for associated conclusions is based
upon westernized constructs. Hence, it is, perhaps, not without coincidence that Hong
Kong is one of the most westernized countries/regions in Asia.
Government officials in corrupt countries grossly misuse and reduce the
effectiveness of foreign aid development funds provided from donor countries. Although
“aid policies [of the donor countries] do not differ as a function of the corruption level of
the recipient country,” it is interesting to note that the “less corrupt donor states allocate
more aid to less corrupt recipient states than to corrupt recipients, whereas corrupt donor
states do not make such a clear distinction” (Schudel, 2008, p. 507). This behavior
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provides empirical confirmation that corruption not only tolerates, but tacitly encourages
corruption, regardless of the state’s size, status, or stature.
War and Corruption
The purpose of war is “to capture disputed land or some other resource, but with
war, lives are lost and production is sacrificed” (Becsi & Lahiri, 2006, p. 3). Hence, if
enhanced production and prosperity for citizens are paramount, then war, itself, can be
argued as a form of corruption against the state’s citizens, since war compromises the
economic success and status of the state. The concept and nuances of war are also
important because of the significant financial, stature, and other incentives that are
integral to a war economy.
The costs of warfare are significant and fall into two categories. The first cost of
war is foregone production, as resources are diverted towards warfare (Becsi & Lahiri,
2006, p. 4). Collier (2007) further estimates this cost as “being roughly the equivalent of
one year’s GDP for the typical developing country engaged in civil war.” The second
cost of war is death, disease, and displacement, where “the human cost has not been
incorporated into modern analyses of conflict, though it can easily exceed the production
costs” (Becsi & Lahiri, 2006, p. 4). Collier (2007) estimates that the “human cost of
warfare” as being “roughly the equivalent of another one to two years of the initial GDP
for the typical developing country engaged in civil war,” and that this cost “may even be
higher because total war deaths are not always easily measured.”
Becsi and Lahiri (2006) find that “an increase in foreign aid to the warring
countries may increase war efforts when arms protect lives in a significant way” (p. 3).
This is counterintuitive, but has been proven to be true. Hence, the financial support of
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another country involved with lethal conflict, and/or war actually hurts more than it
helps. This flies in the face of common sense alternatives, since to do nothing may be
ethically challenging. However, in many cases, non-assistance, from a financial
perspective, is exactly what should have been promoted. Becsi and Lahiri (2006) find,
“An increase in foreign aid to two symmetric warring countries will increase the
employment of solider and the imports of arms in both countries if the effect of arms on
the protection of the lives of soldiers is very significant,” and that “An increase in foreign
aid to warring countries increases their income and therefore their marginal disutility
from loss of life increases” (p. 12). This reduces soldiers employed in warfare. On the
other hand, Becsi and Lahiri (2006) suggest that “an increase in income [because of
foreign aid by other means] and the resulting increase in the marginal disutility for death
induces a country to import more military hardware, which can protect the lives of
solider,” and further assert that “foreign aid to the two warring countries can actually
increase both the employment of soldiers and the imports of military hardware in the two
warring countries” (p. 13).
Within the context of war, it is important to distinguish between the death of
military forces and all others who are not part of the military fighting force. To do this,
war mortality is divided into several categories. For example, Battle Deaths is defined as,
“Civilians and soldiers killed in the course of combat,” and Total War Deaths is defined
as, “Battle Deaths plus deaths from disease, starvation, riots, and crime. Battle Deaths are
more easily measured than the latter, and can be grossly undermined in magnitude. For
example, Total War deaths in the DRC from 1998-2001 were six times greater than
Battle Deaths” (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005, pp. 145-166).

69
According to Henderson (2010), “Civil wars have become increasingly prevalent
in their incidence, and increasingly deadly in their result” (pp. 248-256). Despite their
frequency, the justification for violence is often based upon doing what is “right”, which
is otherwise defined as Justwar Theory. Justwar Theory requires
that a nation at war respect proportionality both before it goes to war, jus ad
bellum, and in the way it fights a war, jus in bello. To respect proportionality is to
know or estimate on good evidence that the whole war, and the tactics used in the
war, will not generate more evil and harm, and costs than they will generate good
and help and benefits (Betz, 2005, p. 137).
For example, a view commonly expressed by many, albeit in hindsight, is that “on the
proportionality standards for a justwar, this [Iraq] war is a miserable failure” (Betz, 2005,
p. 137).
A Justwar Index (JWI) was developed to help researchers evaluate and determine
the extent to which various conflicts could be rationalized or confirmed as “just” (Dorn,
2011, p. 242). The criteria for a Justwar are, “1) Declared by lawful authority, 2) Cause
must be just, 3) War must be fought with the right intention, 4) War must be fought with
the right means, 5) There must be a real probability of winning, and 6) War must have
been undertaken as last resort when all other means for fighting the injustice have been
attempted and failed” (Palter, 1964, p. 214).
Justwar Theory and the mandated prerequisites for justifying armed conflict can
be described and defined by the “long-standing Justwar tradition; Just Cause, Right
Intent, Net benefit, Legitimate Authority, Last Resort, Proportionality of Means and
Right Conduct” (Dorn, 2011, p. 242). Lethal conflict, often in the form of war, is
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frequently avoidable, and because such conflict commonly fails to achieve stated
objectives, the motivations of its architects are questionable. Hence, if the conflict is
orchestrated for the benefit of certain parties rather than for the benefit of the leaders’
constituents, these actions might be classified as corruption.
To further expand upon the nuances of corruption and war, some facets of nuclear
war are discussed herein. An analogy to nuclear war is used as the basis for the following
“extermination” discussion. Palter (1964) discusses Ramsey’s and Anscombe’s claim that
nuclear war can be morally justified as a resulting “Double Effect”, whereby, “one is not
morally responsible for unintended effects of an action which otherwise is not morally
blameworthy, even when the unintended effects are foreseen” (p. 211). Anscombe’s
argument is based on the premise that self-defense is permissible and that society cannot
exist without some degree of coercive power. Interestingly, it is the certainty of death
from nuclear weapons that differentiates nuclear weapons from other types of weapons,
such as biological weapons and/or obliteration bombing, despite both techniques
resulting in massive fatalities of women, children, and non-combatants. However, the
non-combatant immunity principle is not morally absolute if nuclear weapons and other
massively deadly, non-nuclear options are available. Palter (1964) asserts, “Of the two
alternative courses; preparation for nuclear war and unilateral disarmament; each
establishes the ‘absurdity’ of the other . . . and yet morality transcends the stalemate’, and
justifies unilateral disarmament as the only rationale action and the only hope for the
world” (p. 212).
In Afghanistan, there were recently two primary international missions using
armed forces. One was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while the
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other was Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Each had different mandates, histories,
and approaches to the use of force. Dorn (2011) finds that the ISAF mission is
considerably more “justified” than OEF, though still “ethically deficient” (p. 242).
Regardless of the approach, evaluation of justwar criteria is exceptionally judgmental,
subjective and by its very nature prone to error in hindsight. We need look no further than
the first prerequisite of “just cause,” since what might be defined as just by one culture or
nation might be viewed very differently by another. Nonetheless, this is currently our
state-of-the art argument within the current paradigm of Justwar Theory.
War and violence are commonly used as tools for achieving political, strategic,
and/or economic objectives “because the goal of reducing violent conflict is nearly
universally acceptable, [and] these varieties of noninterventionism are rarely scrutinized”
(Trosky, 2015, p. ix). Social psychological peace research (SPPR) is an area of study
focused upon how various psychological factors affect efforts for peace and/or the
proclivity of war, foreign policy, economic and sovereign border issues notwithstanding
(Trosky, 2015, p. ix-x). Despite SPPR’s and other research institutions’ focus upon war
and corruption, the interrelationships between these two topics are, at best, only weakly
understood.
Corruption and war are further related to Power Theory, and can be discussed
through the relationship between an individual’s or nation’s status and the corresponding
effect of a mismatch between economic, military, and political status upon a nation’s
propensity to respond and/or initiate conflict. From an individual’s perspective, many
past studies have showed how a person’s position in social hierarchy, as well as their
position from an external perspective, affects attitudes, often leading to frustration and/or
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aggressiveness. Galtung and other scholars focused past research on “Rank
Disequilibrium” (Wallace, 1971, p. 23), and suggested that an effect similar to that
experienced by individuals exists with nations. Wallace (1971) further states, “Nations
that rank high on such achieved status as economic and military capability, yet are denied
a correspondingly high rank on ascribed ones such as recognition and prestige, appear to
resent their lot” (p. 23). Extensive quantitative analysis using multi-variable regression
analyses were performed over the past 150 years, and arguably support a relationship
between status and war. For example, the greatest propensity and strongest correlation
between status mismatch and conflict occurs at the 15-year point (Wallace, 1971, p. 30).
Wallace (1971) goes on to say that “If we consider the 144-year period as a whole, the
evidence would appear to confirm that status inconsistency has an extremely important,
albeit long-range impact on the genesis of international war” (1971, p. 30).
Status and/or the desire to enhance status can be applied within the context of
corruption from the basis of an individual as well as a state, where the status
enhancement and corresponding positive utility that occurs from a just war that is
effectively unjust is, or can be, the desired outcome and the basis for corrupt behavior.
Individual Motivations for Corruption
Individual level motivations for corruption are primarily based upon fear of
punishment, though more recent literature, as stated by Tavits (2010, p. 1259) and based
upon Levi and Stoker (2000), “has extended the basic deterrence model by treating
compliance as a collective action problem.”
Why do people engage in corruption? Individual attitudes on what constitutes
corruption are shaped by “people’s understanding of what corruption is, their assessment
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of its impact on society, and their trust in the government as an effective enforcer of
corruption prevention” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 583). In the case of Estonia, Tavits
(2010) finds that “both public officials and citizens are more likely to engage in
corruption when they do not define corruption as wrong, as when they perceive that
corrupt behavior is widespread among their peers” (p. 1257). Is lack of trust of
government and/or peers a necessary and/or required condition for corruption? Tavits
(2010) finds “no support for the most common argument on corruption and compliance;
that people are more likely to engage in corruption when they are distrustful of their
fellow citizens or of government” (p. 1257).
Causes for corrupt behavior as well as associated “facilitating factors” were
derived by Huberts (1998a, p. 35) and are described by Table 3, below (as cited in De
Graaf, 2007, p. 68). Each of these causes was found to have an association and/or
correlation with some type of corrupt behavior. Although very interesting, the causes are
noticeably lacking with any type of interactivity and hierarchy. Furthermore, the causes
of corruption are potentially worthless unless, and until, a unified definition for
corruption can be identified.
The accumulation of wealth and the sustainment of ego and pride, for whatever
reason, pragmatically describes a potential motivating force behind corrupt activity. For
example, in Sudan in the 1970’s, the formerly established “mercantile class of traders and
farmers was overtaken by a middle class that was parasitic on the state and used
government contracting as a route to enrichment” (De Waal, 2014, p. 350). There was no
such mechanism, nor any middle class to speak of in Southern Sudan. The same situation
remained leading up to, and subsequent to, South Sudan declaring sovereignty 2011.

74
Table 3
Causes of Corruption

Note. (De Graaf, 2007, p. 68)
De Waal (2014) further reflects upon statements by Sudanese economists ElWathig Kameir and Ibrahim Kursany: “. . . the elite in the South wanted to enrich
themselves as quickly as possible as to be on a level with their colleagues in the North
(Sudan). This is why they have resorted to corruption as the quickest way of acquiring
money” (p. 350). Hence, it is not surprising to find South Sudan classified among the
very most corrupt countries in the world, ranked just one notch above Sudan; both
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countries received grades of “F”. (Abbas, Anderson, Dixon, Hurd & Raymond, 2015, pp.
1-2). To be fair, these rankings were compiled by Transparency International, an
organization that focuses upon quantitative metrics that, frankly, are highly subjective
and in direct contrast to many of the postulates developed by this dissertation. This being
said, having lived and worked in Sudan and South Sudan for many years, I must concur
that by any measure, Sudan and South Sudan are typified by corrupt behavior.
Tavits (2010) believes that the general public in non-communist countries is of
the general opinion that corruption is widespread. At the same time, the causes of
corruption, especially on the individual level, are not well understood. Tavits (2010)
further claims, “Corruption is ultimately the direct result of decisions, choices and
behavior at the level of the individual, but the growing research has largely focused on
system-level and institutional explanations of corruption,” and also states, “One of the
most common explanations in social science research on compliance and corruption;
political and social trust; is not significantly related to an individual’s decision to engage
in corruption exchange” (p. 1257). Instead, “the decision to engage in corrupt behavior
corresponds with positive or neutral definitions of corruption and modeling/imitating
similar behavior by others” (Tavits, 2010, pp. 1257-1258). This interpretation of
corruption, and the underlying propensity for an individual’s, as well as an entity’s
decision to engage in such corrupt behavior represents a core thesis of this dissertation.
Corruption is often seen within people that are otherwise upstanding, law-abiding
citizens. Such behavior is explained through rationalization. This is very relevant to postconflict scenarios, since “people may be encouraged to act in a corrupt fashion, in favor
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of time, politics or other issue, with such activities rationalized” (Anand, Ashforth, &
Joshi, 2005, p. 9).
There are situations where non-corrupt individuals and entities that might
normally be considered as non-corruptible behave corruptly. For example, Fluri (2009)
suggests that the chaos and confusion within a war environment, combined with the lack
of concise bookkeeping provides a significant temptation for “corrupt behavior among
those who manage, assist, or financially profit from international aid and development
economies” (p. 986). Fluri (2009) further discusses why and how NGO personnel in
Kabul, Afghanistan, a group that might otherwise be superficially classified as noncorruptible, behaved in a corrupt manner by subliminally rationalizing their actions and
behavior.
Tavits (2010) explains corrupt behavior by introducing “a cost-benefit calculation
into an individual’s behavior. Namely, the higher the potential benefits of corrupt
behavior, [such as when a person has been extorted to pay a bribe], and the lower the risk
of getting caught, the more likely people will engage in corruption regardless of their
socially learned predispositions” (p. 1258).
On an individual basis, risk orientation might be considered to play a role within
corruption and/or corrupt actions. This is because it stands to reason, by virtue of Utility
Theory and Rationale Behavior Theory, that corrupt actions will only be undertaken
when the risk of failure is low, and/or when the corresponding payoff is high. However,
research actually disproves risk orientation playing a significant role. Dolbear and Lave
(1966) found that a “subject’s basic attitudes towards risk do not affect his behavior in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma situation . . . or if they do have an effect, they [the effects] are not
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very large” (p. 514). Though the null hypothesis could not be rejected, the authors
admitted to “failing to show significant evidence justifying the ability to make conclusive
statements about risk and how it might affect [or not affect] decisions in [a] Prisoner’s
Dilemma game” (Dolbear & Lave, 1966, p. 514). This is not to say that risk orientation
does not affect an individual’s or entities propensity for corruption. Rather, this research
illustrates that such propensity, if it exists, is not very great.
Scholz (1998) claims that “because compliance is equivalent to a cooperative
solution to the collective action problem, the factors that help to sustain cooperation also
promote compliance.” Tavits (2010) further suggests that “One such factor is trust. Both
sides to a social interaction cooperate as long as the other is perceived to be trustworthy”
(p. 1259). However, in large groups, regions and/or cultures, it is hard to determine
whether the other party is trustworthy. Tavits (2010) finds that “Empirical research on
compliance . . . [demonstrates that] the more individuals trust government and their
fellow citizens, the more likely they will comply with laws, rules and standards” (p.
1259). Scholz (1998) supports such claims that “generalized trust, including trust in
political institution, increases tax compliance more significantly than fear of
punishment.”
Seligson (2002) claims a correlation between corruption and trust in some Latin
American countries, but further states that “corruption leads to mistrust” (p. 1260). This,
in turn, infers that an asymmetric balance (of trust versus non-corruption) being required
for non-corruption. Furthermore, if and when the balance is disturbed, the destructive
cycle feeds upon itself, with negative reinforcing feedback promoting increased
destruction.
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Social Learning and Cultural Motivations for Corruption
Tavits (2010) discusses Social Learning Theory, and gives credit to Akers (1998)
who initially developed this theory
to explain deviant behavior . . . [and by so doing] offers an alternative explanation
of individual motivation to engage in corrupt behavior. The basic mechanism of
the social learning theory works as follows: Behavior is acquired and sustained 1)
Through adopting definitions (evaluations of the behavior as good or bad) via
differential association with one’s peers (friends, family, colleagues and civic
organizations, 2) Through imitating such behavior by peers, and 3) Through the
positive reinforcement provided by past rewards for such behavior (p. 1260).
It should be noted that “Social behavior is also acquired and sustained through
imitation or modeling of others’ behavior (Akers et al., 1979). If people perceive that a
behavior is widespread and that it is approved, then they are more likely to engage in it”
(Tavits, 2010, pp. 1260-1261). Tavits (2010) further states, “A person is expected to
engage in corrupt behavior if he or she does not define corruption as morally or
situationally wrong, but rather as a justified and acceptable mode for exchange; and if he
or she has been exposed to corrupt behavior or at least perceives that such a behavior is
widespread and, thus, approved” (p. 1261).
The judicial system is counted upon by the notional rule of law to promote justice
and stability, which certainly infers that corruption should be concurrently minimized.
However, “the decline in ethical standards among the judiciary and the legal profession
became one of the most debilitating aspects of corruption in Uganda, and one of the most
difficult to reverse” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 182). Furthermore, “as corruption
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erodes confidence in political leaders and institutions, the government becomes less able
to rely on the cooperation and support of the public, and it increasingly resorts to force
and coercion. The resulting social unrest often leads to civil strife and a violent change of
government that can subvert, or even reverse, decades of . . . progress” (Sedigh &
Ruzindana, 1999, p. 183).
Montinola and Jackman (2002) rightly maintain that “Government corruption is
more pervasive in lower income countries than in others primarily because of the lack of
adequate pay among/for government workers” (p. 147). Political competition affects the
level of corruption, but in a nonlinear fashion. Specifically, Montinola and Jackman
(2002) claims that “corruption is typically lower in dictatorships than in countries that
have partial democracies. Past a threshold, democratic practices inhibit corruption.
Government size does not affect corruption, but membership of the Oil Producing and
Exporting Countries (OPEC) does” (p. 147).
The determinants of corruption, be they absolutely or relative, have been elusive.
So too has been an explanation of why corruption levels are so different around the
world. El- Bahnasawy (2008) suggests that corruption is “positively correlated to a
country’s size, but negatively correlated to the strength of rule-of-law, per capita wealth
and by the number of women holding seats in Parliament” (p. 7). Western stereotypes for
corruption often associate corrupt behavior with incentives and greed associated with oil,
diamonds, coal, and other natural resources. However, El-Bahnasawy (2008) finds no
correlation between corruption and the abundance, or lack thereof, of a country’s natural
resources (pp. 6-8).
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Corruption is an integral feature of, and embedded within, the culture of all
African countries. Within the African continent, corruption has been pervasive: “despite
sanctions, its apparent irreversibility, the absence of correlation with regime types and its
legitimacy to its supporters. Corruption is culturally and socially part of negotiation
processes, hierarchy, and wealth distribution [in Africa]” (De Sardan, 1999, p. 25).
In Uganda, “while combatting corruption loomed large among the government’s
preoccupations, and the president considered it a matter of highest priority, the Mission
Report noted that corruption also loomed large in the consciousness of the people, but in
a different way. The general public seem unconvinced that the leadership was serious
about dealing with the problem,” with specific areas of concern involving “procurement,
privatization, vote buying and the judicial system” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 199).
The Mission Report was a compilation of efforts from the Economic Development
Institute and Transparency International, who visited Uganda in 1994 to access the
situation and report to the Inspector General of the Government (ICG) (Sedigh &
Ruzindana, 1999, p. 198).
In Uganda, the Mission Report determined that corruption in Uganda was
influenced by: “1) Low levels of civil service pay, 2) High cost of political campaigning,
3) Lax enforcement of auditing, 4) Lack of prohibiting conflict-of-interest activities, 5)
Inability to monitor assets and liabilities of key decision makers, 6) Manipulation of some
types of aid flows, 7) Under-resourced judicial system, and 8) Constantly changing
criteria for privatization programs” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 198). Overall, the
Mission Report noted the Uganda anti-corruption “campaign might falter or even fail
without the involvement of the general public and a determined effort to convict people
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found guilty of corruption” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, pp. 201-202). This led to the
follow-up recommendation of “Engaging the public: The public should be involved in
helping to identify and root out corruption and building a public ethos rejecting
corruption and the corrupt” (Sedigh & Ruzindana, 1999, p. 202).
Tavits (2010) asserts that “Corruption as an illegal act involves both potential
benefits and risks. Benefits can be defined as getting something as a result of a corrupt
deal that one would otherwise not get, while risk can be defined as the probability of
getting caught and being punished. Uncertainty of benefits and risks may increase the
importance of social learning variables” (p. 1273). By comparison, and of greater interest
is that “when benefits are unlikely and risks are high, people should be less likely to
engage in corruption regardless of their socially learned predispositions (Tavits, 2010, p.
1273). Moreover, the
flip side to [the] argument [by Tavits] is that when benefits are certain and risks
are low, [when there is a structural incentive to behave in a corrupt manner], then
perceived acceptability and pervasiveness of corruption may be less important in
making the decision to engage in corruption. For example, in order to receive a
good or a service a bribe is needed or in situations where an official asks an
individual to pay a bribe . . . where in such situations one can be almost certain
that the benefit will follow when the bribe is paid (or at least be certain that no
benefit will follow if the bribe is not paid) (Tavits, 2010, p. 1273).
Tavits (2010) argues that “willingness to engage in corrupt behavior is more
likely when one does not define corruption as morally or situationally wrong.
Furthermore, a willingness to engage in corruption is enhanced by modeling others” (p.
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1275). This is an undesirable adjunct to the suggestion for tolerating corruption and/or
defining corruption within a cultural context since, if others condone such behavior,
additional parties will find such corruption increasingly acceptable.
Tavits (2010) further states that “when engagement in [a] corrupt exchange is
voluntary, or even unsuspecting, then the extent to which a person trusts other people or
government has no effect on his or her willingness to engage in corrupt activity. This
does not invalidate the findings that when extorted, people may lose trust in their
government (Seligson 2002); or when being skeptical about one’s government and the
trustworthiness of other people, one also tends to perceive others (including government)
to be more corrupt” (p. 1275).
In Nicaragua in 2011, “corrupt practices related to [recent] banking bankruptcies
engaged in an extensive instrumentalization of formal state institutions in order to protect
elite parochial interests and to achieve ‘accumulation by dispossession’ through
appealing to the legitimating support granted by multilateral financial institutions”
(Rocha, et al., 2011, p. 159). Many and most perspectives and researchers of corruption
approach this type of situation from a legal perspective. But,
such perspectives focus exclusively on the state as the location of corruption,
whereas clearly, in Nicaragua as elsewhere, corruption is a far more complicated
phenomenon which crosses the artificial boundaries between private and public
sectors. It also evolves and takes a myriad of different forms, which are intimately
connected with the ongoing struggles for control of accumulation processes,
suggesting a much more integral role for corruption within accumulation
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strategies than often allowed for in both orthodox economic and Marxist
literatures on capital accumulation (Rocha, et al., 2011, p. 159).
The academic community is generally divided on the causes of corruption and
respective resolution tactics. In general, there are two schools of thought. One focuses
upon “institutional dimension and emphasize the impact of formal anti-corruption
institutions, law, and policy. Academic theorists such as Klitgaard (1988), RoseAckerman (1999), Johnston (2005) and Gong & Ma (2009), among others support this
approach” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 570). Another group of scholars has focused upon a
belief that a culture of corruption or anti-corruption, itself “persists and greatly shapes
individuals’ behavior. Theorists such as Barr and Serra (2006), Fishman and Miguel
(2006) are two of many supporting this postulate” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 570).
Gong and Wang find that in some developing countries, “corruption is taken as
the rule rather than as the exception (Smith, 2007), and social norms of corruption can
cross institutional boundaries (Larmount, 2009)” (2013, p. 570). The general public
typically assumes a strong relationship between black markets, corruption and the degree
to which a country is developed. The stereotype of lesser-developed countries having
extensive black markets (e.g. shadow economies) and associated corruption is typical.
Yet, “shadow economies are illegal, artificial economies supported by various types of
corruption behavior that have become so institutionalized that they become expected as
the pseudo-norm” (Dreher & Schneider, 2010, p. 215).
The existence of corruption does not necessarily mean that the general public is
either aware and/or cares. Mocan (2008) and Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) note
that “A number of empirical studies point to the low correlation between perceived and
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actual corruption” (as cited in Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 572). Di Tella and Fanceschelli
provided evidence in Argentina where the government distorted their reporting in
exchange for promised government advertising revenue (as cited in Jain, 2011, p. 4). This
is one of but countless examples of the government, itself playing an official role in what
might and should be defined as corrupt behavior.
The correlation between ethics and corruption is yet another area of contradiction
and paradox. For example, in some instances, a high degree of observed corruption may
correspond to a high ethical standard, rather than alleged (and noted ambiguous)
corruption, illegal and/or unacceptable behavior. Gong and Wang (2012) find that
“contextual situations can largely determine the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts by
shaping people’s perceptions. Manion (2004) finds that ‘Widespread corruption makes
actors downplay the role of formal anti-corruption institutions’” (p. 571). Heidenheimer
(1970) and his black-gray-white Corruption Typology attest that social tolerance of
corruption is “a necessary, if not sufficient condition to define corruption” (as cited in
Gong & Wang, 2013, pp. 571-572). Although Heidenheimer’s perspective and definition
for corruption is interesting and academically accepted to a notional degree, the statement
also contradicts this dissertation’s hypothesis. This is because Heidenheimer is
suggesting that corruption, from an absolute context, is enhanced through local and
regional toleration, and that such toleration should be tempered if corruption is to ever be
completely eradicated. Heidenheimer’s observation further confirms the need for
clarifying the current confusion and contradictions surrounding corruption’s definition,
syntax, and applications.
If corruption involves government or organizations in any way, then changing
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these entities might appear to be an option for controlling and/or eliminated corruption.
Choi (2009) posits that any “attempt(s) to cause behavioral changes by restructuring
formal institutions cannot be successful unless it is accompanied by perceptual changes
of individuals” (as cited in Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 572). Corruption is often “narrowly
defined as the use of public authority for private gain” and therefore government centric,
the data gathered and/or provided by the government is itself questionable, and so must
always be considered as a mitigating factor since the issue of corruption is so potentially
embarrassing and destructive within the realm of government, politics, and state
institutions (Wedeman, 2004, p. 895). However, “perceptions and propensities should not
be confused with factual levels of corruption. People’s attitudes may not reveal the actual
degree of corruption to which a society succumbs; they indicate corruption risks.
Whether or not the general public has a strong inclination to accept or reject corruption
sheds light on a society’s susceptibility to it” (Gong & Wang, 2013, p. 573).
Terrorism and Corruption
Terrorism is, itself, a very complex topic. This dissertation will not endeavor to
explain, research, or probe the topic other than to justify its inclusion as a potential form,
driver, or association with/of corruption. By so doing, the benefits and disadvantages will
then be subsequently explored, all within the context of corruption.
Terrorism could arguably be classified as form of corruption. Although acts of
terror are non-financially motivated, they also clearly violate law and provide a demented
form of positive utility to one party, at the expense of others, in a fashion otherwise not
obtainable by normal methods. However, an argument can also be made where such
terrorist acts are akin to what the westernized context would define as war or armed
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conflict. Actions defined as terror by one culture can be, and often are, defined as war or
a justwar by another culture. Defining terrorism as corruption or simply an action against
civilians intended to promote fear in pursuit of philosophical or political goals is
problematic. The definition of corruption is ambiguous. By comparison, terrorism
research is fairly clear, but is simply misunderstood by the general public. By its very
nature and often misunderstood definition, we have to question terrorism’s syntax as well
as its underlying philosophies.
Terrorists do not abide by the stereotype created by western and euro-centric
media as semi-suicidal, pseudo-insurgents. To the contrary, and taken to an extreme,
terrorism is, itself, a tool of sophisticated governments to further their respective agenda.
Hence, this tangentially infers that sophisticated states, themselves, condone terrorism.
Trosky (2015) supports this allegation, and claims,
States regularly use fear of terrorist threats to gain support for domestic political
agendas and promote geostrategic interests. Consecutive U.S. presidents have
cited the theory of the just war to defend these policies and particular violations of
national sovereignty. Those doubtful of whether existing threats justify violations
of privacy and territorial integrity also use fear; of corruption, mission creep, and
unintended consequences; claiming that such interventions are a cure worse than
the disease, yet one about which domestic audiences are easily misled (p. ix).
There is also the issue of defining limited and discriminate terrorism to
indiscriminate terrorism. Walzer and Steinhoff argue that terrorism is, indeed justified or
excused by means of invoking ‘supreme emergency’ circumstances, and claim “that the
Principle of Noncombatant Immunity can be justifiably overridden under extreme
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circumstances” (as cited in Kaplan, 2011, p. 224). However, Kaplan (2011) further
argues against such justification, and states that there is never a situation where “any
harms inflicted upon those who have done nothing to forfeit their rights to life, bodily
integrity, liberty, or property” justify indiscriminate terrorism (p. 221). Nonetheless, an
academically defensible emergency justification for indiscriminate terrorism seems to
open the door to a broader, nonemergency rationale for conceivably excusing or
justifying indiscriminate terrorism.
The Principle of Noncombatant Immunity originated from the Geneva Protocol of
1977, Articles 51 and 52, which prohibit the targeting of “civilian objects” which are in
no way “military objectives” (as cited in Kaplan, 2011, p. 236). “Like their rights to life,
liberty, and bodily integrity, the ‘innocent’ have generally done nothing by which to
forfeit the right to property such that their homes, schools, houses of worship, and so on,
can be legitimately be directly targeted when they serve no military purpose” (Kaplan,
2011, p. 236). Of course, this particular definition, like so many others developed by the
United Nations and other international accords, is highly subjective to interpretation, such
meaning typically assigned by westernized and non-localized perspectives. However, “to
deliberately target the ‘innocent’ with any sort of political violence, regardless of how
one conceives of ‘innocence’ or liability to attack, is a clear prima facie wrong. Whatever
harms inflicted upon those who have done nothing to forfeit their rights to life, bodily
integrity, liberty, or property are taken ex hypotheses to be unjustified” (Kaplan, 2011, p.
219). Furthermore, “once one begins to analyze the arguments from extremity used to
excuse or justify indiscriminate terrorism, one discovers a broader rationale for
conceivably excusing or justifying such acts and which does not require an emergency
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per-se” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 219). Steinhoff (2007) suggests that “indiscriminate terrorism
can be justified for the weak by means of a rule-utilitarian rationale” (pp. 134-135).
Kaplan (2011) further states, “The right of non-combatant immunity should not
necessarily be held above the value of survival, whether construed as individual or
communal survival” (p. 220).
Walzer’s (2004) claims justify terrorism in instances of “supreme emergency,”
defined as, “those rare moments when the negative value we assign; that we can’t help
assigning; to the disaster that looms before us devalues morality itself and leaves us free
to do whatever is militarily necessary to avoid the disaster, so long as what we do doesn’t
produce an even worse disaster” (p. 40). Kaplan (2011) claims, “Supreme emergencies
are not faced by individuals, but by a collective community; whether political, cultural,
ethnic, or religious” (p. 222). Hence, Walzer (2004) would never allow terrorism and/or
exceeding notional moral limitations on an individual’s self-defense, even in most dire
circumstances. However, in the case of a community, entity or state, such moral
justification for terrorism is acceptable. This supports an argument that the positive utility
garnered by terrorists or states promoting terrorism in instances where a supreme
emergency fails to exist satisfies an expanded, utility-based definition of corruption.
The opposing argument is predicated upon a state being neither a community, nor
a collective culture. Instead, a state is “nothing more than an instrument of the
community, a particular structure for organizing collective action” (Walzer, 2004, p. 40).
Hence, using this particular definition, a state can never really die, or be threatened with
genocidal extinction, nor can a state justify its actions using Walzer’s principle of
Supreme emergency; and so, a state is never justified in the use of terrorism (Kaplan,
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2011, p. 222). As we can see through this brief dialogue, classifying some actions as
corrupt, justified, morally acceptable, illegal, and/or appropriate are, in some cases, selfcontradictory. This type of confusion is commonplace within the realm of corruption as
currently defined and utilized:
“It is not sufficient that one’s way of life is being threatened (as was often
asserted by the post-9.11 Bush administration) to declare a supreme emergency. The
destruction of an entire people who may propagate this way of life into the future must be
imminent” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 223).
“The principal of non-combatant immunity only ought to be temporarily
overridden by those facing supreme emergency and, while this excuses any blame post
factum, it does not make it completely right to target the innocent; only less wrong than
allowing genocide” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 224). “In effect, Walzer’s criterion of supreme
emergency is only satisfied by genocidal violence as opposed to massacres of equal
proportion where there is communal identity at risk” (Kaplan, 2011, p. 224).
Hence, the defense of terrorism as a justified act of corruption hinges directly upon the
act of terror being required as a result of a supreme emergency.
Existing research on the relationship between terrorism and corruption, per se, is
non-existent. However, both corruption and terrorism are highly driven, dependent upon
and/or influenced by syntax, culture, and context. To this point, Campbell (2015)
identifies the following three problems defining terrorism. First, objectivity is difficult
because of the pre-judgmental nature of the term “terrorism.” Guantanamo Bay detainees
are caught in this issue, since labeling dehumanized the individuals. If dehumanization
occurs, then there is no surprise when we hear about torture and other types of abuse.
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Second, terrorism is not tied to any organization or ideology. There is also neither a
common religion nor ethnicity. Third, is the generally naive notion that “just because I
understand terrorism does not mean that terrorism can be stopped” (Campbell, 2015).
There are four primary forms of terrorism, identified as: 1) Domestic terrorism
(happens within the state), 2) International terrorism (more than one country or state’s
citizens or territory is involved), 3) Bargaining dependent terrorism, where perpetrators
use anything of value to extort those in power to meet their demands, and 4) Bargaining
Independent terrorism, when bargaining is not sought (Campbell, 2015). Acts are
performed to perpetrate fear, such as bombings, mass killings, mass poisoning, and
activities that might otherwise and externally be classified as genocide (Campbell, 2015).
Bargaining of some sort is easily tied to the definitions of corruption, and also, as stated
above, tied to various forms of terrorism; since bargaining by definition involves the
maximizing of some form of utility on behalf of the terrorists, then it stands to reason that
terrorism might, in fact, be a form of corruption if the bargaining is occurring outside of
the normally accepted rules, regulations and laws whereby individual positive utility is
obtained as a result of such bargaining.
Campbell (2015) further states that understanding and having awareness of
approaches to intervention are different for each form of terrorism. Hence, it makes sense
that fully understanding the importance and relationship of corruption within the
terrorists’ paradigm is not a sufficient, but is certainly a necessary, condition to resolve
terrorist situations. Additional, yet controversial, food for thought is that “terrorism may
be an illegal form of warfare, but characterizing it as an immoral one is meaningless”
because of the issues of context and perspective (Merari, 2007, p. 30). We also should
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also ask ourselves if genocide is sometimes, or always, a form of terrorism? Perhaps
genocide is a sufficient condition for terrorism, but it is not a necessary condition.
Genocide is more thoroughly discussed in subsequent sections.
Campbell (2015) further suggests that attacks on terrorist groups by the
encompassing state in form of structural violence help generate sympathy for terrorists by
such inferences that, “We’re terrorists, but we’re really not bad people. We are victims of
the State’s attacks (via structural violence on us).” This aids in recruitment, as being
labeled as a terrorist becomes a badge of honor. Hence, what is abhorred and/or illegal in
one society is morally acceptable and commendable within another. By this definition,
terrorist activities are neither necessarily immoral nor unethical, though they are likely
always illegal. Even this latter issue is non-absolute, since an individual or group could
evoke terror by simply sharing proprietary information so sufficiently intimidating that
fear and terror result. All of these nuances complicate succinctly labeling terrorism as
corrupt or labeling corruption as a form of terrorism.
Wieviorka (1993) states that terrorism is an “antithesis of a social movement, and
results when social actors are disconnected from the popular movement” (as cited in
Crenshaw, 2012, p. 9). This is likely applicable within the context of a small number of
terrorists representing a significant minority, and further restricted to non-state actors
evoking fear through the death of innocent civilians. However, when the terrorists
become a larger faction, such as thousands or tens of thousands, western society is
reluctant to reclassify these actors as anything but terrorists. This continues with factions
within Afghanistan, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia and elsewhere. This is not to
say that the activities of these groups are ethical, right, wrong, or inappropriate. Rather,
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the point here is to reinforce the ambiguity of terrorism, and the corresponding ambiguity
of corruption.
Significant evidence exists that terrorists are neither insane, nor suicidal, nor
crazy as inferred by the general public and media. Target choices as well as terrorists are
rational (Crenshaw, 2012, p. 11), though repulsive to many, since “terrorism is the
peacetime equivalent to war crimes” (Crenshaw, 2012, p. 5). Post (2007) claims that,
“individual terrorists are psychologically normal…” (p. 15), and that “each of these
terrorist groups was fighting for admission that, at the onset at least, expressed the goals
of the people. The sociopolitical environment was accepting and supporting, with
members winning praise for their service . . .” (Post, 2007, p. 12).
Terrorism may sometimes be classified as form of corruption. However, at other
times it may, instead, be an expression of, or a result of, corruption. The key point is the
importance of the critical roles played by the conversation’s audience and context. Hence,
as a result of corruption being non-absolute, perhaps neither is terrorism. This argument
further supports how important culture and context are when western society researches
and imposes mandates upon another culture for non-corrupt behavior within a
westernized paradigm. Campbell (2015) summarizes this by stating, “[Society is] wasting
time on trying to stop terrorism. The underlying concept is much more important.” This
same philosophy may be directly applied to corruption, too.
Genocide and Corruption
Genocide was defined earlier in this dissertation. A key aspect to properly
classifying activities and incidents is that genocide must involve intent. Campbell (2013)
discussed the four motivations for genocidal intent as: “1) Destruction of social

93
interconnectedness, 2) Identity reformation, 3) Resource reallocation, and 4)
Consolidation of power throughout the community of genocidal perpetrators” (p. 102).
Five foundational and purportedly morally justified claims for genocidal intent are listed
below. These false, illogical and/or nonsensical claims of intent made by genocidal
orchestrators include: “1) Extermination of targeted group is justified to strengthen the
nation, 2) Extermination of targeted group is justified by biological supremacy of
protected population, 3) Extermination of targeted group is justified because they threaten
existence of protected population, 4) Extermination of targeted group is justified because
of sociobiological incompatibility, or 5) Extermination of targeted group is justified
because of their inherent parasitism” (Campbell, 2013, p. 144).
Genocide was/is often committed by former victims, such as former refugees,
survivors, and internally displaced persons (Campbell, 2013, p. 106). Sometimes those
targeted will attempt to shed their identity as an alleged and/or superficial victim by
becoming a perpetrator (Campbell, 2013, p. 107). As a result, it certainly seems likely
that justification and intention for genocidal activities might be subjective and/or biased
as a result of past atrocities. Researchers need to keep in mind that, as outsiders, we
cannot easily judge or truly understand another party’s feelings or motivations. We can
undoubtedly judge other’s actions from our own context, but by definition, we are not
able to judge actions from the point of view of another’s culture and context. This
certainly does not alleviate guilt or responsibility from genocidal perpetrators. However,
this idea, as well as additional research conducted as part of this dissertation, might start
to explain the challenges researchers face with complex, multi-dimensional topics such as
corruption, terrorism, and genocide.
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Resource aggregation and power aggregation, on their own accord, do not
completely explain the rationale behind genocide. This is because if the targeted
population’s lives are spared, and despite their property and power being taken, they
continue to pose a threat because their existence “affords them the opportunity of
attempting to reclaim what was original theirs” (Campbell, 2013, p. 110). Resource
reallocation is not a suitable alternative to the death of the targeted group members for
the same reason just discussed. Also, such sparing of death would not be called genocide,
since the intent to destroy the human group would be absent. Hence, if the intent exists,
and if genocide is therefore, intended, then the purposeful death and/or relocation of the
targeted group are required (Campbell, 2013, p. 113).
Genocide is enormously contextual. Ethical reasons are the most important
reasons for studying genocide, and scholars must “stand unequivocally on one side of the
historical process. Yet, one group of people may be perceived as victims in one context,
and perpetrators within another” (Shaw, 2007, p. 5). This makes research difficult,
complex, and controversial. Thus, context with genocide is critically important, just as
with terrorism, war; and corruption.
An individual’s positive utility can clearly be defined as their sense of morality
and ethnic purity. Right or wrong, this desire for enhanced positive utility can be
achieved through modified actions, and these actions can take the form of genocide
through the actions of an individual or through the actions of a state. The latter occurs as
Intentional Embeddedness, defined as the “willful and specifically constructed attempt to
introduce, hence embed, interpretative distinctions within a population” (Campbell, 2013,
p. 130). Both individual as well as structural genocidal justification are shown via

95
Heinrich Himmler’s infamous, sincere speech, though with a warped morality: “We had
the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy these people, who wanted to
destroy us. But, we have not the right to enrich ourselves with so much as a fur, a watch,
a mark, or anything else. We have exterminated bacterium because we don’t want in the
end to be infected” (as cited in Campbell, 2013, p. 134).
Positive Aspects of Corruption
The positive aspects of corruption are not prolifically addressed within the
literature. However, there are a few succinct instances where such positive benefits have
been posited: “Some researchers (and many practitioners) have argued that corruption
may be a good thing because it can smooth rigid bureaucratic systems and help get things
done. There is some truth to this, as excessive red tape . . . can make businesses
[otherwise] unprofitable. Corruption . . . [can] enable private entrepreneurship and
promote businesses (Amundsen, 1999. p. 19). Multiple examples are provided below.
“Several studies have found oil wealth to be a significant predictor of the onset of
civil war,” whereby “the mechanisms suggested to tie oil wealth to civil war work largely
via policy failure in the allocation of revenue.” (Fjelde, 2009, pp. 199-201). For example,
in Nigeria, oil exploration has resulted in massive hardship, “while the elite benefit
through rent seeking and corruption” (Ebiede, 2011, p. 143). This relationship between
extraction resources and conflict is “not conclusive. “In fact, Watts (2008) cautioned that
the resources determinism argument risks ascribing too much superficial important to
natural resources . . . [because the] attribution of the conflicts to oil resources alone
leaves out critical issues of governance” (Ebiede, 2011, p. 145). Politicians often “engage
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in primitive accumulation of wealth and use state funds to finance party politics and
maintain their patrimonial ties to national … leaders” (Ebiede, 2011, p. 145).
Nevertheless, political-corruption is not always associated with a higher risk of
civil war. An exception might exist within oil-rich states, where political corruption can
be used to mitigate violence by offering perks and special privileges. Governments of oilrich states can use political corruption to buy support from key segments of society:
“Countries such as Gabon, Libya and Saudi Arabia illustrate how oil-based rent-seeking
can strengthen regimes by extending the clientelist networks, and thus placating restive
groups” (Fjelde, 2009, p. 200).
The size and enormity of government budgets with respect to insurgents and other
sources of violence effectively results in corruption instituted and supported by the
government, thus overshadowing and overwhelming factors that would otherwise lead to
civil war. Hence, though counterintuitive, increases in oil production and political
corruption decrease the risk of conflict overall. Political corruption prolongs poverty as
well as confirming alliances with a stake in the continuation of the corrupt regimes.
These regimes, though corrupt as defined by western standards, might themselves “result
in greater stability and decreased violence, albeit at the expense of wealth sharing and
economic growth” (Fjelde, 2009, p. 199).
For example, in Cameroon, the “cross-cutting network of clientelism” has
pacified a very complex political environment, but it is unsurprisingly accompanied by
waste, mismanagement, and economic detriment (Fjeld, 2009, p. 203). Here, “the
providers of patronage crowd out proponents of more accountable public policies…. [and
so] political corruption might thus be considered a default option for inducing stability in
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the weakly institutionalized” regions adjacent to oil rich countries (Fjelde, 2009, p. 204).
Fjelde (2009) suggests, with significant quantitative analysis as well as qualitative
substantiation, that “a strategic use of public resources for off-budget and selective
accommodation of private interests might reduce the risk of violent challenges to state
authority in oil-rich states” (p. 214).
There is rigorous, quantitative evidence confirming a negative relationship
between resource rents and violence in less democratic countries (Arezki & Gylfason,
2013). The World Bank argues that one of the primary challenges of African economies
“is the wide scope given to ‘rent seeking’ activities; namely, the search for financial gain
or profit from non-production economic activities that are especially prevalent among
these who depend on state privilege for access to credit, grants, licenses, contracts, and,
often, monopoly markets” (as cited in Harsch, 1993, pp. 40-41). Restated for clarity,
resource rents refer to the excess costs above and beyond production costs and normal
margin associated with the extraction of natural resources. Directly contrasting world
opinion, an evaluation of conflict from 1985-2007 in 29 African countries showed that
“higher resource rents lead to more corruption . . . and to fewer internal conflicts. [These
findings are likely] explained by the ability of the political elites in less democratic
countries to more effectively quell the masses through redistribution or rents to the
public” (Arezki & Gylfason, 2013, p. 552).
State building, while modifying the status quo through pragmatically supporting
special circumstances and situations that might have otherwise been labeled as corrupt, is
possible from an official anti-corruption viewpoint. One example illustrating such
inconsistencies and contradictions between state building and anti-corruption is the
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Performance-Based Governors' Fund (PBGF) in Afghanistan, where “some donors
[countries] attempted to reduce corruption in local government by encouraging warlord
governors to act and lead with integrity” (Marquette, 2011, p. 1871). Being realistic and
direct in the short term was suggested, while concurrently having long-term indirect
strategies that build integrity, rather than fighting corruption, per se. The emphasis with
the PBGF was to promote the support of a new approach, rather than trying to promote
the existing zero-tolerance corruption protocol. This behavior flies in the face of past
behavior. The PBGF overlooked past behavior in favor of the future, rather than
continually trying to prosecute and condemn those who have acted contrary to what the
United States and its allies consider corrupt.
The impact of corruption upon growth, investment and the quality of government
is superficially and anecdotally considered to always be detrimental or negative.
However, extensive quantitative analyses using a data sample of 71 countries within the
time period of 1970 to 1998 has shown otherwise. As would be expected, a negative
effect is seen between corruption on both growth and investment. However, unlike
previous studies, “corruption has a negative impact on growth independent from its
impact on investment” (Méon & Sekkat, 2005, p. 69). These effects worsened when the
quality of government worsened. This study supports anti-corruption behavior within its
current status quo and paradigm. What is most relevant to this dissertation, and
potentially alarming to those supporting the status quo vis-a-vis corruption, is that the
effects of investment and economic growth, with respect to corruption, are independent.
This defies past logic and opens the door for objectively examining the entire situation.
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Hence, if a critical portion of past theory is proven wrong, then perhaps the entire theory,
context and supporting foundation should be reconsidered.
Many countries have dictatorial democracies, dictatorships, or democracies where
leadership appears to be benevolent, kind and caring to various causes. Instances of
corrupt behavior are often associated with such benevolence, and “some dictators appear
to have a benevolent side to them . . . by sharing the wealth” (Jain, 2011, p. 4). Although
superficially attractive, it is more likely that such behavior is “merely a reflection of the
high cost of purchasing the loyalty of the public and of those who help maintain the
corrupt structure” (Jain, 2011, p. 4).
After a coup, “One of the most common, first, and generally correct charges to be
alleged against the previous regime is one of corruption” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). The
promotion of the status quo from western and Eurocentric society teaches us that
corruption is evil, and that such behavior is destructive to growth, establishing/promoting
democracy and enticing external investment. However, “Other scholars have adopted an
opposite opinion and provide evidence about how, under some circumstances, corruption
is good. Examples include the United States and Russian economic development, as well
as the integration of millions of immigrants into the American economy in the 19th
century” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). Within the first of these examples, the greater good
benefited by corrupt government officials promoting economic development during
nuclear disarmament in the face of likely alternative effects of nuclear material and/or
weapons being sold to terrorists. In the latter example, “corrupt behavior from
immigration officials in the 19th century allowed the United States to greatly benefit from
the sharp minds and strong bodies arriving from Russia” (Nye, 1967, p. 417). As a result
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of these and a multitude of similarly contrarian examples, it seems dangerously foolish to
universally declare, without caveat or precondition, that corruption, as currently defined,
is always destructive, undesired, and/or deleterious to violent fatalities and physical
feelings of safety.
Corruption within four Latin American countries recently studied was shown to
be beneficial for “political development, enabling citizens to overcome inefficient
bureaucracies while increasing loyalty to the political system (Seligson, 2002, p. 408).
Amundson (1999) adds, “In economic terms, corruption is not always bad. This is seen
for instance in the level of economic growth and the level of direct foreign investment, in
highly corrupt nations” (p. 19). However, this effect may be degrading over time, because
while short term benefits with respect to inefficient bureaucracies may be occurring,
“corruption erodes belief in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust”
(Seligson, 2002, p. 408). The countering arguments of “loyalty to political system” and
“eroding belief in the political system” are complex and are unanswered (Seligson, 2002,
p. 408). The matter of time in this issue was also left ambiguous, since a timeline of two
years is likely much different than two generations.
According to Graveline (2016), “Although corruption has clear moral and
financial costs, scholars find that it can actually strengthen state cohesion by lessening the
risk of coups and civil war in the short term through patronage based cabinet
appointments.” Nepotism and asymmetric favoritism towards family members have long
been associated with most definitions of corruption. Although typically shunned as
inappropriate, many countries, such as the United States, have recently and overtly
thwarted this restraint, appointing and/or hiring family members in earnest. It is unclear if
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this behavior has any affect whatsoever upon violence in developed countries. However,
in developing and/or conflict-ridden countries, such as those in Africa, Arriola (2009)
notes that “cabinet expansion [through patronage] lowers the probability of a leader’s
being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister . . . lowers a
leader’s coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage increase in economic
growth” (pp. 1339, 1357). This enhancement is accomplished by leaders using “state
resources to facilitate intra-elite accommodation” (Arriola, 2009, p. 1340).
In other words, these leaders are effectively paying off their political competitors,
whereby “Patrons offer resources to their clients in enhance for their loyalty, and clients
support their patrons to access rewards that cannot be readily attained in a weak formal
economy” (Arriola, 2009, p. 1344). There are enormously complex conditions associated
with this particular observation. First, it is only applicable in countries where economies
are weak, resources are plentiful, hardship is extreme, democracy is weak, and the threat
of lethal conflict is both realistic and recent. Cabinet size within the 40 African countries
studied also appears to have been a function of “GDP, regime type, ethnic
fractionalization and total population” (Arriola, 2009, p. 1358). Although these
conditions may appear unrealistic for the majority of the world, such a conclusion would
be untrue. This is certainly true for nearly all of Africa. Figure 4 describes this
relationship from 1970-2000 with data collected from 40 African countries, and infers
that there is a point of diminishing returns where the appointment of an additional
minister increases, rather than reduces, the likelihood of a coup (Arriola, 2009, p. 1357).
So, we can conditionally conclude that from 1970 onward, “African leaders use the
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cabinet as an instrument for managing their political environment”, and as a result, lower
incidences of lethal violence (Arriola, 2009, p. 1349).

Figure 4. Ministerial Appointments and Probability of Coup. Note. (Arriola, 2009, p.
1348)
Levels of corruption are directly affected by the structure of government
institutions and of the political processes. Weak governments with uncontrolled agencies
experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need
for secrecy cause distortion. This in turn costs the government more than would have
resulted from taxation, the legal alternative to corruption. Hence, in some less developed
countries, corruption is very high as well as costly to development . . . [and] corruptionbased scandals can sometimes lead or affirm the general principles about how the country
should be run (Shleifer &Vishny, 1993, p. 599).
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One draconian, yet positive, aspect of corruption is that corruption becomes a tool
used by anti-corruption forces, empowering achievement beyond what would have
otherwise been possible (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993, p. 599).
Gaps in Literature and Research
The entire field of corruption is ambiguous as a result of lacking a universally
accepted definition of corruption. Some organizations, such as the United Nations, World
Bank and other entities of similar impressive stature, have made such universal claims,
but these respective definitions have yet to corroborate or replicate each other. Copious
data and research are available on corruption, war, terrorism and genocide. An equally
large volume of work is available on deadly violence and feelings of security. However,
thus far, succinct research exploring the potential beneficial effects of corruption upon
lethality, violence, war, violent insurgency, genocide and/or terrorism is rare. In fact,
because corruption’s current definition is so often tied and restricted to financial
remuneration, the vast majority of research also fails to fully address the negative effects
of corruption upon the various topics associated with violent lethality. This substantial
and critical gap in research is directly caused by a corresponding inadequate and
universally nonacceptable definition for corruption.
Interestingly, the vast majority or research, context and syntax concerning
corruption is currently based upon various corruption indexes. These corruption indices
are prepared using quantitative metrics to describe qualitative behavior and context that
often disregard cultural specificity. This renders the entirety of the data ambiguous and
potentially useless. These corruption metrics currently drive entire works of research and
policy, and although likely correct in some instances, the reader must somehow discern
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that these specific instances avoid drawing incorrect conclusions from seemingly neat,
concise and orderly data.
Gong and Wang (2012) claim that “scholars and researchers typically prefer to
use first-hand data for corruption research, and depend upon surveys and interviews
whenever possible” (p. 572). The basis for such behavior by scholars and researchers is
that the “under-laying assumption is that perceptions represent . . . a good proxy for
experiences” (Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010, p. 1057). Corruption research tools such
as the Corruption Perception Index, Global Corruption Barometer and Bribe Payers
Index, all products of Transparency International, are relevant indications of corruption
perception within corruption’s current ambiguous definition (Gong & Wang, 2013, p.
572). Additional corruption research tools include the “Business International (BI) Index,
the International Country Risk Guide (IRCG) index, the Global Competitiveness Report
Index . . . [and] all of these indexes are . . . based on the personal judgements, perceptions
and opinion of a number of observers, and not on statistical ‘hard data’” (Amundsen,
1999, p. 27).
These references above notwithstanding, and with greatest respect, this
dissertation politely suggests that current academic opinion may not be entirely correct if,
as is being suggested, the current definition of corruption is unclear and subject to
significant interpretation as a result of culture and context. Despite the seemingly robust
nature of these metrics, the basis of this dissertation and hypothesis unfortunately renders
the vast majority of existing data potentially worthless, since the issues of culture and
context have been inadvertently, yet purposefully, avoided in favor of a doctrine based
upon absolute, firm, quantitative and financially-centric definition of corruption. This
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dissertation asserts that such an attitude is problematic, and as a result is fatally flawed.
Significant research is needed to explain, bridge and close these gaps within the plethora
of existing corruption research.
Past research has utilized a number of focused research methods, ranging from
quantitative to case study to phenomenological. These types of activities should continue,
but closer coordination between researchers is needed, since “methodological
triangulation (the use of several social science methods) is necessary to disclose the
patterns and extent of corruption” (Amundsen, 1999, p. 27). The literature review also
clearly reveals the potential for contextual relevancy of corruption within the arenas of
war, terrorism and genocide. This being said, research on this specific topic and
relationship is negligible.
Although inferences and glimmers of relevancy between corruption and positive
benefits have been uncovered, past research does not provide significant, firm evidence
of a positive correlation between lethality and/or insecurity with corruption, though it
does point to several areas where such benefits might exist. In general, very limited
research has been performed on culturally tolerable and/or potentially beneficial aspects
of corruption. This makes it challenging to draw conclusions
It is also critical to note that there are no instances, whatsoever, of past research
confirming the null attestation; that any degree of tolerance to corruption will not
mitigate violence, at all. This lack of negative confirmation is, itself, cause for intellectual
optimism, and helps justifies the need for additional research.
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Summary
Chapter Two has focused on the study of literature and past research associated
with the definitions, drivers, and associated aspects of corruption. Chapter Three will
discuss the methodological options available for performing this dissertation’s research,
the basis for selecting Existential-based Phenomenological Analysis as the preferred
approach, and the tactics and processes associated with the execution of an existentialbased phenomenological methodology.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
Restatement of the Research Problem
Protracted lethal conflict and unrest have continued in Afghanistan, South Sudan,
Iraq, Sudan, Uganda, and other countries around the world for decades. Perhaps not
without coincidence, each of these countries has extraordinarily high levels of corruption.
The United States’ and western countries’ foreign policies insist upon zero corruption
within post-conflict society, yet the collective success of these efforts has been poor, thus
this dissertation challenges the necessity for a zero-corruption mandate. Compounding
this issue, the foundational definition of corruption and its key drivers are ambiguous and
often self-contradictory, and so robustly defining corruption as well as understanding the
drivers and relationship (if any) between corruption and continued lethality and/or
associated feelings of insecurity during and after conflict is highly desired.
Restatement of the Research Questions
Research question one. How should corruption be properly, accurately, and
pragmatically defined?
Research question two. Is zero corruption required for maximizing feelings of
safety during and/or post-conflict while concurrently minimizing associated lethal
violence?
Research question three. Is there an optimum, positive level of tolerable
corruption associated with maximizing feelings of safety from violent death and/or
minimizing lethal violence?
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Methodology Options
Researching the potential benefits, if any, of corruption included the associated
controversial facets of war, terrorism, and genocide. This was difficult because of the
variability in defining basic terms and syntax as corruption, terrorism, genocide, and an
ethically uniform sense of ethics. The situation was further compounded as a result of this
research challenging the current paradigm defining corruption. Consequently, the
research was required to identify and/or account for the potential for contextual bias
within past data collection and research. Despite past research being carefully performed
and presented, if the research used an incorrect and/or imprecise definition of corruption,
then any and all data collected is automatically suspect as contaminated, skewed or
categorically worthless on an absolute basis. As a result, each and every reference was
carefully evaluated and vetted for applicability.
Research within the social sciences is divided into two general categories:
Quantitative Analysis and Qualitative Analysis. “Quantitative research produces more
precise (numerical) measures, but not necessarily more accurate ones,” while “Qualitative
research tries to achieve accurate [conclusions]” but typically lack precision (Keohane,
King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 151). One of the biggest problems with using
quantitative research for this particular dissertation was the issue of endogeneity,
whereby the results affect the chosen variables and the chosen variables themselves affect
the results. “The values of the explanatory [independent] variables are a consequence,
rather than a cause of our dependent variable” (Keohane et al., 1994, p. 185).
“Endogeneity is not always a problem to be fixed, but is, instead, an integral part by
which the world produces our observations” (Keohane et al., 1994, p. 199). The two
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traditions of qualitative and quantitative research appear quite different. In fact, they
“sometimes seem to be at war” (Keohane, King and Verba, 1994, p. 3). Given the nonconcise nature of the major arguments, and since it is not even clear how to define
corruption, some type of qualitative methodology was deemed necessary.
A qualitative approach to corruption research was chosen and was very
appropriate because “first and foremost, as a participant-observer in a culture, one is
obliged to make known one’s intentions, to protect anonymity of individuals and perhaps
communities, to protect one’s informants from the possibility of any intrusion as a result
of information gather, and to take measure to avoid distortion of the community studied”
(Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 247). In support of an anthropological or ethnographic
approach, Fiske-Rusciano (2014) notes, “The challenges and opportunities that
globalization offers us mandates that we share more of these lived experiences, and
integrate them into our worldwide marketplace of knowledge” (p. 251). Furthermore,
“The significance of anthropological investigation into matters of corruption is not the
claim to higher truth than the work of other specialists, but rather, to get closer to the
events one is dealing with. This methodology allows a ‘reciprocal acquaintance between
the observer and the observed: a form of mutual trust progressively develops, which
makes possible an access to the everyday (Fassin, 2013)’” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p.
252).
Corruption has had an enormous amount of past research performed and data
collected using a variety of numerical metrics. This situation would otherwise support the
use of quantitative techniques. However, nearly all of this past data is highly suspect and
potentially erroneous, not because of human error, but instead because the data,
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questions, reflections, and conclusions may have been communicated and/or analyzed
out-of-context. Hence, some type of qualitative methodology was preferred over
quantitative options because qualitative theoretical sampling, as opposed to statistical
sampling, “lets the research guide the data collection,” and because the “basis for
[qualitative] sampling is concepts, and not people” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 157).
There are five major qualitative methodologies. These methodologies are:
“Narrative Research, Phenomenology, Grounded Theory, Ethnography and Case Study”
(Creswell, 2013, pp. 104-106). Narrative Research involves the recounting and telling of
stories of individual experiences. It typically involves the experiences of a single
individual and his/her past experiences within “lived and told stories” (Creswell, 2014, p.
70).
Phenomenology seeks to identify and describe the essence of a lived
phenomenon. Polkinghorne (1989) suggests that phenomenological studies use “5-25
individuals who have all experienced the phenomenon” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p.
81). Phenomenological methods will be described in detail later in this chapter. Although
typified by several approaches, each are notionally referred to as a form
Phenomenological Analysis.
Grounded Theory develops a foundational, and potentially new, explanation in the
views of the 20 to 60 interviews conducted (Creswell, 2013, pp. 83-90). The intent of
Grounded Theory is to “move beyond description and to generate or discover a ‘unified
theoretical explanation’” (Creswell, 2013, p. 83; Corbin & Straus, 2008, p. 107).
Ethnography describes and interprets the “shared patterns” of culture from a
group or community, which is generally comprised of more than the “20 or so” required
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by Grounded Theory analysis (Creswell, 2013, p. 90). Ethnography is typified by
extended, long term “participant observation” where the “researcher is immersed” into
the subject culture (Creswell, 2013, p. 90). Ethnography is based upon the premise that
“Human behavior and human interaction could best be studied in their proper and
original natural environment” (Atkinson, Coffey, Delamont, Lofland & Lofland, 2001, p.
81). Ethnography is akin to the study of communities, as “For many people doing social
research meant doing the study of a community” (Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 80). Hence,
Ethnography takes place where human interaction occurs in full view, so that the
researcher can see, experience and record such activity. Park (1925) states, “The city is
not an artificial construction. It is involved in the vital processes of the people who
compose it; it is a product of nature, and particularly of human nature” (as cited in
Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 80). Past ethnographic efforts were too broad, attempting to
cover too many areas of the targeted community. Today, such studies are more focused
upon a particular area of the community (Atkinson et al. 2001, p. 88). For example,
“Ethnographic approaches allow the researcher to occupy a place between the perspective
of the observer and the observed” (Fiske-Rusciano, 2014, p. 261).
Case Study provides an in-depth understanding of a single case, multiple cases or
a case-within-a-case. A single case could be described as a single individual (Creswell,
2013, p. 97). This approach generally involves significant research and literature study
rather than interviewing subjects. Case Study closely examines “real-life . . .bounded
system[s]” using multiple sources of information, such as “observations, interviews,
audiovisual, documents and reports” (Creswell, 2013, p. 97). The output of Case Study is
a “Case Description and Case Themes” (Creswell, 2013, p. 97). Stake (1995) discusses
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two types of case studies: “Intrinsic,” or unique; and “instrumental,” or applicable to a
large problem or issue (as cited in Creswell, 2013. p. 98). Stake (1995) further claims that
Case Studies result in the researcher making “conclusion or assertions” while Yin (2009)
claims that they ‘identify patterns or explanations’” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 99).
Phenomenological Methodologies
Qualitative methodologies can also be described through its four key
phenomenological methodologies. These include Hermeneutical, Transcendental,
Empirical, or Psychological, Grounded Theory, and Ethnography (Creswell, 2013, p. 79);
some of these overlap with the preceding discussion. Phenomenological research
describes the “common meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences of a
concept or phenomenon,” and attempts to “reduce individual experiences with a
phenomenon to a description of the universal essence” (Creswell, 2013, p. 76). Van
Manen (1990) describes this as a “grasp of the very nature of the thing” (as cited in
Creswell, 2013, p. 76). Phenomenology is a “philosophical approach to the study of
experience” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 11). Husserl claimed that phenomenology “involves
the careful examination of human experience” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 12). Husserl further
developed a “Phenomenological Method” where he suggests that we, the researcher,
“consider the consequences of our taken-for-granted ways of living in the familiar,
everyday world of objects. We need to ‘bracket’, or put to one side, the taken-for-granted
world in order to concentrate on our perception of that world” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 13).
The first two phenomenological methodologies are collectively referred to as
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). IPA is concerned with “the detailed
examination of human lived experience” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 32) and is further defined
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as “How people make sense of their major life experiences,” and the “exploring
experience in its own terms” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 1). IPA identifies, studies, analyzes,
and further interprets “what happens when the everyday flow of lived experience takes on
a particular significance for people” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 1). IPA attempts to understand
others’ relationships to the world, is “necessarily interpretative” (Smith et al., 2009, p.
21), and is typified by a fairly small sample size of subjects and by using semi-structured
interviews. “IPA has a double hermeneutic”, according to Smith & Osborn (2003),
whereby the researcher interprets what other people interpret, in a fashion: “the
participant’s meaning-making is first-order, while the researcher’s sense-making is
second-order” (Smith et al., 2009, pp. 35-36). IPA “focuses upon people’s experiences
and/or understandings” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 46). This also includes the perceptions and
views of participants, as well as researchers, assistants, and advisers. Hence, the
combination of phenomenological and interpretive experiences occurs most readily when
the data is gathered and analyzed in the context of existing experience and ancillary data
from all sources, including, and particularly as a result of, the past experiences and
reflections by/from the researcher.
Heuristics-based, Transcendental Phenomenology was developed by Edmund
Husserl (1859-1938), and is the original form of phenomenological research (Kafle,
2011, p. 185). It is sometimes referred to as Empirical or Psychological
Phenomenological Methodology. It seeks “to determine what an experience means for the
persons who had the experience and are able to provide a comprehensive description of
it” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 13). Based upon work of Husserl, it is “focused less on the
interpretations of the researcher, and more on a description of the experiences of
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participants [being interviewed]” (Creswell, 2013, p. 80). Transcendental, Empirical and
Psychological are the heuristic variations of phenomenological methodologies, and thus
differ from hermeneutic thinking. In heuristics, the research focus is “exclusively and
continually aimed at understanding human experience. Only the researcher’s experiences
with the phenomenon are considered, [and] not how history, art, politics or other human
enterprise account for and explain the meanings of the experience” (Moustakas, 1994, p.
16). Here, the “researcher’s experiences” refers to the interaction between the researcher
and the participant with respect to the phenomenon being researched. Past, pre-conceived
notions are discarded. According to Husserl, “the basic interest of this school of
phenomenology is to discover and scribe ‘lived world’” (as cited in Kafle, 2011, p. 186).
Transcendental means “in which everything is perceived freshly, as if for the first
time” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 34). Hence, heuristic researchers must avoid bringing their
own past experiences and perceptions to bear, and instead “bracket out these views before
proceeding with the experiences of others” (Creswell, 2013, p. 80) and “suspend personal
opinion” (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). Of course, this is nearly impossible, but is required to
ensure that bias is avoided.
Transcendental methodologies are oriented towards “lived experiences”
(Creswell, 2013, p. 79) where “The research participants remain close to depictions of
their experience telling their individual stories with increasing understand[ing] in sight”
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 19). Van Manen (1990) describes this as when the “researcher
mediates between different meanings of the meanings of the lived experiences” (as cited
in Creswell, 2013, p. 80). In direct contrast to Hermeneutical Phenomenology, the
heuristic-based Transcendental Phenomenological approach “focuses less on the
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interpretations of the researcher and more on a description of the [lived] experiences of
participants” (Creswell, 2013, p. 80). The life experiences of the heuristic researcher and
the project’s participants, in conjunction with “his or her study of all of the depictions,
portraits and personal knowledge of the experience, [means] the primary researcher
develops a creative synthesis” to the problem being studied and avoids overinterpretation since: “The depiction is complete in itself. Interpretation not only adds
nothing, but [detracts from the overall meaning] and essences of experience” by the
researcher and the participants (Moustakas, 1994, p. 19).
A Transcendental methodological approach provides results in a textual
description that is very rich and delves deeply into all aspects of the subject’s experience
to include feelings, sounds, color, shapes, etc. (Moustakas, 1994, p. 34). Transcendental
Phenomenological analysis requires the researcher to utilize “Imaginative Variation” to
“grasp the structural essences of experience’” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 35), while at the same
time suspending personal opinions and subjectivity. The structural essence is then reintegrated back into the Reduction Phase and subsequently incorporated into the textual
description, resulting in a “textual-structural synthesis of meanings and essences of the
phenomenon or experiences being investigated” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 36). This approach
is a “path to knowledge in the absolute sense, which means that it is also necessarily a
path to self-knowledge, too,” as it “tries to eliminate everything that is a prejudgment and
presupposition” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 40). It is typified by a “freshness, openness and a
readiness to see in an unfettered way, not threatened by the customs, beliefs and
prejudices of normal science, by the habits of the natural world, or by knowledge based
on unreflected everyday experience” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 41). Transcendental
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approaches assume that “if there is more than one reality that leaves doubt and lack of
clarity”, then the claimed understanding of the phenomenon is questionable (Kafle, 2011,
p. 186). This requires that the researcher “suspend personal prejudices . . . [while]
attempting to reach to the core or essence through a state of pure consciousness” (Kafle,
2011, p. 186). In other words, personal opinion must be suspect, and this particular
requirement is considered the primary motivation for Hermeneutical Phenomenology.
The Hermeneutic variation is defined as “the art of reading a text so that the
intention and meaning behind appearances are fully understood” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 8).
Hermeneutics is further and loosely defined as the “theory of interpretation” (Smith et al.,
2009, p. 21). Van Manen (1990) describes hermeneutics as the “text” of life (as cited in
Creswell, 2013, p. 79). This approach involves the “dynamic interplay among six
research activities, which primarily focus upon the researcher writing a detailed text and
description on the topic of interest and then analyzing this self-authored product in
concert with his or her lived experiences, as refined and accentuated by the experiences
conveyed from the analysis of interviews. The Hermeneutic Cycle is shown by Figure 5.
The interpretations of the researcher are emphasized, rather than experiences of
the individuals being interviewed (Creswell, 2013, p. 80). These interpretations do not
arrive immediately, but are iteratively obtained by reading, writing, interpreting, and then
rewriting (Kafle, 2011. p. 195). The Hermeneutic variation for phenomenological
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Figure 5. Hermeneutic Cycle. Note. (Kafle, 2011, p. 195)
research was developed because some members of the academic community rejected the
Transcendental requirement of “suspending personal opinions” (Kafle, 2011, p. 186).
Here, instead, a focus is placed upon the subjects’ subject experiences. The hermeneutical
researcher is attempting to “unveil the world as experienced by the subject through their
life world stories”, as told and recounted subjectively, from their own personal
perspective (Kafle, 2011, p. 186).
Contrary to Creswell, Kafle (2011) considers IPA to be augmented with an
additional phenomenological approach, that of Existential Phenomenology (p. 185).
Existential Phenomenology is based upon the premise that “philosophy should not be
conducted from a detached, objective, disinterested, disengaged standpoint” (Kafle, 2011,
p. 188). Said differently, this variation still demands the essence and core understanding
of a phenomenon, but the researcher must endeavor to do so in direct contradiction of the
other two phenomenological variations. Heuristics and Hermeneutics both require that
the individual be as detached and as objective as possible. By comparison, existential
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phenomenology “stresses . . . the description of everyday experience as it is perceived by
the consciousness of the individuals” (Kafle, 2011, p. 188). Warthal claims that this
group of researchers are of the common opinion that “certain phenomenon only show
themselves to one who is engaged with the world in the right kind of way” (Kafle, 2011,
p. 188). Their reference to this approach rejects Husserl’s belief in “complete reduction,”
and instead attempts to “re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world” by
“stress[ing] . . . the description of everyday experience as it is perceived by the
consciousness of the individuals” (Kafle, 2011, p. 188). An Existential Phenomenological
approach insists upon the following requisites and constraints:
1. “Whereas Husserl saw the task of transcendental phenomenology to be that of
describing the lived world from the viewpoint of a detached observer, the
observer cannot separate himself from the world.
2. Shift of the notion of the Lebenswelt (lived-world) to the emphasis upon being-inthe-world expanded phenomenology in a way that allowed it to consider the
totality of human relationships in the world in terms of the individual's concrete
existence
3. ‘Being-in-the-world’ refers exclusively to human reality in contrast to nonhuman
reality, and although the specific terminology has varied among existentialists,
common to all is the insistence that human reality is situated in a concrete worldcontext. In short, man is only man as a result of his actions which are worked out
in the world
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4. This is not a concept that arises only in reflection. Even prior to reflection upon
one's awareness of being-in-the-world there is already a pre-reflective grasp of the
basic modalities which are his ways of being-in-the-world.
5. In pre-reflective experience, the subject and world are not distinct; they are rather
the givens of concrete experience which can only be separated by a process of
abstraction
6. Any reflection--whether theoretical or practical--already assumes man's prereflective experience of the world and his activity in the world” (Stewart &
Mickunas, 1990, pp. 64-65).
The third phenomenological theory is Grounded Research Theory, or Grounded
Theory, and it involves “unraveling the elements of experience. Its foundation is based
upon close, rigorous, long term study of the phenomenon, and “from a study of these
elements and their interrelationships, a theory is developed” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 4).
Ethnography is the fourth and final phenomenological methodology, and requires
“extensive fieldwork that allow for direct observations of the activities of the group being
studied, communications and interactions with the people and opportunities for informal
and formal interviews” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 1).
Selected Research Methodology
Case Study, Ethnography, and Grounded Theory methodologies were considered
as options and quickly discarded in favor of the three phenomenological options.
Polkinghorne (1989) states that the objective of a IPA approach is to “come way from the
phenomenology with the feeling, ‘I understand better what it is like for someone to
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experience that’” (as cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 82). This statement is simple, but is
directly what I wanted to gain from the research.
IPA includes both heuristic-Transcendental as well as hermeneutic approaches.
However, heuristic-Transcendental IPA requires suspending personal opinions. Although
potentially desirable, this did not seem realistic, since I have extensive experience with
corruption, lethal violence and have lived and worked in regions of extreme violence.
Avoiding personal opinion and bias in this situation was also nonsensical, since my own
personal perspective and experience should be used as a strength, if possible, and not as a
detriment. Heuristic-Transcendental IPA was also based upon the concept of
“discover[ing] reality”, and that by “suspending personal prejudices”, subsequent
analysis would reveal the “core or essence” of the phenomenon. On that same note,
Husserl based Transcendental IPA on the belief that a “single, essential and description
presentation of a phenomenon” could be obtained (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). This was
concerning, since it was not clear to me that corruption had a singular core description,
nor was it clear that this description would be defined in the same manner by different
individuals. Although Transcendental IPA is arguably the most popular form of
phenomenology used in research today, it did not seem appropriate. This left
Hermeneutical Phenomenology and Existential Phenomenology as viable approaches.
Hermeneutical IPA approaches clearly allowed subjective interpretation of data,
with such data originating from subjects but eventually being the researcher’s own
written text expressing reflections, thoughts, and feelings as a result of the research. This
approach requires enormous amounts of writing and subsequent reflection upon the
researcher’s own writing, feelings and interpretation of the subjects’ feelings and
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expression. Although clearly valuable, this methodology also seemed to be more
applicable to situations where the Participants may be more generically selected and not
necessarily experienced with the exact phenomenon under investigation.
By comparison, Existential Phenomenology allowed the literal, direct and
subjectively experienced stories of Participants to be analyzed within the context of each
Participant’s interpretation of what is, and what is not, corrupt from a “concrete
perspective” of each individual’s “lived world” (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990, p. 64). An
Existential Phenomenological methodology pursued an understanding of issues,
perspective and lived experiences through each subject’s eyes and experience “as it is
perceived by the consciousness of the individuals” (Kafle, 2011, p. 186). An Existential
perspective of “being in the world” contrasts with Husserl’s Transcendental
Phenomenology perspective of “lived world” where, “from the viewpoint of a detached
observer, the observer cannot separate himself from the world” (Stewart & Mickunas,
1990, p. 64).
Existential Phenomenology also considers the pre-reflective influence of culture,
context and environment to be of primary importance. This is particularly important,
since my own background includes many years living and working within the corruptridden societies of Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda and Liberia. Rather
than completely bracketing off these past experiences, Existential Phenomenology allows
me to leverage and extend this background and pre-reflection as a component of what is
otherwise unbiased analyses. Hence, for this particular research project, an Existential
Phenomenological Analysis methodology was deemed ideal, and was chosen as the
preferred approach.

122
This research methodology and approach also required the development of
questions. These questions were carefully and iteratively developed to ensure open-ended
responses without bias, and without pressure. In general, Moustakas (1994) suggests that
two broad general questions are always asked for Phenomenological Analysis: 1) “What
have you experienced in terms of the phenomenon, and 2) What contexts or situations
have typically influenced or affected your experiences of the phenomenon” (as cited in
Creswell, 2013, p. 83)? Moustakas’ advice was used to develop the interview questions,
which have been included as Appendix B.
Coding, Sample Metrics and Data Gathering
Coding and data gathering. All types of phenomenology involve interviewing
subjects, analyzing documents, and/or the review of all types of media. The review of
collected data is defined as coding. Coding refers to analysis performed in a rigorous,
formal fashion that allows an incremental and sequential understanding of the data, while
hopefully avoiding inadvertent self-bias. It typically involves assigning a series of letters
(or Codes) to categories to themes to theory (Saldana, 2009, p. 8). The data is then
contrasted by using the previously assigned codes, lumping and splitting the data into
logically oriented groups (Saldana, 2009, p. 19). Clark (2005) states that analytic memos
include “sites of conversation with ourselves about our data” (as cited in Saldana, 2009,
p. 32). These memos focus upon “what I am thinking as I analyze data will be presented
as a memo,” and that “each memo . . . be labeled with a concept” (Corbin & Strauss,
2008, p. 163). Analytic memos can include: “1) Personal reflections, 2) Research
questions, 3) Code choices and operational definitions, 4) Emergent patterns, categories,
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themes and concepts, 5) Networks, 6) Emergent theories, 7) Ethical dilemmas, 8 Future
steps, and 9) Final report” (Saldana, 2009, pp. 34-39).
Coding is typically performed in cycles, with the first cycle or pass through the
data being of an overview nature. This is where general categories and observations are
made. First Cycle coding categories include, but are not limited to: “attribute coding, invivo coding, hypothesis coding, values coding, and descriptive coding” (Saldana, 2009, p
46). Then, with key phrases, thoughts and observations already coded from first cycle
activity, a second cycle of coding occurs. Second cycle coding is a much more advanced
way of reorganizing and reanalyzing data from first cycle methods (Saldana, 2009, p.
149). Second cycle coding categories include, but are not limited to: “Axial Coding,
Pattern Coding, and Focused Coding” (Saldana, 2009, p. 32). The primary goal of the
second cycle coding is to develop categorical, thematic, conceptual or theoretical
organization (Saldana, 2009, p. 149). For example, if there were 50 codes from first cycle
coding, the result from second cycle coding might be three categories, with 25, 15 and 10
codes respectively (Saldana, 2009, p. 149). Coding stops when further data collection and
sampling will not add anything new to the conceptualization, or at the point of
“saturation” (Corbin & Straus, 2008, pp. 143, 263).
The following six steps, redacted from this dissertation’s IRB (see Appendix F),
pragmatically describe the process of data gathering, coding and analyses. I used this
process without incident for all coding and analysis.
Step 1: Read and re-read the original data. Take a break between successive
readings. Take care to have an open mind, void of predisposed conclusions. For initial
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readings, take particular care to avoid confusing the data and experiences of one
Participant with another Participant.
Step 2: Make notes, comments, codes and categories for anything of interest.
Writing down thoughts, albeit personal and intuitive, through the data analysis process is
invaluable. Scan or re-type all hand-written notes so that all data is in electronic format.
Step 3: Identify and develop emerging themes. This is where trends and patterns
are hopefully identified. Reread transcripts (again) as necessary, and cross correlate with
memos and notes written thus far.
Step 4: Connect and merge themes. Just as Step 3 looked for trends and
relationships between various types of data, this step looks for trends and relationships
between various trends and patterns.
Step 5: Repeat Steps 2-4 throughout, using different types of coding techniques in
Step 2.
Step 6: Merge themes from different interviews and cases together. Develop and
identify models and theories. Several preliminary models have already been developed as
part of the Literature Study of the dissertation. These models may end up being
confirmed as appropriate. However, take care to avoid forcing the data, trends and
patterns to fit the model. Instead, be objective and take steps to create new models as the
data and patterns dictate.
The qualitative analysis software MAXQDA was used to assist with all of the
steps above. This specialized software allowed all codes, patterns, and trends to be linked
within a single file. The software also provided several tools to visual display various
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trends and relationships, greatly enhancing the analysis’ depth, accuracy and time
efficiency.
Sample size. Sample size for research using a phenomenology-based
methodology must include at least two subjects, though a minimum of three to six
subjects are recommended (Smith et al., 2009, p. 51). The sample sizes should be fairly
homogeneous, if possible, but care must also be taken to avoid being deliberately nonhomogenous in order to make a comparison (Smith et al., 2009, p. 50). A detailed
examination of each case is then performed, with similarities and differences identified
through coding. Phenomenology researchers need “access to rich and detailed personal
accounts” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 40).
This dissertation and its associated IRB mandated that a sample size of six to ten
Participants be obtained, and that all subjects abide by inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Although challenging, eight Participants were successfully identified, recruited and
interviewed.
Sample recruitment and selection. Over the past fifteen years, I have lived and
worked extensively in regions of extreme conflict, including, not without coincidence,
this dissertation’s six targeted regions of study. These six regions included Sudan, Iraq,
Uganda, Iraq, Liberia, South Sudan, and Afghanistan. Throughout this period, a fairly
robust network of friends and professional contacts was developed. This network was
used to solicit eight interview subjects, all self-identifying as being from one of the six
targeted regions of study. The interviews were performed by Skype, in person or by
telephone. Face-to-face interviews occurred in Gainesville, Virginia, in the vicinity of my
home, or in a location within the Participant’s respective country of self-identification.
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Participants were recruited via my personal network, Gatekeepers and from
friends of Gatekeepers. This latter technique is called snowballing. Gatekeepers were
identified and recruited through existing personal friends and contacts from within my
personal network through telephone, Skype, email or face-to-face activities. Snowballing
was encouraged, but failed to successfully recruit any potential Participants until after the
research had been substantially completed. As a result, these successful results of
snowballing were never interviewed. In the end, all candidates were recruited directly by
me through my own proprietary network.
A Recruitment Poster was developed, approved by the IRB, and was provided to
participants by the PI and/or Gatekeepers at the time of initial contact. The Recruitment
Poster is provided as Appendix C, and was either delivered personally, face-to-face, or by
email. A sample email is included with this dissertation as Appendix D. Once a
Participant was tentatively interested in participating in the study, a copy of the Consent
Form was provided. An unsigned Consent Form is provided with this dissertation as
Appendix E. The Recruiting Poster, Sample Email, and Consent Form were all reviewed
and approved by the IRB on April 27, 2017. A copy of this IRB Approval letter is
included with this dissertation as Appendix F.
Each interview lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. However, each interview
pragmatically involved a modest degree of socializing and preparation prior to, and
immediately after, the interview. Hence, each interview required two to three hours of
expended time from me and from each Participant.
The Gatekeepers provided each prospective participant with a Consent Form at
the time of recruitment, and/or once the individual tentatively agreed to be a Participant.
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The Participants were always given the option of signing the Consent Form immediately,
upon receipt. Regardless of when the Consent Form was signed, the Consent Form and its
overall intentions was always discussed immediately prior to the interview. Questions, if
any, were addressed. A signed copy of the Consent Form was always obtained prior to
the onset of each interview. These Consent Forms, as well as associated personal
identifying information for this dissertation’s Participants, are currently stored under
lock-and-key, with confidentiality provided and protected, as dictated by this
dissertation’s IRB.
Inclusion criteria. In accordance with the IRB, all Participants were required to
have the following mandatory attributes. Note that this study was secular and gender
agnostic.
1. Self-identify being from the region/country under study, such identification
stemming from being born, raised (lived in the region for at least three years after
age 14) and/or working extensively (at least five years) within regions of extreme
violence. Relevant regions of extreme violence are limited to Sudan, South Sudan,
Iraq, Uganda, Afghanistan and/or Liberia. Other regions will not be considered.
2. Have experienced the non-natural death of at least one close friend or family
member through insurgency, civil war, genocide, dictatorial oppression and/or
other form of lethal violence.
3. Be over the age of 18 at the time of the interview, which is also the time/date at
which the Informed Consent Form will be signed.
4. Volunteer, and be willing to be interviewed about their experiences and feelings
about violence and feelings of insecurity as they relate to corruption.
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5. Be able to understand and speak English.
Exclusion criteria. In accordance with the IRB, all Participants were excluded
who were:
1. Unable or unwilling to provide Informed Consent via the Consent Form.
2. Unable or unwilling to safely complete the interview process for any reason
whatsoever.
3. Employed or involved with/by mass media (e.g. newspapers, internet blogs, etc.)
4. Solicited through any type of third party coercion, threat, financial reward or
associated influence.
5. Unable or unwilling to express their feelings, thoughts, experiences and
impressions.
6. Not self-identifying as being from a targeted region of extreme violence, such
regions being Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Uganda, Afghanistan and/or Liberia.
Interview scheduling and approach. Interviews occurred either in person or via
Skype and lasted between two to three hours each, overall. It was very important to
ensure that the subjects were at ease, so about half of the interviews involved two or three
phases. Breaking up the interview process made the entire experience less intimidating.
The first phase of the interview focused primarily upon setting the stage for the
subsequent phase and was not recorded. Social exchanges occurred, and a degree of trust
was established. The next two phases collectively included questions requiring reflection
and were recorded.
Each interview was scheduled by email, telephone or face-to-face
communication. Alternatively, Gatekeepers were given the opportunity to schedule
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interviews on behalf of the PI. Interviews were scheduled for an appropriate day, time
and location mutually acceptable and suitable for the Participant and the PI. These times
were typically in the morning, eastern standard time, as the majority of participants were
located in Africa, the Middle East, or SW Asia. The locations of face-to-face interviews
included, but were not limited to, private homes, coffee shops, hotel common rooms,
libraries, and any mutually agreed upon public location that provided an acceptable
degree of privacy.
The recorded portion of each interview lasted 60-90 minutes. All interviews were
conducted in English. Interviews were semi-structured and utilized an interview protocol
as outlined in IRB Section 7A, and included here as Appendices A and B. Interviews
were recorded using a TASCOM DR-05 digital audio recorder. The Participant was
always informed that the interview was being recorded and would be subsequently
transcribed. Formal written consent obtained earlier using the Consent Form shown in
Appendix E was verbally reaffirmed prior to beginning the interview. Written notes were
taken during the interview and were treated with the same degree of confidentiality as
other interview material. It was made clear that follow-up interviews, if needed, were
voluntary and at the discretion of the Participant, and would range from 20-90 minutes.
Follow-up interviews followed the same structure as the interview. Each Participant was
asked to participate in only one interview session, with an option for voluntary follow-up
interviews as needed. Follow-up interviews were used in several instances, with each
follow-up interview occurring within an hour or so of the initial interview. Interviews
were conducted in a variety of fashions, with prioritized options ranging from face-toface, Skype or telephone. There was significant travel involved by the Principal
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Researcher, with interviews occurring in Orlando, Florida, Kampala, Uganda and the PI’s
home in Gainesville, Virginia.
Demographic questions. Demographic information, if not already known, was
collected during Phase 1. These questions are outlined below, and are also included with
this dissertation as Appendix A:
•

Sex?

•

Race?

•

Ethnicity (if applicable)

•

Marital Status?

•

Children?

•

Country of Citizenship?

•

Country of Self-Identification?

•

Education?

•

Current Occupation?

•

Religious Persuasion?
Interview questions. The following questions listed below and included with this

dissertation as Appendix B were posed, with the interaction recorded and subsequently
transcribed. They are listed in order of chronological priority, but I sometimes modified
this priority as the interview progressed. I was always ready to stop the interview
immediately upon the request of the subject. However, this never occurred. Because of
the logistics and challenges of setting up these interviews, multiple interviews with each
subject were neither intended nor pragmatically desired. Hence, there were several
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situations where small breaks were taken, with the interview recommencing immediately
thereafter.
1. Introduction Question: First, I wanted to express my sincere gratitude for you
helping me out with this research. I really appreciate it! Let’s begin by
introducing ourselves and describing the objectives of our time together today,
and the associated objectives of this project. My name is Mark Thaller, and I am
the Principal Investigator for this research focusing on Corruption and its effects
upon Lethality and Feelings of Safety in Regions of Extreme Conflict. I am a U.S.
citizen, and have spent a good part of my life serving careers on Wall Street,
nuclear engineering, consulting and the U.S. Navy. However, over the past fifteen
years I have lived and worked independently and often without government
support in regions of extreme conflict, to include Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq,
Liberia, Uganda and Afghanistan advising military and government leadership as
well as advising commercial clients on entrepreneurial matters. This has
compelled me to try to understand what, why and how such hardship, conflict and
lethality is occurring in these regions, which is why I am now focusing my efforts
through this PhD, to hopefully better understand what I saw, heard and felt. So,
this is “me” in sixty seconds. Now, let’s talk about you.
a. Shift to Demographic Questions. If possible, obtain answers to the
Demographic Questions before the interview.
2. Can you tell me a little about how yourself, and where you spent your teenage
years? And then?

132
3. Please tell me about a time where you experienced fear (of death or severe harm)
for yourself, your family, your friends?
4. Please tell me a little bit about the home, town and country that you are
remembering?
5. I understand that you lived through a period where many people died. Please tell
me what you think about so many people in your family, town, region, and/or
country being killed.
6. What does corruption mean to you? Why do you feel this way?
7. Please describe why you believe that your country, government, military acts (or
ever acted) corruptly (or not)?
8. Tell me about a time that corruption that made you upset? Why do you think that
this corruption occurred?
9. Tell me about other countries that you think are corrupt? Why do you think that
they are acting the way they do?
10. Please tell me why you think that some countries are more corrupt than others,
and why you feel this way.
11. Please tell me why you think that corruption in your country, your town, in the
military and/or anywhere affected (or did not affect) your feelings of security or
the number of people killed.
12. Have your feelings about corruption changed over your lifetime? Why do you
think they have changed?
13. Please tell me about a time where you felt very safe? Why do you think this
example came to mind?
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14. Let’s talk about the people in charge of the government, law enforcement,
military, legal system and their degree of corruption? What comes to mind when
you think of these people?
15. What has a person, group, or department in your country done, in your opinion,
that has most reduced violent death, and/or most reduced related mortality and/or
most enhanced your feelings of security? Why do you think that these efforts
were so successful? Let’s take some time to ponder this before answering.
16. What has a person, group or department done that has most increased violent
death, and most reduced your feelings of security? Why do you think that these
efforts were so unsuccessful? Let’s take some time to ponder this before
answering.
17. Probing will occur in each instance where the subject refers to death, violence, or
fear with questions like:
a. What you were thinking and feeling when that occurred?
b. Why do you think that this (violence/death/mistreatment) may have
occurred?
c. What do you think the other party was thinking and feeling when this
occurred?
Transcriptions. The interviews were transcribed, verbatim, by native-English
speakers into MS Word files by Vanan Online Services, doing business as (dba) Quick
Transcription Service, a professional transcription service. A formal Non-Disclosure
Agreement (NDA) was executed with Quick Transcription Service on April 18, 2017.
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Time stamps were applied to all transcriptions every 30 seconds. All of the
Participants have English as their second or third language. Most have moderate to heavy
accents, too. As a result, the transcription service was challenged, but overall provided an
excellent quality product. The eight Participants were interviewed and provided nearly
400 pages of transcribed data. These transcriptions, as well as approximately 50 pages of
memoranda, rough notes, and other material were subsequently uploaded, coded and
analyzed using the MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software.
The audio files, as well as the transcription files, are currently maintained on an
external, password protected memory drive. Hard copy will not be maintained past the
submission of this dissertation. In accordance with the requirements of the IRB, all
interview records will be maintained for 36 months, after which these records will be
destroyed, and a corresponding written attestation provided to Institutional Review
Board’s Center Representative at Nova Southeastern University at the address included
with Appendix F.
Summary
Chapter Three discussed the methodological options available for performing this
dissertation’s research, the basis for selecting Existential Phenomenological Analysis as
the preferred approach, and the tactics and processes associated with the execution of a
phenomenological-based methodology. Chapter Four will discuss the data that was
gathered, its analysis and the emergent themes.
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Chapter Four: Presentation and Analysis of Data
Chapter Overview
A rigorous analysis of nearly 400 pages of memoranda, notes and verbatim
interview transcriptions from this dissertation’s eight Participants required hundreds of
hours of iterative, multi-layered coding. This process revealed several general themes,
with strong supporting data. However, the analysis failed to support an overall theme in a
few areas, too. This section will summarize this process, but will steadfastly exclude
personally identifying information, since the majority of the Participants still reside in
their respective countries, and, as a result, the possibility of persecution and/or retaliation
as a result of their candor and honesty is possible. All personal identification is also
precluded as a result of the Consent Form that I provided and signed with each
Participant prior to each interview, whereby I pledged to uphold all of the Participants’
confidentiality and to safeguard the storage of all confidential documents.
Participant Demographic Profiles
Basic demographic data was gathered prior to, or in the course of, each interview,
in accordance with the demographic questions outlined in Section 3 and included as
Appendix A. Table 4 summarizes the demographic information obtained. It is important
to note that the names used within this table are completely arbitrary in an effort to
protect confidentiality, while also allowing easy reference to a Participant’s thoughts,
statements and/or feelings. Each of these aliases were randomly assigned from among the
first names of my own children, nieces and nephews.
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Table 4
Participants’ Demographic Profiles
Alias

Sex,
Marital
Status
Male,
Married

Race

Religion

Education,
Profession

African
Black

Christian

Kyle

Male
Married

African
Black

Christian

Daniel

Male,
Married

Arab

Muslim

Nate

Male,
Married

Kurdish Muslim

Matt

Male,
Married

African
Black

Christian

David

Male,
Married

African
Black

Christian

Bridget

Female,
Married

African
Black

Christian

Jeremy

Male,
Married

Arab

Muslim

Post-graduate
degrees,
Military
Officer
High School
diploma,
Driver &
facilitator
College
degree,
Construction
management
High-school
diploma,
Entrepreneur
College
degree,
Entrepreneur
College
degree,
Medical Prof.
Post-graduate
degrees,
Medical
doctor
Post-graduate
degrees,
Senior
manager

Josh

Citizenship
South
Sudan

Country of
SelfIdentification
Sudan,
South Sudan,
Uganda

Uganda

Uganda

Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Iraq

Iraq
(Kurdistan)

South
Sudan

Sudan,
South Sudan

South
Sudan

Sudan,
South Sudan

Uganda

Uganda

Sudan

Sudan

The Participants for this study represent the feelings, impressions and reflections
of Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq and Uganda. Half of the Participants selfidentified with Sudan and/or South Sudan. However, with few exceptions, their
impressions and comments aligned very closely with the remaining Participants. All of
the participants were married, and all but one was male. The Participants’ education level
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varied from High School to several years of post-graduate education and associated
degrees. All of the Participants were highly expressive, and, clearly, very intelligent.
Religious persuasions were either Christian or Muslim.
It is important to note that other than the country of self-identification being
mandated as one of the countries of interest referenced by this dissertation’s IRB, none of
the other demographic metrics were deemed relevant as inclusion or exclusion criteria.
Hence, the demographic mix described herein and presented by Table 4 is completely
random. This being said, there is significant satisfaction, post-dissertation, in having
recruited and interviewed individuals having such a high degree of intelligence, verbal
expression and candor.
Coding, Memo and Analysis Tactics
Each of the interviews was transcribed by Quick Transcription Services, a
professional transcription services firm. An NDA was executed prior to any transcription
occurring. Coding was performed using the assistance of a MAXQDA, a qualitative
analysis software developed and distributed by VERBI GmbH, located in Berlin,
Germany. MAXQDA allowed the transcription files to be uploaded directly, and
maintained an ongoing aggregate of the original files as well as all coding annotations.
Memos were frequently written, summarizing midstream thoughts, personal
reflections and continual findings. A memo was commonly written concurrent with, or
immediately after, each interview. These memos sometimes utilized direct redactions and
tables from MAXQDA. In other instances, the memos were written free-form, without
structure, and were more akin to a journal or diary format. My observations and eventual
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conclusions evolved over time, and the progression of these memos served as a catalyst
for such evolvement.
The eight Participants’ transcriptions involved 13 separate MSWord files. These
numbers are unequal because some of the interviews required two phases, and so there
were two files for some of the Participants. A total of 485 minutes of interviews were
transcribed, with an associated 346 pages of double spaced transcriptions coded. The
coding was performed sequentially, one document at a time. However, as each
subsequent document was read and coded, the coding structure and format within
MAXQDA was modified and repeatedly updated. Each of the transcriptions was
reviewed individually and in concert with the coding that had been ascribed. MAXQDA
made this process fairly efficient, since the transcriptions, as well as coding to include
remarks and memos, were maintained within a single MAXQDA data file.
First cycle coding was performed using categories of Initial, Attribute and InVivo coding (Saldana, 2009, pp. 55, 64). This was iteratively refined with hypothesis,
values, and emotion coding superimposed (Saldana, 2009, pp. 123, 89, 86). Second cycle
coding was performed using Focused, Pattern and Theoretical coding categories
(Saldana, 2009, pp. 155, 152, 163). All of this was maintained within, and by, the
MAXQDA software tool, allowing codes and references to be quickly added, modified,
merged and/or deleted.
Visual maps and tables were also created by using MAXQDA. This allowed me
to see overlapping codes and interrelationships, and by so doing, to determine general
themes. Critical quotations were also identified and maintained within a separate,
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artificial coding category. This greatly simplified the presentation of data, since I was
confident that a good portion of these critical quotations would be needed and used.
Data Analysis and Codes
Over the course of analysis nearly 200 code categories were created, with nearly
2000 quotations initially referenced. These were continually merged, modified, vetted
and refined to their final form, comprised of 68 coded categories and 885 verbatim coded
references. Tables 5 and 6, both shown below, describe this dissertation’s final Code
System. Table 5 provides a clear snapshot of the overall Code Hierarchy, while Table 6
provides a matrix showing from which documents each of the various codes were
extracted.
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Table 5
Code System Hierarchy
Code System
Code System

Memo
New Critical Quotes
Critical Quotations, Overall 8-18-2017
Benefits of Corruption
Greater Good
Factors (Drivers) of Corruption
Human Factors
Moral (Religous & Ethical) Conviction
Pride
Selfish Betterment
Fatigue, Resignation, Despondency
Peer Pressure (including fear)
Temptation, Greed & Seduction
Job Security & Protection of Interests
Naivete; Lack of Perspective
Scarcity of Resources - Extreme Poverty
Family Responsiblities
Revenge
Rationalization - Greater good
Cultural Factors
Status Quo
Acceptance
Toleration of Corruption
Established Customs and Behavior
Cultural Conviction
Religious Influence
Tribal-Ethnic
Institutional Factors
Foreign Influence
School System & Education
Lack of Incentives
Gov't Imposed/Promotion Toleration
Gov't Promoted Corruption
Extraction Resources (oil, gold, etc.)
Criminal, Violent, Illegal Environment
Non-oversight
Willful Tolerance (via Police, etc.)
Systemmic Inertia
Political Leadership
Public Trust
Inneffective Leadership and Policies
Rule-of-Law --- Corrupt judiciary
Lack of Repurcussions
Non-accountability
Military Influence
Fear-Safety-Violence-Death resulting from corruption
Violence to Protect Interests
Fear
Fear of Atrocities
Lethal Conflict
Violence (general and via police)
Reduced/enhanced Safety
Forms/Types of Corruption
Financial Remuneration
Non-confrontation
Acceptance of Situation
Maintain Status Quo
Tolerating Corruption
Discretionary Violence & Crimes
Willfully Non-performing Public Duty
Sexual Favors; Indentured Servitude
Power
Political Objective
Foreign Policy Objective
Military Objective
Unjust or Immoral Promotion of War or Violence
Reallocation of Gov't Resources
Amassing Non-financial Resources
Obligatory Reciprical Gratitude
Tribal Gratitude
Family Gratitude

#
885
4
79
0
4
0
0
18
5
23
15
12
23
6
15
15
11
1
3
0
12
0
18
26
18
14
9
0
11
9
1
19
18
5
8
10
18
25
7
15
17
18
12
16
23
0
9
30
7
27
32
16
0
55
0
9
4
18
4
2
5
17
14
7
5
10
14
7
15
10
5
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Table 6
Code System Matrix
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All of the codes were aligned with four key categories: Benefits of Corruption,
Factors of Corruption, Fear-Violence-Safety-Death as a result of Corruption, and
Forms/Types of Corruption. Each of these primary categories are further delineated by
subcategories, which were collectively used to derive primary themes. Some of these subcategories have much more substantiating data than others. Although I used a qualitative
methodology, observations supported by a plethora of data were more strongly weighted
than isolated instances.
These overall categories were primarily developed in response to this
dissertation’s Research Questions. The subordinate categories were subsequently aligned
to this dissertation’s major themes and were iteratively developed by following the
impressions, feelings, and verbiage of the Participants, as analyzed and interpreted
through coding and thematic data analysis. Each primary category had, in some instances,
more than a dozen subcategories. The most common and eventful subcategories were
selected and constantly refined using graphical tools to further enhance the analysis
process, resulting in either a non-conclusion or in what is presented herein as major
themes.
Chapter Three discussed an Existential Phenomenological methodology to data
collection and analyses. This approach required that care be taken to preserve each
Participant’s subjective interpretation and perspective as a “lived in the [concrete] world”
experience (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990, p. 64). Coding and analysis was conducted with
the realization and understanding that the subject’s experiences were grounded in the
concrete world, and that my own feelings and understanding were also an important part
of the same world and society. “Central to the work of this figures was an emphasis on
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the existing individual, and a call for a consideration of man in his concrete situation,
including his culture, history, relations with others, and above all, the meaning of
personal existence” (Stewart & Mickunas, 1990, p. 63). Existential Phenomenology
considers the pre-reflective influence of culture, context and environment to be of
primary importance, and so I outwardly, purposefully, and visibly engaged myself with
the research, with each Participant, and within the issues of corruption in each respective
country of interest. The Existential Phenomenological approach appears to have been
well received by the Participants and allowed rapport and credibility to be quickly and
significantly established. In hindsight, I cannot fathom the interviews with these eight
Participants providing such detailed, rich data had I not outwardly shared and displayed
shared experiences and empathy with their own perspectives.
A variety of graphical tools were provided by MAXQDA, and were repeatedly
used throughout the various coding passes to visually show the degree of granularity,
specificity, overlap, and commonality between each of the codes. These and other tools
allowed an efficient review and confirmation of the actual quotation and associated
context. Coding is not an exact science; thus, just as the presence of a relationship did not
concretely prove anything, the corresponding lack of a relationship was similarly
ambiguous. Hence, these MAXQDA graphical tools were iteratively, yet extensively
used to tentatively support and/or disprove various mid-research assumptions and
relationships.
Figures 6 and 8 are provided as examples of the dozens of scenarios that I created
as part of the coding and data analysis process. These graphical tools and resulting
diagrams were also highly interactive. Each of the hundreds of lines shown in these
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figures, codes, and sub-codes are interactive, and link each of the coding categories to
corresponding quotations with the respective Participant’s associated file, showing the
degree of interdependence. The importance, or degree of, inter-coding association is
shown by the size of each linkage-line. These lines are all directly linked to each of the
nearly 70 codes, and to the nearly 1000 final-coded segments from this study’s eight
Participants and an associated 13 documents and nearly 400 pages of verbatimtranscribed text.
The graphical images shown in Figures 6 and 8 each correspond to an electronic
file of nearly 100 MB. The files are very large because of the linkage data described by
the previous paragraph, rendering the images as nearly illegible when viewed in hard
copy. The MAXQDA software and associated computer can easily zoom-in and view the
images. However, this is not possible in printed form, and so each of these images has
been magnified. The magnified images of Figure 6 and Figure 8 are shown below as
Figures 7, 9 and 10.

Figure 6. A. Forms of Corruption -- Code Co-Occurrence Model
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Figure 7. B. Forms of Corruption -- Code Co-Occurrence Model (Magnified)

Figure 8. A. Fear-Violence-Death-Safety --- Code Co-Occurrence Model
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Figure 9. B. Fear-Violence-Death-Safety -- Code Co-Occurrence Model (Magnified)
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Figure 10. C. Fear-Violence-Death-Safety -- Code Co-Occurrence Model (2x Magnified)
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Emergent Themes and Supporting Data
The emergent themes within this dissertation were continually identified,
developed and refined through many cycles of coding as described in Chapter Three.
These themes were merged within the coding and sub-coding process, and are now
presented in textual form within Tables 7-9. Some of these primary categories have a
dozen or more subcategories. In these instances, the more numerically dominating
subcategories were selected as representative, and, upon refinement, further designated as
an Emerging Theme. This is not to say that the other categories listed are not important.
Rather, in these instances, there was, instead, simply inadequate research to substantiate
further designation.
The following sections present supporting data for each of the emergent themes
and subcategories. Discussion is brief or absent, since the relationship between the
category and associated quotations are generally self-evident.
Benefits of corruption. There was very little supporting evidence associated with
corruption and its potential benefits. Instead, the vast majority of the data supported the
contrary, or zero tolerance for corruption, with corruption being defined in whatever
manner deemed appropriate by the Participant. It is also interesting to note that this
scarcity of discussion and data occurred despite the Recruiting Poster and Consent Form
each alluding to this study’s focus upon the potential for positive benefits of corruption.
Only the 8th, and last, Participant of the eight Participants interviewed provided any
justification for corruption’s potential to have positive benefits. This is not to say that the
other Participants disagreed with the positions suggested by this last Participant. Instead,
it was important to note that the potential tolerance of corruption having positive benefits
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was never overtly queried. I felt it critically important to allow the Participant maximum
freedom of expression, and so I took great care to avoid suggesting or inferring
conclusions while carefully noting their responses, emotions, stories and inferred
feelings. This was in line with an Existentialist form of Phenomenology, whereby I was
aware of my own feelings and persuasion, while also respecting each Participant’s right
to have a different, very subjective point of view, and concurrently realizing that there
may be more than one underlying theme.
Greater good. This theme is simple in its statement, but much more complicated
in its meaning. The pursuit of greater good in this instance does not contradict, nor
malign, morals, ethics, or civil rights in the long term. Instead, it is oriented to allow the
passage of time and the toleration, to some degree, of corruption, during and after which
institutions can be established. These institutions, of various types and forms, once
established, can then be utilized to further reduce corruption to levels of non-tolerance.
However, until such institutions are formed, mandates of non-tolerance, while noble, may
delay and/or curb the establishment of these critically needed institutions. The importance
and critical relevance for creating institutions, from one Participant’s perspective, is
supported by the following two quotations.
Yes, I believe that in less developed societies, where as I’ve mentioned before, we
virtually don’t have institutions, or we have very little institutions. [Hence] . . .
there is a space for corruption to thrive, and in order to fill this space we need to
support institutions. And, if these institutions are not willing to be present [or are
not formed] because of this corruption, then we are actually defeating the
objective of getting rid of corruption . . . So, I think that institutions should, or
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parties should . . . try to be present where there is corruption, and participate in
these communities in order to be able to improve the conditions of these
communities, and therefore reduce corruption. However, if we want a prerequisite
zero corruption, then it might as well mean that these institutions will no longer
be able to help us within this community, and as a result I think we’ll have more
corruption. (Daniel from Sudan)
I think you do change your emotions of corruption. I think when you are younger
you see things in black and white. You do not tolerate any form of corruption.
You don’t want to associate yourself with any person who has an iota of
corruption in him. I think this changes with time when you are experience[d with]
life, and you start to realize that there is a grey area in between. There are people
who might not share your same values, but you have to accommodate their
existence in order to be sure of the greater good. (Daniel from Sudan)
Zero tolerance for corruption. Feelings advocating zero tolerance for corruption
were much more prevalent than tolerance of any kind. Data supporting this conclusion
include, but is not limited to the following quotations.
I think whatever level [of corruption, that] . . . for me, I think that corruption is
corruption, and it is an evil for the society. But I say ‘no’ [to corrupt behavior]. I
didn't succumb to that. I didn't succumb to that. I think corruption is absolute.
There's no way corruption can be accepted by another person. There is no
corruption which is better than the other. I personally agree that there must be
zero tolerance to corruption. I will say that. Zero tolerance to corruption. (Kyle
from South Sudan and Uganda)
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And those people who are not corrupted, it is not that they are afraid of the
government. [Instead], they are afraid of their God and their religion, [as they
think] that it [the bribe or extortion] is not my money. [They are afraid that] God
sees this, and [so they decide] ‘I’m not going to be corrupted’. (David from
Afghanistan)
Well, basically, nobody wants corruption, of course. Every[body] wants
everything to be done in according to laws and regulations. (Simon from Sudan
and South Sudan)
Factors of corruption. This primary category has three subcategories, each
representing a potential emerging theme. These three emergent themes derived herein are
designated as Factors of Corruption, and are specifically defined as Human, Institutional
and Cultural Factors of Corruption. They collectively represent the three primary
categories that cause, mitigate, and/or accelerate corrupt behavior. Within each of these
three Corruption Factors’ categories are as many as a dozen specific factors. These
Factors of Corruption are shown in Table 7, and were derived by summarizing the
Participants’ most prevalent and/or relevant themes from Tables 5 and 6. These
Corruption Factors can take the form of a catalyst, an enhancement, or a mitigating
element. Examples of supporting data for each of these Factors and Sub-Factors of
Corruption is provided within the following paragraphs.
Human factors of corruption. My research identified the following 13 Human
Factors of Corruption, with examples provided for each. This is the first of three
emerging themes that appear to affect an individual’s propensity for corrupt behavior.
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Table 7
Factors of Corruption
Human Factors of Corruption
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Institutional Factors of
Corruption
Selfish Betterment
• Systemic Inertia
Pride
• Foreign Influence
Temptation, Greed and/or
• School System and
Seduction
Education
Fear
• Lack of Incentives
Job Security & Protection of • Gov’t-Imposed,
Interests
Promoted, Tolerated
Scarcity of Resources and/or • Political Leadership
Extreme Poverty
& Public Trust
Naiveté, and/or lack of
• Rule of law
perspective
• Military
Fatigue, Resignation, and/or
despondency
Peer pressure
Family responsibilities
Moral (religious & cultural)
conviction
Revenge
Rationalization

Cultural Factors of
Corruption
• Established Customs
and Behavior
• Religious Influence
• Tribal/Ethnic

Selfish betterment. This Human Factor of Corruption included various objectives
focused upon the individual, rather than upon a group, family, community or society. The
following three quotations are provided as supporting corroboration.
Everybody will see that that's the way that you can be because everyone wanted a
better life, wanted a better house, wanted a better work, and these services are not
given by the government. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
So, everyone knows how to help themselves. They’ve got to grab everything.
(Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
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Basically, when . . . [describing] people in my country, they think about their
self. They don’t say, ‘Community.’ They will say ‘our self.’ Everybody now is
thinking about himself. (Jeremy from Iraq)
Pride. Actions performed as function of pride or ego were seen as drivers of
corrupt behavior. An example of data supporting this conclusion is provided by the
following quotation.
It’s unfortunate, but [in] the culture [that] is being formed now, . . . it’s more to
your [image] . . . [to have] the most money you can make from any position or
any place that you have responsibility over. So basically, it means that if you are
in a position, and you can make whatever money extra than your regular monthly
wages, then if you ignore it and if you don’t make it, then you are silly. You
should not be in that position, and you are being made of – made fun of by your
own friends. Your close friends will laugh at you and say, ‘How silly you are.
You could have this much money and you ignored it.’ So, that culture is being
formed, and it is strong. It is strong right now, but it is getting worse, you know,
in a negative way, [whereby] basically, that if you’re in a position, you have to
basically, you have to get money from outside sources, or from any other source
other than your monthly wages. (David from Afghanistan)
Fear. Feelings of fear or insecurity can arise from others behaving corruptly.
Similarly, fear can cause an individual to choose whether or not to engage in corrupt
activities. Examples of data supporting this conclusion are provided by the following four
quotations.
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The fear of the Taliban would stop people [from acting corruptly]. Some of the
people; the majority, I would say, they had religious beliefs that would stop them
[from acting corruptly]. Then, the other part, the fear of the Taliban punishment
[stopped them from acting corruptly]. (David from Afghanistan)
And when he saw how corrupted it was, he couldn’t stay there. After three
months, he quit. Now he’s doing business, so he didn’t want to be a part of that
group. But, a lot of people want to be, and they are there, and if you want to be
there acting clean; no, you would not fit there, so you will be forced to quit or, as
my other distant family, you know, relative who was killed, you will end it up
being, as they say, sleeping with the fish. (David from Afghanistan)
But, it’s [corruption] an ugly thing. But, unfortunately, it’s something which is
growing and becoming very dangerous, as well, because if you tried to talk about
it, . . . to show the high-profile [corruption topics] where billions of shillings [and]
resources are being swindled, . . . you may end up in a mafia van. (Bridget from
Uganda)
If you raise your voice [about corruption], you go to the streets you will be get
arrested. Many people were arrested in the South Sudan. People were jailed, and
eventually some of them were killed. So, what you do? You just keep silent, or
you go and talk outside the country. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
Temptation, greed and/or seduction. Corrupt behavior often occurs in an
unplanned, non-methodical fashion as a result of human weakness and vulnerability to
temptation, greed and seduction. Examples of data supporting this conclusion are
provided by the following three quotations.
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When they got their hands on the U.S. dollars, and being a part of a human being
having greed, so they caught; they would cut a part of that money for themselves.
(David from Afghanistan)
The amount of money was so much, that they would be like, ‘You know, I can’t
let this go.’ Nobody’s asking me. The government is not like [the] Taliban [and is
not going] to punish me. I don’t go to jail for stealing the money; I don’t . . . [and
I am not] being sued for stealing the money. And this is a big money, so should I
let it go? Maybe not. And that’s what it is started. And then the other people
seeing their bosses or their subordinates, you know, stealing and getting all that
[money], and nobody’s asking them [about it], so they were motivated to do that,
which is now . . . it is really terrible. Because, as I said, it’s very hard to find
somebody in the government who is not corrupt. (David from Afghanistan)
So, he has to accept it [the money] and he, himself, will say ‘okay, since my
commander is asking me to release this fund for his family or his personal
benefits, I will take also something out of it. (Simon from Sudan and South
Sudan)
Job security & protection of interests. Preserving employment was seen as a
common driver of corrupt behavior. This following data supports this conclusion.
People are thankful to [have their jobs] . . . and so they end up bribing the
authorities. It’s a lucrative business going on. Corruption. Therefore, survival
becomes [a priority] for the people. Realize that, you know, violence comes in,
because the [people will take steps to] protect their interest. (Bridget from
Uganda)
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The President also is fighting back, [in order] to keep his position. (Simon from
Sudan and South Sudan)
And, the moment somebody's corrupt, he or she will never want again to leave the
position where he is. So, this is the connection where we have a very tragic
situation. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
Scarcity of resources and/or extreme poverty. Lack of alternatives amidst
extreme poverty, with realistic risks of starvation and duress, were commonly expressed
by Participants as significant reasons for corrupt behavior. Three examples of data
supporting this conclusion are provided below.
They steal, because of they don’t get their salary. I saw on the news [one] day,
which makes me really sad, [that] a teacher . . . stole a can of milk for his kid. He
got [put] in jail for three years. A teacher! The money we get is not enough to
feed the people. (Jeremy from Iraq)
They, [the army soldiers] are corrupt, because probably poor of pay. They [are]
poorly paid. They have squalid living conditions in their barracks where they live.
[They are only] given the little money they get as salary, so somehow, they have
to make ends meet. That’s what we think [about why soldiers become corrupt].
(Bridget from Uganda)
Corruption is basically caused by poverty. People are very poor. A soldier in the
army is being [paid] 700 pounds [per month]. 700 pounds, which is equivalent to
10 dollars; this is the salary for a month . . . [and as a result of payment delays
from the government] it takes him three to four months to get $10, so what he
does is that he goes on, you know, [having corrupt behavior] and looting. They,
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they do raiding also, they raid the houses and . . . there is a scarcity of resources,
and you have a big population down there, so they need, all of them, they need
these resources. So, everybody has to fight for [the resources]. (Simon from
Sudan and South Sudan)
Naiveté, and/or lack of perspective. Complete ignorance, as well as a
corresponding lack of Eurocentric perspective, was a very surprising, yet common theme
expressed by the Participants. Examples of data supporting this conclusion are provided
by the following 4 quotations.
Because, the Russian time, as I said, the people were kind of [respectful because]
the religious belief was there. It would have stopped a lot of them [from corrupt
behavior]. That was the first thing, and before the Taliban I’m talking about, all
those governments. Plus, the people did not have that much money to offer [as
bribes and corrupt behavior]. There was not much. There was just, you know, the
people . . . [they] were happy with what they were making on their, daily life, and
they [didn’t] know that you can [become] corrupt. Basically, believe it or not, I
know it’s sounds stupid and silly, but they didn’t know that [they could become
corrupt]. (David from Afghanistan)
[There was] a recent upheaval and a change in the government in Sudan, so a lot
of people were thrust into power that never had power before. Most of them are
not highly educated, and do not have, actually, a professional [perspective] when
it comes to enlightening the mind or experiences. These people, many of them
experienced power that they've never had before, and not knowing how to handle
that power, and not having anybody to learn from, it's not like they were watching
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their father or their father's father. They succumbed to general human temptation
[and became corrupt]. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
Because none of those people constitute what was and is the army, the intellectual
base of these people that might have fought against corruption was never brought
to bear, and because of that, the army doesn’t, in some ways, doesn’t know any
other way. All they know is what they’ve been doing since they were thrown into
this situation with all of this money around them. And, the corruption that’s
existing now in the government of South Sudan and in the army or all the
uniformed forces, part of it came from the bush. Because, when they were in the
bush, all the army and the policing sector was divided to all, so evidently, they
[the soldiers in the bush] had [their] own battalion. (Matt from Sudan & South
Sudan)
He [John Garang, former President of Southern Sudan] was a little bit [corrupt]. A
little . . . but [only] because they [John Garang and his supporters] were in the
bush, of course. They were in [the] bush, and you cannot change overnight. So, in
the bush, they would have no laws. There was no regulation. It’s . . . jungle law.
(Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
Fatigue, resignation, and/or despondency. Philosophical as well as physical
exhaustion were expressed by many Participants as strong drivers of corrupt behavior.
This conclusion is supported by the data gathered, to include the following four
quotations.
People in my country they have zero trust with the government, zero trust with the
police, zero trust with nobody. We had cases where the police or army they came
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to houses. They kidnapped people; not just fake people, [but] real people. So,
there is no trust. I don’t know how you want me to go further, but we don’t trust
the government. We are tired. You know, every day we dream about this.
‘Tomorrow’s going to be better, tomorrow’s going be better, tomorrow’s going to
be better.’ But, it’s not. Since 2013, up to now, every day we are dreaming
something is going to be better, something is going to be better. (Jeremy from
Iraq)
If you get the military to be corrupt, if you get the police to be corrupt, if you get
the legal or the judicial system to be corrupt, then you are done as a country.
(Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
It’s a part of the life, now. Any office you enter, you – you’re expected to pay a
little more to expedite your process, or even [to use] the normal process, you have
to pay, the guy to me, to me to sign. Although he is being paid by the government
to sign that paper for you, but no. If you want him to sign, then you have to pay
him. (David from Afghanistan)
All the good people have gone. All the good people. All good people, I’m telling
you. (Jeremy from Iraq)
Peer pressure. The strength of peer pressure has been, and will likely continue to
always be, a compelling reason for corruption and other types of undesired behavior. This
conclusion is strongly corroborated by the data gathered and exemplified through the
following five quotations.
But, I can tell you about the other departments [in the Afghanistan Government]
which are worse and which are bad. [This] is because the majority of them
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[corrupt people] are there. I know. I knew. Actually, I knew a person, one of our
distant relatives. He was a great guy. He was sort of religious in a good way. He
did not accept any bribes. He did not accept any corruption from anybody. And he
became a judge in one of the districts of Herat, [Afghanistan]. [After] working
there a few months, [he saw that] all his colleagues were corrupted. They didn’t
like him. He didn’t fit in their group. He didn’t fit, and he was trying to be loud
about it. You know; tell others; his friends not do it. So, he was starting to advise,
[or to tell others not to act corruptly], but then, unfortunately, after three or four
months of working there, he was killed. Somebody stopped by . . . [his house] and
. . . he was killed. So, that makes it really hard for a person not who’s not
corrupted to work in those environments. (David from Afghanistan)
When you associate with the people who are corrupt; when you associate with the
people who have this kind of negativity to the public and all that, you sometimes,
if you're not careful, [or] if you are not principled, you [can] get yourself in this
kind of [similarly corrupt] situation. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
So, he has to accept it, and he himself will say ‘Okay. Since my commander is
asking me to release these funds for his family or his personal benefits, I will take
also something out of it.’ And it becomes [acceptable] . . . or else, if he doesn’t do
it…he will be fired. He will be fire from his position. He will [have to be]
transferred somewhere. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
It’s unfortunate, but the culture [that] is being formed now . . . [compels you to
earn as much] money you can make from any position or any place that you have
responsibility over. If you are in a position and you can make whatever money
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extra than your regular monthly wages, then if you ignore it and if you don’t make
it, then you are silly. You should not be in that position, and you are being made
fun of by your own friends. And if you are satisfied with the monthly wage, then,
as I said, you’re being considered as a silly person and not being worthy of that
position. (David from Afghanistan)
There are people who might not share your same values, but you have to
accommodate their existence in order to be sure of the greater good. (Daniel from
Sudan)
Family responsibilities. A sense of duty and responsibility for family transcends
cultural and sovereign boundaries, compelling otherwise righteous people to commit
corrupt acts. Examples of support for this finding include the following four quotations.
Most of our leaders were generals of the army, commanders and all, during their
struggle. And most of them, they have never lived with their families. They have
never taken their families to live in the camps. So, most of them have their
families living in Kenya, in Nairobi, and in Kampala. And they started, you know,
with the pressure of their families and all that. They have to use the resources that
they get from their struggle in order to feed their families. So, when you get
yourself in this kind of situation where your family [is put at risk] . . . because of
economics and the difficulties of finances and all that, [then corrupt activities
occur]. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
I’ve seen the military has been maintaining a control . . . and they have been
shipping all the contracts to their relatives, to their friends, to their wives, to their
children, to themselves. And, there was no way for any business contractor who
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sits with a lot of money, personally, [to ever get the contract]. (Matt from Sudan
& South Sudan)
So, he has to accept it, and he, himself, will say, “Okay, since my commander is
asking me to release this fund for his family or his personal benefits, I will take
also something out of it. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
He’s got to bring all his relatives that belong to him, and he’s got to recruit a
militia that protects him and his small circle. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
Moral (religious & cultural) conviction. Religious and cultural issues negate
corrupt behavior, so the lack of these issues is often associated with corruption. Findings
supporting this conclusion include the following five quotations.
Corruption, actually, is one thing I don’t like. Basically, I grew up within the
values of my culture that does not encourage, actually, cheating others and a
culture that promotes care to others. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
There is a difference between corruption being a fact of life, and corruption being
a way of life, and there are so many countries where corruption is a fact of life. I
wouldn’t rule out any country in the world where corruption is a fact of life, but
the problem is when corruption becomes a way of life, and this is when it hinders
the development; economic, political, and social development. (Daniel from
Sudan)
Whenever we see anything wrong happening, and we keep quiet about it, we are
giving way to corruption, [allowing it] to thrive and develop . . . horns, and
tentacles, so that by the time you start saying, ‘No, no, this is too much. It has to
stop,’ then you know that the beneficiaries, [or affected parties] of that kind of
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corrupt act might actually come up in full force [and be subject to] maximum
[detrimental] effects. (Bridget from Uganda)
Honestly, our religion tells us to not steal, to not lie. That’s correct. To always to
do the good stuff. But nowadays, the religion in my country is weak. You’ve got
to be strong in my country. If you are weak, they will take you. (Jeremy from
Iraq)
And those people who are not corrupted, it is not that they are afraid of the
government. [Instead], they are afraid of their God and their religion, [as they
think] that [the bribe or extortion] is not my money. [They are afraid that] that
God sees this, and [so they] decide ‘I’m not going to be corrupted.’ (David from
Afghanistan)
I think whatever level [of corruption, that] . . . for me, I think that corruption is
corruption, and it is an evil for the society. But I say ‘no’ [to corrupt behavior]. I
didn't succumb to that. I didn't succumb to that. I think corruption is absolute.
There's no way corruption can be accepted by another person. There is no
corruption which is better than the other. I personally agree that there must be
zero tolerance to corruption. I will say that. Zero tolerance to corruption. (Kyle
from South Sudan and Uganda)
Revenge. Revenge as a basis for corruption is not likely very common, and may
be an outlier. Data supporting this conclusion was available only one Participant. An
example of this data is provided below.
One of our managers fired an employee, and that employee went to the security
services and I think he probably bribed them . . . and they came and they actually
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[acted] in revenge. They came to that manager, and he was detained for 35 days,
and he came back in a very miserable state, and we were all worried about his
safety. We were worried about our own safety. (Daniel from Sudan)
Rationalization. Justifying corrupt behavior in favor of a greater good or social
benefit promotes such behavior by making it less egregious. This last Human Factor of
Corruption has limited support, with data provided by only one Participant. However, the
data is compelling, as shown by the following two quotations.
I think you do change your emotions of corruption. I think when you are younger
you see things in black and white. You do not tolerate any form of corruption.
You don’t want to associate yourself with any person who has an iota of
corruption in him. I think this changes with time when you are experienced [with]
life, and you start to realize that there is a grey area in between. There are people
who might not share your same values, but you have to accommodate their
existence in order to be sure of the greater good. (Daniel from Sudan)
Yes, it’s possible [that government leaders and officials might be taking the
argument of greater good too far, and rationalizing their own behavior]. It is
possible of course, but, then again, [with respect to Southern Sudan and South
Sudan], we are talking about a situation where you do not have any institutions, or
you have very [weak] institutions. There are people who will most definitely
exploit that situation but, as these institutions grow, I think the, window shuts
down. The window of exploitation. But, definitely people would always exploit
this situation. (Daniel from Sudan)
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Institutional factors of corruption. My research identified the following
Institutional Factors of Corruption, with examples provided for each. This is the second
of three emerging themes that appear to affect an individual’s propensity for corrupt
behavior.
Government-imposed/promoted/tolerated corruption. Although various
government agencies and entities can be comprised of corrupt individuals, these same
institutions can promote such corrupt behavior as a result of rules, regulations and
structure, making it difficult for its personnel to avoid such behavior. Data supporting this
finding includes the following three quotations.
People were still on the feeling of the previous, you know, because they were . . .
the government was stronger, [the] Taliban had just gone, [and] so the
government was a stronger, the government had more control, the people who had
this fear, although the government didn’t, you know, punish anybody. But, they
had this fear of being punished. But then . . . they realized the government doesn’t
care, so then [corruption] raised up, and raised up. So, every day, it rises to a new
level. Every day. And the government, yes, the government has few organizations
and few departments [that are not corrupt]. Now it’s a part of the life, now. (David
from Afghanistan)
I would say that the government is corrupt in the sense that [it is] endorsing
corruption, and does not hold the individuals in the government accountable to
what they do. (Daniel from Sudan)
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[It is] very disappointing when you find that the same institutions that are
supposed to reflect the best practice are the same that have broken. (Kyle from
South Sudan and Uganda)
Political leadership & public trust. Political leadership and an associated level of
public trust is directly related to the onset and proliferation of corrupt behavior. The
following four quotations corroborate this finding.
They just torched those homes, and . . . this [is] a very, very sad thing. Usually,
say, [they] made all of their family men . . . were pushed into their huts, and then
[they] torched them, you know, and that kind of thing. So, it was not really
something which hmm-hmm; it’s still something which is not nice [to recall], and
that probably explains why people in this type of region don’t like the current
government, because of what they experienced. And, [at] one point in time, we
were at home, and then we just saw the people coming, running, from a nearby
village. (Bridget from Uganda)
We had cases where the police or army they came to houses. They kidnapped
people. Not just fake people. Real people. So, there is no trust. I don’t know how
you want me to go further, but we don’t trust the government. We are tired.
(Jeremy from Iraq)
There was no government supervision to control that, because the government is a
human organization. It’s made of human beings. So, every person, they saw
somebody they’re underneath. Or, just some subordinates are having this big
money . . . because they had a hand in that corruption, or that [they were] having
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[a] piece of that money. They could not stop their subordinates because they were
[now] a partner of that crime. (David from Afghanistan)
So, you cannot tolerate any of your colleagues stealing money, and then . . . still
promote him, or still promote her. I think that this is a problem, because the
bigger challenge; the biggest challenges that I notice in my country [are] that
leaders [have] accepted to tolerate all individuals that have caused [corruption, or]
that have actually [been themselves] corrupted in some way of another. (Kyle
from South Sudan and Uganda)
Rule of law. The importance of legal rules and regulations with associated
oversight, enforcement, and accountability was found to be extremely important. The
lack of strong rule of law allows corrupt behavior to occur more readily and to be
rationalized and/or justified more easily, too. Data corroborating this finding is provided
by the following five quotations.
Saddam Hussein was a bad guy, as everybody knows. He was bad in a lot of
aspects, but he was good in . . . [a few ways]. Saddam Hussein was punishing the
person who steals, admittedly. It doesn’t matter [why he was stealing]. He’ll kill
him. He’ll put him in jail forever, even if he steals $10. Right now, there is no
law. That’s why everybody’s acting by themselves. There is no law. You’re by
yourself. (Jeremy from Iraq)
Believe it or not, there is a government, but people go there to the Taliban. [They
go to the Taliban] because it doesn’t cost them as much. Because they don’t have
to pay the judge. Because they don’t have to, you know, corrupt [or pay a bribe
to] the judge for, you know, helping and supporting them. But they were the
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highest paid. They were the highest paid people in the government. Judiciary
people, the judges, were being paid so high. But, you know, they were still
corrupted. No, it is the greed, it does not stop you. (David from Afghanistan)
The Supreme Court is absolutely doing nothing. The judicial system is corrupted
because government brought everyone in. So, I don’t . . . [think] . . .that we’ll see
any changes . . . happen anytime soon. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
There's no accountability, and you can do anything with impunity. A [military]
commander can do anything with impunity. You can kill. You can rob somebody,
and nobody answers for that. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
If the auditor comes and to do auditing on payrolls, the army will say ‘well, where
are you coming from,’ and they will intimidate you with a gun, and all this, so
eventually, of course, you will just leave. So, the army payrolls are not audited.
(Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
I would say that the government is corrupt in the sense that [they are] endorsing
corruption, and does not hold the individuals in the government accountable to
what they do. (Daniel from Sudan)
Military. The presence, involvement, and influence of the military affects, as well
as incites, corrupt behavior in many situations. Evidence supporting a finding of the
military promoting and/or involving itself with corruption include the following six
quotations.
Military leaders and government leaders came from towns like yours and growing
up in a culture that actually does not endorse corruption at all. Regardless of how
you define the definition, these people, many of them experienced power that
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they've never had before, and not knowing how to handle that power and not
having anybody to learn from. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
I was working in Mosul with the Army. There was more than forty-five, fifty
thousand soldiers in that Mosul City; fully equipped. They got training from the
U.S. Army. What happened, when the ISIS, they came, none of those soldiers
they even shot a bullet. They; everybody ran away. There was a corruption from
the top leader; Iraqi Government Leaders, then, to the top commanders. I know
[several] people; soldier [who] work for, or [junior] officers who work for a big
commander. They said, ‘Our commander told us never shoot a bullet. Run away.’
(Jeremy from Iraq)
A [military] commander can do anything with impunity. You can kill. You can
rob somebody, and nobody answers for that. (Kyle from South Sudan and
Uganda)
The way the army is developed, it's developed in a structured manner that actually
is not supposed to have gotten issues of corruption, and all that. It's made in such
a way that it is a little bit difficult; [actually it’s] supposed to be very, very
difficult [to succumb to corruption] within the army structure and all that . . .
because there's a kind of command and control, and there's chain of command and
all those kinds of things. You can't do something without an order. You must get
this. And you can hold people accountable. So, there's this system of
accountability within these institutions [that] you are talking about. And, it's really
very disappointing when you find that the same institutions that are supposed to
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reflect the best practice are the same that have broken. (Kyle from South Sudan
and Uganda)
I’ve seen the military has been maintaining a control . . . and they have been
shipping all the contracts to their relatives, to their friends, to their wives, to their
children, to themselves. And, there was no way for any business contractor who
sits with a lot of money, personally, [to win any of this work]. They will award
the contract to themselves, and they will deliver nothing, and they will walk away
with the money. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
So, then, each general in the army is a certain ethnic group and underneath him
are all his people. For instance, the Shilluk have their army. The Equatorians, they
have their army. The Dinka have their army. They were [separate armies before]
but [are] now becoming rebels. Now they’re all rebels, so now officially all of
these other armies are rebels. Officially, there is only one army and it happens to
be the Salva Kiir army, which is the government of South Sudan army…and it
happens to be all Dinka, and all these ethnic armies are fighting Salva Kiir
because of his corruptions. The army is inflaming the situations throughout. It is
only, it is because the army, sometimes they act on their own. Basically, the rules
and regulations as I said are not, are not in force. (Simon from Sudan and South
Sudan)
Systemic inertia. It is difficult to change the course of large ship, but quite easy to
maneuver a small dingy. Corruption, once established, becomes part of culture, part of
behavior, and part of institutional structure. Hence, it is extremely hard to modify corrupt
behavior. Inertia is the propensity for any object at rest to remain at rest, and for any
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object in motion to remain in motion. This physics principle is directly applicable to
corrupt behavior. Hence, a region populated by people acting corruptly is resistant to
behavioral change and is directly analogous to a systemic inertia. This finding is further
supported by the following four quotations.
Now it’s a part of the life now. Any office you enter, you’re expected to pay a
little more to expedite your process. Or, even [with] the normal process, you have
to pay the guy [in order for me] to sign. Although, he is [already] being paid by
the government to sign that paper for you . . . , but no; if you want him to sign,
then you have to pay him. (David from Afghanistan)
The system is not good. We didn't build it well. But, it is the corruption, itself. It
is the corruption, itself. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
For me, corruption always used to be like if you took a pen from the office which
is not yours, but it belongs to the businesses [departments] that run the
government. Corruption to me means no transparency. Corruption means, to me,
control over every part of the earning with either the market share. Corruption
means to me that the links they can evolve [within] a system that they [the corrupt
people] can get rich. Corruption means to me a system [in which] the people
within an elite family tried to benefit. The elites are the government the position
of the elite. Corruption means to me the elites that develop a system that they can
get rich themselves, with the government, or within a system, eventually. (Matt
from Sudan & South Sudan)
Corruption is also mostly due to a lack of institutions. And, institutions, they just
don’t come from the sky. Institutions are built through time, and any country that
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is still in its beginning of state formation would, most probably, be lacking in
institutions. And, this lack of institution is definitely one of the main reasons that
you have corruption. (Daniel from Sudan)
Foreign influence. Foreign policy, aid, and assistance affect propensity for
corrupt behavior to begin and to proliferate. This finding is supported by the following
two quotations.
Foreign aid is a very fundamental concern to our countries, and particularly in
South Sudan. There are a couple of issues that I wanted to bring for your just for
you to have attention. One fact, is that while it is true that international
community sends aid to countries like South Sudan, . . . amidst corruption and all
those kinds of things . . . you can’t stop actually sending aid to a country, which is
said to be corrupt and all that, because you are actually exactly affecting the poor
people and all that. Now, if we had used the money correctly; if you’ve used the
money for the benefit of the people, over $30 billion U S dollar within eight years
would have tarmacked all other roads in South Sudan. We would have built
schools in South Sudan. We would have not allowed all the children of these
ministers and all to go and study outside the country. (Kyle from South Sudan and
Uganda)
Maybe western companies and countries, they start this issue in these countries
for me. This is my personal; that’s my personal opinion, because for me, it
doesn’t make sense. You have all these problems started . . . in all these countries;
especially a few of those [countries]. They’ve been living good. As we know,
there’s a lot of countries, let’s say United States Government and Europe and
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multiple countries. They are in charge of the peace in the world, correct?
Especially what they did in my country. They saved us, correct? Why they didn’t
do the same thing in Syria? Why all these million people they die. The land is
vanished. It’s a higher level of corruption. Corruption is occurring. Everything
what’s going on in the Middle East. It’s about money. Basically, it’s about oil. I
will give you an example, which I don’t understand honestly. You know, I live in
Kirkuk. Kirkuk is “Land of oil” by the way. Oil is everywhere by the way. Even
in my house, there is oil. I dig a well. I dig a well, and after ten feet, oil popped
up. So, imaging how rich we are. How [come] my city’s the poorest city
comparing to the other cities? All these resources, but people living . . . poor. My
dream was to find a job in Kirkuk City. I never got a job yet. Never; [because
of] corruption. (Jeremy from Iraq)
School system and education. A relationship was found between corrupt
behavior, education and the school system. This finding is supported by the following
four quotations.
With the oil money that comes from the oil, [they] all use [this money] and they
put in their account. They take their kids to best schools overseas (Simon from
Sudan and South Sudan).
Even the building, you know; it’s cold. It’s freezing. The window is
broken. When it’s hot in the summer, we don’t have a water to drink in the place.
Broken tables. We don’t have even an AC system to cool off the place. So, that’s
also part of the corruption. By the way, I didn’t finish the school because of the
corruption. (Jeremy from Iraq)
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Most of them are not highly educated, and do not have actually a professional
[perspective] when it comes to enlightening the mind or experiences; all that.
Most actually do not have that. And they found . . . the easiest way to enrich
yourself [is by corruption], because once you get into power, . . . you use your
power in order to amass resources very freely, and all that; particularly in a
country where there's no checks and balances. There's no accountability, and you
can do anything with impunity. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
Let’s say you have a Chief Command of the Iraqi Army. If you go through his
background, you find this guy is not educated. You will find most of the
commanders; they are not educated. I have a couple friends. One of [them], he’s a
Major General. One of them, he’s a Colonel. Both of them, they’ve never been in
schools, and both of them they barely can write their names. (Jeremy from Iraq)
Lack of incentives. Providing aligned incentives has been a traditional
motivational tool, and this relationship appears relevant for corruption, too. This finding
is not well supported, and may be an outlier. Nonetheless, the following quotation is
provided.
One of the most important tools of setting up proper institutions is actually to
have the right incentives for people so that they will not misuse the power in their
hand. (Daniel from Sudan)
Cultural factors of corruption. This is the third of three categories that emerged
as a driver of corrupt behavior. My research identified the following Institutional Factors
of Corruption. Examples are provided for each sub-factor.
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Established customs and behavior. The actions of friends, family, officials, and
community have a direct affect upon our individual behavior. A relationship between
corrupt behavior, customs and local behavioral effects is supported by the following
seven quotations.
Supposedly this culture [against corruption] has been within our [country]; these
acts have been within our culture for years and years, and they used to do this
with the thieves that the local village elders or the local war lords, if they were to
arrest somebody who did some [corruption] . . . they would punish him like
that. They would black his face, or her face; and then make him stand somewhere,
so that people would see. And, that [the public humiliation of face blackened with
tar] was basically the punishment. Usually, they put coal, like charcoal or oil,
which is a symbol I am black faced, which means that yes, I did something wrong
and now I’m black. Black facing is an expression in our language it means that
somebody who was, or who is being punished for a guilt. (David from
Afghanistan)
If a kid is corrupted, of course, eventually after 20, 30 years, he will be the master
of corruption. It will lead to violence eventually. (Jeremy from Iraq)
Military leaders and government leaders came from towns like yours, and [these
leaders were] growing up in a culture that actually does not endorse corruption at
all, regardless of how you define the definition. These people, many of them,
experienced power that they've never had before. And, [these leaders did] not
know how to handle that power, and [did] not having anybody to learn from . . .
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[And so this was] a [corrupt] culture that grew up with a country, right from
independence. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
It [corruption] was something not tolerated in the society where I grew up from,
because it was attached to a bad omen, which would follow you as well as your
children. So, if anything bad happened to a family, they would say, ‘Yeah. They
got things which did not belong to them without permission, and they made other
people for to suffer [and so this is their punishment]’, or something like that.
(Bridget from Uganda)
It’s difficult to build a culture [during] this big conflict, when these [people] think
it’s important to be corrupted . . . because there’s no system with money [that will
pay a normal salary]. Because, at the end of the day, the customer will be in chaos
and . . . whoever is strong, [this person] will take the bigger cake. (Matt from
Sudan & South Sudan)
So, there was a [time when] we were living together, as a family, as peoples of
one country. Yeah. So, there was no crisis [or war] when we were so little in
1970’s or early 80’s, you know. So, we were having a harmony among our self as
the Dinka, the Nuers, the Shilluks, the Anuaks, even some Equatorians. People
from Equatoria, Juba, Torit, Yambio, and Yei . . . they were also living in Malakal
because they came . . . [to do] work [and to] do business. So, the city was really
good. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
I think the only way that we can fight corruption is to be there . . . to be present, to
try to find ways to deal with corrupt people in order to minimize their influence
and try to propagate our own values. And I think with time, as societies develop
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institutions, I that corruption would become, as I said before, a fact of life rather
than a way of life. (Daniel from Sudan)
Religion. Culture has, is, and will forever be closely related to a region’s religious
practices. Evidence supporting religion’s strong effects upon corrupt behavior is provided
by the following four quotations.
The Islam religion in my country, every day, is getting weaker and weaker.
Because of this situation, we have the ISIS. Whenever somebody’s praying,
people, even nowadays, are scared to go to Mosque.” (Jeremy from Iraq)
[The Taliban]; it’s just political ideology. But, because they were insisting on
being religious, they were really against corruption; against robberies, stealing
and all that. So, if they would arrest somebody who was corrupted, they would
not have mercy on that person. If the person had accepted a bribery, they would
not have any mercy on the person. They would bring him to the stadium; to the,
you know, to the field, . . . any place with a large amount of people [could gather
and watch]. They would bring that person, and they would lash the person; 70 to
80 lashes per person, if they had known that this guy has accepted bribes. So, the
fear would stop [corrupt behavior]. At that point, the fear of the Taliban would
stop people. Some of the people; the majority, I would say, they [also] had the
religious beliefs that would stop them. (David from Afghanistan)
The Taliban time was definitely less [corrupted] than the Russian time; and the
corruption currently right now, is not even comparable. It’s way more. (David
from Afghanistan)
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It [Iraq] is a religious country. “Honestly, our religion tells us to not steal, to not
lie; that’s correct; to always do the good stuff. But, nowadays, the religion in my
country is weak. So, religion; the Islam religion, in my country, every day is
getting weaker. Weaker, [and] because of this situation, we have the
ISIS. Whenever somebody’s praying, people, even nowadays, are scared to go to
Mosque because they don’t want to become connected with the ISIS. Some
people are scared to even raise a beard, because they think it’s a wrong thing. So,
that’s what’s happening right now. (Jeremy from Iraq)
The [Muslim] religion says that, ‘If it’s not your money, it is illegal money; if you
did not earn it the proper way.’” I know some people; I’m not saying a lot, but I
know a few people who, because of their religious belief, they have turned down a
lot of gifts and a lot of improper money or other stuff that they were offered.
(David from Afghanistan)
Tribal-ethnic. The tribal and ethnic background of people comprise a primary, if
not the primary, component of their cultural composition. The effects of tribal and ethnic
allegiance, or lack thereof, were identified as significantly related to corrupt behavior.
Data supporting this finding includes the following seven quotations.
Here in Uganda, we have many trades. I can be in Uganda, and if I’m in the office
and the one giving jobs, I can look for someone who is [from same tribe as me]. If
I look for the one [from the] Muganda [tribe], and [can] . . .give him a job. And,
that’s why sometimes we have some powerful tribes as well referring [people to
me]. If I’m Acholi [tribe, and if] I want a job, I have to go to find out the minute
[it is announced from the] ministry. Like, we have an example from a tribe called
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Bakuba. We [can] find . . . many [Bakuba people] in [the Minister’s office] even
if you have not papers [even if the job is not announced]. At least they can [give
you a temporary job] somewhere, to do something, before they come to lift up
their tribe. That’s a very bad thing [hiring people from their tribe]. [Despite their
efforts to try to lift up their tribe, overall, this corruption is] very bad. (Joshua
from Uganda)
The government used that money to pay the Dinkas, or this [other] group in order
to do their functions and all that. And, the Dinkas have become like an institution;
an institution in the presidency that decides whatever they want to do in the
country; whatever they want to do and don’t. And, all these people have all their
families outside the country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
I’m told, you know, [that in the] Obote government, most of the people in the big
offices and so on, were from his [Obote’s tribal] region. That’s probably not a part
of this country. So, [others who were not of this tribe] felt that they were
marginalized; [that] they were, you know, left out and so on and so forth. So, they
ended up, you know, getting angry . . . because some [people] of this society felt
they were, you know, they were left out from the government, . . . and so another
corruption is [occurring to benefit of Obote’s tribe], and probably that’s what
makes them [angry and willing] to go [to war] and, you know . . . [leave] their
regular [military] outfits and start fighting the Obote government. (Bridget from
Uganda)
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He’s got to bring all his relatives that belong to him, and he’s got to recruit a
militia that protects him and his small circle [of relatives from his tribe]. (Matt
from Sudan & South Sudan)
“So, why aren’t these soldiers and these people prosecuted? Why does corruption
continue? Why do you think it’s allowed to continue?” [asked by Principal
Investigator] Tribalism . . .because, basically, if you and I we came from the same
ethnic group, and you committed a crime, or you went on embezzled public funds,
I would protect you. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
Back in, I believe 2007, the Minister of Finance in Southern Sudan . . . embezzled
millions [of] dollars, and the government, the President, eventually decided to put
him in jail. His very own ethnic clan in the army, they came in their armor and
they went to the police stations and took him out from there [broke him out of
jail]. The national army came and removed him from the jail and took him. He is
a free man. He [the President] could not do anything; could not do
anything. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
“Which one, which types of corruption do you think are most related to increase
violence?” [asked by Principal Investigator]. Finance. Yeah. Finance, because
with [support from Ministry of Finance], . . . a Dinka will buy guns with, with
money…to kills other ethnic groups. And, they are using money; they give it to
their Dinka’s in other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly
what is happening now in South Sudan. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
Fear – safety – lethal violence and corruption. This primary coding category
intended to identify relationships between corruption and violence. More specifically,
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there existed the possibility that some level of tolerable or endorsed corruption may have
corresponded to reduced levels of violence and lethality. This primary coding category
was further refined with five sub-categories, which are described below with supporting
data from this study’s Participants.
Individualized violence. Corruption is commonly related to individualized
violence. This finding is supported by the following seven quotations.
When you get yourself in a pool of people who have [a] tendency . . . [for]
corruption, [and then] if you want to be principled, you must be careful because
[these actions] will even cost [you] your life. (Kyle from South Sudan and
Uganda)
If a kid is corrupted, of course, eventually after 20, 30 years, he will be the master
of corruption. It will lead to violence eventually. (Jeremy from Iraq)
But, at the end of the day, they’ll be violence. At the end of the day, they’ll be
change of regime; by force or by whatever, because the people cannot [accept
corruption]. The people will always resist this kind of behavior. So, I think the
best is if you can, [try to discuss and find peaceful solutions]. If [these issues] can
be sorted earlier, it’s far better than condoning it, and then actually making it . . .
institutional. [If you are not careful] you institutionalize the corruption itself
within the country you see. Yeah, no. I think that’s what I can [say]. That’s what I
see. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
So, he was starting to advise [tell others not to act corruptly], but then,
unfortunately, after three or four months of working there, he was killed.
Somebody stopped by . . . [his house] and . . . he was killed. So, that makes it
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really hard for a person not who’s not corrupted to work in those
environments. (David from Afghanistan)
So, at the end of it [corruption], all you find [is] that there’s going to be; bound to
be violence when these people go [to] protect their properties by force. You’ll
find people waiting, you know; wild. And lives get lost in the process. (Bridget
from Uganda)
Violence is created for options, because if you only have stability, everyone
would be accountable. When you don’t have stability, everyone will do whatever
they like. So, I believe always to have mental point; Violence is a man-made
creation, [and is created] in order to make, [or] . . . in order to gain, [or] . . . to
make money. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
[So, the people are fighting] over the scarce resources. [And, the scarce resources
are made even more scarce] because of corruption. (Simon from Sudan and South
Sudan)
Collective/organized violence. Corruption results in higher levels of violence
from groups and/or organizations. Data corroborating this finding includes the following
four quotations.
But, at the end of the day, they’ll be violence. At the end of the day, they’ll be
change of regime; by force or by whatever, because the people cannot [accept
corruption]. The people will always resist this kind of behavior. So, I think the
best is if you can, [try to discuss and find peaceful solutions]. If [these issues] can
be sorted earlier, it’s far better than condoning it, and then actually making it . . .
institutional. [If you are not careful] you institutionalize the corruption itself
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within the country you see. Yeah, no. I think that’s what I can [say]. That’s what I
see. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
So, now I [will] give [you an] example [of how corruption has orchestrated
conflict]. The Dinka’s are fighting against the Shilluk in Malakal. The Dinka’s are
fighting against the Murle in Boma. They are neighbor in Jonglei state. So,
they’re neighbors. They are fighting against each other. The Dinka’s are also
fighting the Equatorians in Torit. Also in Yei. So, where are they getting these
resources? It is the government’s leaders giving them the money to buy these
resources [weapons and ammunition]. Favoritism [is the basis for the government
assisting one tribe at the expense of others]. They’re [corruption and violence]
related because of [a couple of things]. First, it is finance [and the corruption from
finance] that empowers them. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
The government, by itself, do[es] explosions for their self. They do; the
government, by itself, they do explosions. Even they got caught by a camera.
[They promote violence and conflict] just . . . for their interests. [Their own]
personal interests. (Jeremy from Iraq)
This is where we're going to cause a loss of lives in our country. We're going to
cause a lot of deaths to our country. And a corruption, actually, for me, is one of
the reasons; one of the fundamental reasons why people will always go to [violent
activities]. Because, if somebody takes power, and then he uses the power to
amass resources, then another [person] or the rest of the people [are] resisting,
[saying to themselves], ‘no; we wanted also to be in that power so we can do
that.’ So, if you don’t do that, and if you don’t allow people to get in that power,
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you automatically . . . [encourage that] people start all this fight. At least there
will be conflict, definitely. There will be conflict. (Kyle from South Sudan and
Uganda)
Fear. Corruption results in fear, which is not necessarily the same thing as safety
and feelings of safety. The relationship between corruption and fear is supported by the
following six quotations.
The fear of the Taliban would stop people, and some of the people, the majority, I
would say, they had the religious beliefs that they would stop them, and then the
other part, the fear of the Taliban punishment, so that was the corruption. (David
from Afghanistan)
But, it’s [corruption] an ugly thing. But, unfortunately, it’s something which is
growing and becoming very dangerous, as well, because if you tried to talk about
it, . . . to show the high-profile [corruption topics] where billions of shillings [and]
resources are being swindled, . . . you may end up in a mafia van. (Bridget from
Uganda)
If you raise your voice, you go to the streets you will be get arrested. Many people
were arrested in the South Sudan. People were jailed, and eventually some of
them were killed. So, what you do? You just keep silent, or you go and talk
outside the country. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
You would have been in jail. Plus, if you had long hair, they would have been
punished by the Taliban with a week to a month, or longer [of] jail time; and
lashes, of course, and . . . the hair being cut. (David from Afghanistan)
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We had a threat message left to our door with a couple rounds [from a gun]. It
basically [said], ‘Leave the city or we will kill everybody.’ (Jeremy from Iraq)
So, . . . those days [were] so dangerous because those are the days where you see
your father been beaten in front of you because they want money. They want
riches from you. (Joshua from Uganda)
Reduced/enhanced safety. Corruption results in reduced physical safety as well
as reduced feelings of safety. Data supporting this finding includes the following two
quotations.
You see that we pay exorbitant fees. We have to do that, because otherwise our
safety is at stake. (Daniel from Sudan)
Me [and many] of my colleagues . . . were deported from the region, from Kenya
to South Sudan; immediately because of talking about corruption, and then talking
about human rights violations and all that.” (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
I could not go to my home village for the last eight years basically. So, that’s
because of the violence and the people who are there. Everybody has gun, so that
would not be safe out there. (David from Afghanistan)
Manifestations of corrupt behavior. This primary coding category is
summarized within Table 8 below, and clarifies the current ambiguities and selfcontradictions associated with the definition of corruption.
This primary coding category was initially much larger and included two
emergent themes: Corrupt Activities and Corrupt Objectives. Corrupt behavior describes
the actions of an individual, thus defining corruption must be behavioral-oriented and
individual-centric. Corrupt activities clearly lead to corrupt objectives, but so too do
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Table 8
Primary Categories of Corrupt Behavior
•

Financial remuneration.

•

Power.

•

Obligatory reciprocal gratitude.

•

Non-confrontation.

countless other activities that are not listed here. In fact, nearly every legal and moral
infraction conceivable could theoretically be tied to corruption. This thought process
clarified this primary category and resulted in the omission of activity-based
subcategories, which admittedly are better categorized as either criminal and/or unethical.
This left only ten or so objective-based categories, which have been consolidated into
four emergent themes. These are discussed within the following paragraphs, with
supporting data provided from this study’s Participants.
Financial remuneration. Financial reward, commonly in the form of bribery and
extortion, are clearly the most common forms of corruption. However, financial reward
can be provided in other forms, such as:
•

Bribery

•

Extortion

•

Kickbacks

•

Illegal land sale

•

Illegal hiring practices

•

Asymmetric law enforcement

•

Judicial favoritism

This finding is s supported by the following five quotations.

187
Just for example, if I'm a custom officer, I'm paid money by the government to do
that job as a custom officer. But in the process of doing [my regular job], if I start
asking favor from the people of an organization or whoever crosses [the] border
or come[s] with goods and all that, and then I ask him [for] more money to give
[to] me and use it for my personal [benefit, then] . . . that is where corruption is.
So, because I'm charged with the responsibility [for my normal work] that I
should . . . clear either [customs] papers and all that based on [an] agreement . . .
with the government, . . . then I'm paid for that. [But]. . . if I ask for extra thing[s]
and then extra favor[s], I think that's where corruption is [occurring]. (Kyle from
South Sudan and Uganda)
So basically, it [corruption] means that if you are in a position [to make money
through corruption], and you can make whatever money [more] than your regular
monthly wages; then, if you ignore it and if you don’t make [the extra money], . . .
you are silly. (David from Afghanistan)
The money [is] taken by the leaders of the country and put in their personal
accounts overseas. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
Those [government] individuals are already corrupt. And, now they want to get
more corrupt. They want to gain more wealth to enrich themselves with the
remaining pot of whatever is still there. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
It’s still boils for the same thing. For instance, a public officer decides to use his
influence to swindle billions of shillings for his own benefit. (Bridget from
Uganda)
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You go to the [authorities] to report [corruption with your land ownership]. [Then,
you] . . . find [that] . . . they have already took [a bribe] and they’re connected [to
the people taking your land]. So, you [took a] risk [to report this corruption]. You
took your own case [to your lawyers]. [You do] not mind pay[ing] for the lawyers
to work on your case. And, when you do have somebody to help, they pass by, see
your lawyers, and then they pay them off. (Joshua from Uganda)
[There are] so many officials and soldiers on the way who try to exploit the
situation, and [are] blackmailing you into paying them something in order for
them to allow you to continue along the river to [deliver the humanitarian relief
cargo to] your destination. (Daniel from Sudan)
Power. The pursuit and maintenance of power is a very common form of
corruption, but is not commonly discussed within the existing paradigm. Here, power can
be in the form of an elected position as well as employment. Government employment is
not a necessary requisite, though this situation is clearly the most commonly seen. Power
is demonstrated through corrupt behavior within the following six categories.
•

Political objective

•

Foreign policy objective

•

Military objective

•

Unjust or immoral promotion of war or violence

•

Reallocation of gov’t resources

•

Amassing non-financial resources

This finding is supported by the following twelve quotations.
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Now, if you have done this [become elected] without getting yourself into serious
corruptions and all that, then you'll have the opportunity . . . [and] you can say,
‘No, I think my term is over. I want . . . to spend time with [my] family. I want to
be a free citizen.’ So, they enjoy their life not being caged within [the
government]. [The] problem is most of the leaders get themselves into [a position
of corruption]. That is why they continue. They continue, and that’s a big
challenge you have. They continue to hang on for power. (Kyle from South Sudan
and Uganda)
It [corruption] can involve . . . money. It can involve force, power. It can involve
the social, . . . somebody with a high social level among the country to use as
fame; to corrupt somebody because of [this person] having fame, power, . . .
money, [and] all that. (David from Afghanistan)
There's no accountability, and you can do anything with impunity. A [military]
commander can do anything with impunity. You can kill. You can rob somebody,
and nobody answers for that. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
Basically, they believe that they [the Dinka tribe] need be always in power. The
President has to be always, a Dinka. [So], whatever happens, [the President] must
be a Dinka and, and for him to do so he has to be empowered [by] grassroots
[supporters] in various states to protect him. He is also training an army from his,
his own area . . . to be his bodyguards and always keep him in power. (Simon
from Sudan and South Sudan)
Corruption means to me that you attempt to gain advantage over somebody [or for
something] else that is . . . not meant to be yours. (Daniel from Sudan)
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The government, by itself, do[es] explosions for their self. They do; the
government, by itself, they do explosions. Even they got caught by a camera.
[They promote violence and conflict] just . . . for their interests. [Their own]
personal interests. (Jeremy from Iraq)
I think the worst corruption is when you distort a government budget; when you
take the whole budget of a government, which is supposed to serve the
population, or the citizens. I think that's the worst one; the . . . ones [types of
corruption] I mentioned; the others which are at the lower level [classification of
corruption] . . . where you extract some . . . money from the citizens, and all that.
But, I think for me, corruption is corruption. Whether it is small or big, it is still
corruption. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
If you give funding to a government, you have a certain level of power, because
you can . . . influence that government. It has always been the case most of the
time. And, if you don’t use that power well to influence the government or that
leadership to stand on the principles that your country stands for, then I think . . .
you really compromise a lot in reference to the lives of even the people of that
country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
I think, . . . violence . . . and corrupt [actions occur] for political positions and that
kind of thing. We think, maybe, it is outside of . . .their [capabilities] and also
their [personal desires]. So, probably, they’re just following orders. (Bridget from
Uganda)
The war has been; yeah, the war is a man-made creation. When you want to
control resources, and when you don’t want to be accountable, what do you do?
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You create a problem, and this problem will give you a set of emergencies and
give you a state of emergency [that] will give you control over all the government
wealth. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
So, then, each general in the army is a certain ethnic group and underneath him
are all his people. For instance, the Shilluk have the army. The Equatorians, they
have their army. The Dinka have their army. They were [separate armies before]
but [are] now becoming rebels. Now they’re all rebels, so now officially all of
these other armies are rebels. Officially, there is only one army and it happens to
be the Salva Kiir army, which is the government of South Sudan army…and it
happens to be all Dinka, and all these ethnic armies are fighting Salva Kiir
because of his corruptions. The army is inflaming the situations throughout. It is
only, it is because the army, sometimes they act on their own. basically, the rules
and regulations as I said are not, are not in force. (Simon from Sudan and South
Sudan)
“Which one, which types of corruption do you think are most related to increase
violence?” [asked by Principal Investigator] Finance. Yeah. Finance, because with
[support from Ministry of Finance], . . . a Dinka will buy guns with, with
money…to kills other ethnic groups. And, they are using money; they give it to
their Dinka’s in other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly
what is happening now in South Sudan.” (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
[Corruption is] Somebody using force or using his power. (Kyle from South
Sudan and Uganda)
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Obligatory reciprocal gratitude. When significant favors are done for family,
friends, and organizations, the expectation of some type of favor in return represents
positive utility and is a form of corruption. The favor in exchange may be nothing more
than gratitude and reverence. Obligatory reciprocal gratitude can take the form of either
tribal/ethnic-based or family-based gratitude. This finding is supported by the following
seven quotations.
So, once the President approves it, it then comes through the Parliament. And,
[inside of] the parliament, of course, because of the tribal issue and other issues,
there might be some people who are supporting this guy [this particular issue or
budget item]. But, a lot of them don’t. So, what this minister or the nominee
do[es] is she goes . . . and pays him off with gifts, with promises, with all other
corruption items [in order] to get the vote for becoming the minister. (David from
Afghanistan)
What the government is doing . . .they acted corruptly against you, [so in
retaliation] you used a friendship and acted corruptly against them. (Jeremy from
Iraq)
You favor your own person [or tribe] that you know. (Simon from Sudan and
South Sudan)
Here in Uganda, we have many tribes. I can be in Uganda, and if I’m in the office
and the one giving jobs, I can look for someone who is [from same tribe as me]. If
I look for the one [from the] Muganda [tribe], and [can] . . .give him a job. And,
that’s why sometimes we have some powerful tribes as well referring [people to
me]. If I’m Acholi [tribe, and if] I want a job, I have to go to find out the minute
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[it is announced from the] ministry. Like, we have an example from a tribe called
Bakuba. We [can] find . . . many [Bakuba people] in [the Minister’s office] even
if you have not papers [even if the job is not announced]. At least they can [give
you a temporary job] somewhere, to do something, before they come to lift up
their tribe. That’s a very bad thing [hiring people from their tribe]. [Despite
efforts to try to lift up their tribe, overall, this is] very bad. (Joshua from Uganda)
So, why aren’t these soldiers and these people prosecuted? Why does corruption
continue? Why do you think it’s allowed to continue? Tribalism . . . because,
basically, if you and I we came from the same ethnic group, and you committed a
crime, or you went on embezzled public funds, I would protect you. (Simon from
Sudan and South Sudan)
Yeah, of course. That is also [corruption]. Yeah, that's also another aspect in
terms of nepotism and all that, because if you appoint your own relative and all
that, and [he is from the same] ethnic group and all that, and then [he] becomes
corrupt; stealing money from the government and all that, and since he's from
your place, usually they will not dismiss them. They will always incur [an
obligatory debt to you as a family member]. (Kyle from South Sudan and
Uganda)
It [corruption] could be nepotism. Well, employment . . . procedures are not
followed. The laws of employment; the laws of public refugees are not followed
to the letter, and a person who is in a government position will employ his own
relatives . . . [such as] his wife. [It] might be his child; [It] might be his cousin in
the office. So, for me is, this is a corruption. Favoritism. You favor your own
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persons that you know. So, this will eventually lead to incompetency. (Simon
from Sudan and South Sudan)
Non-confrontation. Avoiding confrontation, and thereby supporting the status
quo, is part of everyday life. Nearly everybody avoids confrontation at some level and/or
upon some issue. Corrupt behavior is no different. However, unlike other types of nonconfrontation, such behavior in the context of corruption is itself a type of corruption.
Non-confrontation as a form of corruption can be in the form of:
•

Acceptance

•

Maintenance of the status quo

•

Toleration

This finding is supported by the following seven quotations.
But nowadays, people know that, you know, corruption is the order of the day.
(Bridget from Uganda)
The government of the Taliban was corrupted themselves. I mean, the corruption
as [represented by] receiving weapons and guns from Pakistan government to
fight the majority and the U.S. allied and the forces, of course, that was a
corruption itself, because they were accepting it. (David from Afghanistan)
So, you cannot tolerate any of your colleagues stealing money, and then . . . still
promote him, or still promote her. I think that this is a problem, because the
bigger challenge; the biggest challenges that I notice in my country [are] that
leaders [have] accepted to tolerate all individuals that have caused [corruption, or]
that have actually [been themselves] corrupted in some way of another. (Kyle
from South Sudan and Uganda)
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Whenever we see anything wrong happening, and we keep quiet about it, we are
giving way to corruption. (Bridget from Uganda)
Well, basically, nobody wants corruptions of course. Every[body] wants
everything to be done in according to laws and regulations. However, a junior
officer, for instance, who is in charge of accounting, of accountings of money; if
he is asked by his commander to release certain money, he cannot say
‘no’. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
I would say that the government is corrupt in the sense that [they are] endorsing
corruption, and does not hold the individuals in the government accountable to
what they do. (Daniel from Sudan)
The Taliban exists in Helmut [Afghanistan] because the local people do not want
to help the government to eliminate them. The local people do not want the
Taliban to be eliminated because they can [be more helpful to the local people
than the central government]. I’m talking about local people. (David from
Afghanistan)
Application of Data to Research Questions
The following section provides responses to each of the Research Questions. Each
Research Question is restated for clarity, and is then answered and defended with
supporting evidence from this dissertation’s eight Participants.
Research question one. How should corruption be properly, accurately and
pragmatically defined? A new, broader, non-financially constrained definition of
corruption is needed. The following data, supplemented by the data discussed in the
previous sections supports this dissertation’s claim and supposition that the current,
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financial-based, personally benefitting definition for corruption is insufficient,
incomplete, and in many instances misleading:
Corruption means . . . that you attempt to gain advantage over somebody else [or
something else] that is not meant to be . . . yours. (Daniel from Sudan)
[Corruption means] . . . to take something that’s not yours, that does not belong to
you, through means that are improper. (Daniel from Sudan)
Corruption means something for something. You scratch my back; I scratch
yours. (Bridget from Uganda)
And they are using money. They give it to their Dinka . . . [friends and allies] in
other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly what is
happening now in South Sudan. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
Corruption, at this point, is not money only. (David from Afghanistan)
Corruption is a very big word. Taking a bribe doesn’t mean that [taking a bribe is]
a corruption. It’s a corruption sometimes. But, there are many ways of being
corrupt. (Joshua from Uganda)
Whenever we see anything wrong happening, and we keep quiet about it, we are
giving way to corruption, [allowing it] to thrive and develop . . . horns, and
tentacles, so that by the time you start saying, ‘No, no, this is too much. It has to
stop,’ then you know that the beneficiaries [affected parties] of that kind of
corrupt act might actually come up in full force [and be subject to] maximum
[detrimental] effects. (Bridget from Uganda)
The emergent themes described within the primary data category of Forms/Types
of corruption provide the basis of a more robust, non-financially driven definition of
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corrupt activities. Financial Remuneration appears to be critically important, and
admittedly dominates the discussion. However, there are other non-financial elements
that must also be explained, such as the desire for Power, the garnering of Obligatory
Favors, and the Avoidance of Confrontation. This data was summarized in Tables 8 and
9.
Equally important to this question is an associated explanation describing the
nature, drivers, and factors behind an individual’s decision-making processes prior to
acting corruptly. These primary factor-categories were identified as emergent themes and
specifically defined as Human Factors, Institutional Factors and Cultural Factors of
Corruption. This data was discussed in detail earlier, and is summarized by Table 7.
Chapter Five will further discuss this Research Question, and by so doing, posit several
overall models/theories, as well as an associated universal definition for corruption.
Research question two. Is zero corruption required for maximizing feelings of
safety during and/or post-conflict while concurrently minimizing associated lethal
violence? This dissertation has not identified significant evidence supporting the
beneficial aspects of non-zero levels of corruption. Although limited data was gathered
specifically supporting the toleration of corruption, the data was from a single Participant.
In fact, the other seven Participants either inferred, or succinctly and adamantly
supported, zero tolerance. The following data, all from a single Participant, is compelling
in its sincerity and has potential merit as justification for future work:
I believe that in less developed societies where, as I’ve mentioned before, we
virtually don’t have institutions, or we have very little institutions, there is a space
for corruption to thrive. And, in order to fill this space, we need to support
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institutions. And, if these, institutions are not willing to be present because of this
corruption, then we are actually defeating [working contrary to] the objective of
getting rid of corruption. So, I think that institutions should [try], or parties should
try to be present where there is corruption, and participate in these communities in
order to be able to improve the conditions of these communities, and therefore
reduce corruption. However, if we want a prerequisite zero corruption, then it
might as well mean that these institutions will no longer be able to help us within
this community, and as a result I think we’ll have more corruption. (Daniel from
Sudan)
I think when you are younger, you see things in black and white. You do not
tolerate any form of corruption. You don’t want to associate yourself with any
person who has an iota [even a little bit] of corruption in him. I think this changes
with time, when you are experience [in] life and you start to realize that there is a
grey area in between. There are people who might not share your same values, but
you have to accommodate their existence in order to be sure of the greater good.
That doesn't mean that you endorse what they do. But, sometimes you just cannot
achieve what you desire, even if it’s the most-lofty of goals and objectives, unless
you are cooperating with others. (Daniel from Sudan)
There is a difference between corruption being a fact of life, and corruption being
a way of life, and there are so many countries where corruption is a fact of life. I
wouldn’t rule out any country in the world where corruption is a fact of life, but
the problem is when corruption becomes a way of life, and this is when it hinders
the development; economic, political, and social development. (Daniel from
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Sudan)
The aforementioned collective stance for zero tolerance occurred despite the
Participants being overtly reminded of this particular hypothesis, such reminders
occurring within the Recruiting Poster and the Consent Form. Hence, the Participants’
collective stance on this issue cannot be easily explained nor rationalized, other than by
the obvious; that the Participants, in general, feel that a policy of zero tolerance is
warranted and desired. The following data represents just a few of the many instances
where Participants supported a stance of zero toleration for corruption:
I think corruption is absolute. There's no way corruption can be accepted by
another person. I personally agree that there must be zero tolerance to corruption.
I will say that. Zero tolerance to corruption. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
If you get the military to be corrupt, [and then] if you get the police to be corrupt
[and then] if you get the legal or the judicial system to be corrupt . . . then, you are
done as a country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
And those people who are not corrupted, it is not that they are afraid of the
government. [Instead], they are afraid of their God and their religion, [as they
think] that it [the bribe or extortion] is not my money. [They are afraid that] that
God sees this, and [so they decide] ‘I’m not going to be corrupted.’ (David from
Afghanistan)
Research question three. Is there an optimum, positive level of tolerable
corruption associated with maximizing feelings of safety from violent death and/or
minimizing lethal violence? This question is directly linked with Research Question Two,
and since data supporting Research Question Two is limited, this particular question
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cannot yet be definitively resolved. This is not to say that the answer to the above
question is definitively “no”. In fact, the data gathered thus far is leaning towards support
for zero corruption. However, such opinions for zero corruption were made external to
the context of safety and violence. All this being said, we must also keep in mind that the
data has also concurrently and strongly suggested a new, more robust definition for
corruption. Examples supporting toleration for corruption having positive benefits
include:
So, you actually could pay low ranking officers small amounts of money in order
to facilitate business, and I think this is a great idea, not because I endorse
corruption, but because I know that sometimes for the greater good, you have to
be flexible (Daniel from Sudan)
So, we need to constantly negotiate these different understanding of values until
we maybe feel that [the] time is right so that we can uphold these values in the
same manner that we are holding [similar values] in other countries. But, until we
reach that stage, we have to be flexible. Not very flexible, but we have to
somehow understand the context in order for us to ensure that the maximum
number of people are lifted out of poverty, and that we are able to save lives.
(Daniel from Sudan)
Although this dissertation does not fully demonstrate if/how tolerable levels of
context-modified corruption might increase feelings of safety and/or reduce lethal
violence, significant data was gathered, confirming the contrary. Specifically, this
dissertation supports a direct correlation between corruption and feelings of insecurity,
violence, lethal conflict. This may seem self-evident. However, unless and until the
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definition of corruption is properly defined, any relationship between conflict and
finically-driven definitions of corruption are both inappropriate as well as misleading.
Data supporting a direct relationship between corruption and lethal violence include:
Anyone who comes to try to disorganize the status quo will have to look for a way
of silencing that kind of pattern. And what will that be? It will be violence. So,
corruption [has] led to violence. (Bridget from Uganda)
People are fighting over the scarce resources, and the scarce resources are made
even more scarce because of corruption. It is now high time for us to take a gun
and fight these people who are taking our resources. You got my point? (Simon
from Sudan and South Sudan)
[Corrupt activities and violence occur] . . . because the army sometimes [takes
actions] on their own. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
When you get yourself in a pool of people who have [a] tendency [for] corruption,
[and] if you want to be principled, you must be careful because [non-corrupt
behavior] will even cost [you] your life.” (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
We had a threat message left to our door, [along] with a couple of rounds [from a
gun]. It basically says, ‘Leave the city, or we will kill everybody.’ (Jeremy from
Iraq)
If a kid is corrupted, of course, eventually after 20, 30 years, he will be the master
of corruption. It will lead to violence eventually. (Jeremy from Iraq)
So, he was starting to advise [verbally express discontent on corrupt behavior].
But, then unfortunately, after three or four months of working there, he was
killed. Somebody stopped by . . . [and] he was brought back to his house, [where]
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he was killed. So, that makes it really hard for a person . . . who’s not corrupted to
work in those [corrupt] environments. (David from Afghanistan)
Conflict is created by corruption. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
Those [government] individuals are already corrupt, and now they want to get
more corrupt. They want to gain more wealth to enrich themselves with the
remaining pot of whatever [money] is still there. (Matt from Sudan & South
Sudan)
Wars are made by humans; by the government [in order] for them to defile their
accountability, [and] for them to loot the money. Look at some money. Look at
Iraq [and] the war over the oil. Someone else needs to make money out of it, so
[that’s] what’s happening. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
Summary
Chapter Four discussed the detailed coding and data analysis performed using
MAXQDA software. Several emergent themes were identified as drivers of corruption,
and were subsequently defined as the Human, Institutional, and Cultural Factors of
Corruption. These Factors of corruption, as well as subcategories, were further identified
and substantiated with selected quotations from the Participants. This chapter also
responded to each of this dissertation’s three Research Questions, and by so doing,
confirmed the inadequacy of corruption’s current definition. Subsequent rigorous data
analysis derived the basis for the four primary manifestations of corrupt behavior as:
Financial Remuneration, Obligatory Gratitude, Non-Confrontation, and Power. Chapter
Four also discussed the lack of significant evidence supporting the notion that tolerable
and/or contextually acceptable levels of corruption might mitigate violence and/or
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enhance feelings of safety. Although inconclusive, the data obtained on both sides of this
issue should prove very useful if, and when, additional research is performed.
The Factors of Corruption, in concert with the clearly identified non-financially
centric manifestations of corrupt behavior, provide the framework from which a more
robust description and definition of corruption is developed in Chapter Five. Emergent
themes will be reconciled utilizing existing theories from Galtung and Maslow, serving
as the foundation for new corruption theories and models explaining financial and nonfinancial corrupt behavior within a culture-agnostic, global context. Chapter Five will
conclude with a discussion of this dissertation’s limitations, challenges and
recommendations.
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Chapter Five: Discussion, Findings and Conclusions
Dissertation Overview
This IPA-based study attempted to better understand corruption and corrupt
behavior, and how such behavior might (or might not) be directly related to lethal
violence and corresponding feelings of insecurity in regions of extreme conflict.
Countries of interest were limited to Iraq, Afghanistan, Uganda, Sudan, and South Sudan.
Past research within this particular area was nascent, and so the possibility existed that
toleration of culturally and/or contextually acceptable levels of corruption might mitigate
lethality and associated violence.
There also existed the possibility that current foreign policy insisting upon
minimal or zero levels of corruption was inadvertently exacerbating violence and
lethality. Hence, this research also intended to clarify if, when, and how various levels of
corruption within leadership and governance directly and/or indirectly affected lethal
violence and associated feelings of safety among the general populace within regions of
violent conflict.
As initially envisioned, my research intended to provide insight to the potential
positive benefits of corruption. However, upon performing a detailed study of literature
and past research, I identified corruption as being ambiguously defined and often
exclusively applied within a euro-centric context. Corruption’s ambiguous definition,
application, and discussion within existing research was confusing and often selfcontradictory. As a result of corruption’s vague definition, my dissertation proposal and
the associated emphasis of my research was refined to include the development of a more
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universally applicable definition and theory explaining what corruption is and why it
occurs.
My dissertation proposal/topic, including chapters one through three, was
presented to my Dissertation Committee for formal approval. Upon approval, this
augmented dissertation proposal was subsequently presented to, and approved by, the
Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB’s formal
approval is included here as Appendix F.
Restatement of the Research Problem
Protracted lethal conflict and unrest have continued in Afghanistan, South Sudan,
Iraq, Sudan, Uganda, and other countries around the world for decades. Perhaps not
without coincidence, each of these countries has extraordinarily high levels of corruption.
The United States’ and western countries’ foreign policies insist upon zero corruption
within post-conflict society, yet the collective success of these efforts has been poor,
hence this dissertation challenges the necessity for a zero-corruption mandate.
Compounding this issue, the foundational definition of corruption and its key drivers are
ambiguous and often self-contradictory, and so robustly defining corruption, as well as
understanding the drivers and relationship, if any, between corruption and continued
lethality and/or associated feelings of insecurity during and after conflict, is highly
desired.
Review of the Methodology
This research used an Existential-based Phenomenological methodology to
interview eight individuals from five different regions of extreme conflict. Each interview
was recorded, transcribed, reviewed, and rigorously analyzed through multiple sequences
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of coding. MAXQDA software was used to closely examine, consolidate, identify,
develop, and refine emergent themes from over nearly 2000 initially coded segments and
nearly 400 pages of recorded transcriptions, memoranda, and notes. Graphical analysis of
the inter relationships between various codes invaluably assisted with this process.
Research Questions
My research provides some suggestions to reconcile corruption’s current
ambiguous definition, while also providing a universal model and theory explaining the
nature, factors, and associated drivers of corruption from a global perspective. My
research neither firmly supports, nor clearly dispels, the potential for moderate levels of
tolerable corruption being beneficial. Each of these Research Questions are restated and
discussed within the following sections.
Research question one. How should corruption be properly, accurately, and
pragmatically defined? Chapter Four provided extensive data supporting the need for a
more robust definition of corruption. Extensive data was obtained supporting the notion
that corruption is motivated by issues, needs, and desires far exceeding current definitions
focused upon financial remuneration. Granted, financial rewards are a dominant driver.
But, so too are many others. These needs, desires, and issues were collectively defined as
Corruption Factors, and include 13 Human Factors, eight Institutional Factors and three
Cultural Factors of Corruption. Unlike the current definitions of corruption, not all of the
factors identified herein involve finance or money, nor do all of these factors parochially
limit corrupt behavior to only public service and/or government employees.
My research strongly suggests that corruption is widely pursued for reasons and
motivations external to direct personal benefit as well as non-financial objectives.
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Corrupt behavior is exhibited by individuals of all walks of life, and is neither required
nor focused to limit itself to government employees or public servants, though such
occupations admittedly dominate the topic. Although occupations can vary, corrupt
behavior is differentiated from simple crime, extortion, and selfish behavior by some type
of fiduciary expectation. This can be in the form of a public servant or elected official,
but can also be in the form of general moral, community, and/or civil posture.
This dissertation also provided significant evidence of the manifestations of
corrupt behavior and has established four primary categories of corrupt behavior,
classified herein as: Financial Remuneration, Obligatory Gratitude, Non-Confrontation,
and Power. These manifestations of corruption represent the complete universe of corrupt
behavior; thus, any definition must encompass all of these variations. Again, by
comparison, the current definitions of corruption are very finance-centric. Collectively,
this dissertation suggests that we define corruption as:
Corrupt behavior is typified by an individual possessing responsibility or
authoritative power, either formally or informally, pursuing personal positive
utility at the expense or disadvantage of another party, and contrary to the
fiduciary and moral expectations of this individual’s constituents.
The proposed definition is simple in its underpinning, but admittedly complex in
its explanation and verbiage. Understanding this concept requires concentration and
reflection. However, once understood, these concepts are actually extremely simple and
robustly applicable to any and all cultures, context, and situations while also transcending
individual and non-individual constraints and occupations. "Corruption means . . . that
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you attempt to gain advantage . . . to take something that’s not yours . . . through means
that are improper" (Daniel from Sudan).
It is also important to note that this definition encompasses the general principles
and notions of the current financially and public-service centric definitions. Hence, this
refinement of corruption and its syntax will not require enormous adjustment from a
communications perspective. However, the philosophical, foreign policy, and political
ramifications are potentially enormous, which is why this dissertation endeavored to
identify such a solution.
For example, world leaders and any foreign involvement with post-conflict
reconstruction and/or stability efforts also have an imputed level of responsibility. In
South Sudan, “SPLA officer became oriented towards an apparently unending supply of
international humanitarian aid, which could be stolen impunity. Looting food aid was
elevated to military strategy in the 1990’s, when the contending factions of the SPLA
staged hunger camps to attract humanitarian relief, which was then stolen. Both NGOS
and donors often connived in [these activities]” (De Waal, 2014, p. 351). In South Sudan,
“the Army is prohibited from engaging in private enterprises . . . [yet allegedly] President
Salva Kir is a major shareholder in the ABC construction company that provides most of
the technical road construction work in Juba” (Abbas et al., 2015, p. 21).
These and countless other examples are blatant reminders that “Each of the
possible sources that can curtail corruption is also a possible source of corruption”
(Amundsen, 1999, p. 29). Hence, foreign government officials, NGO executives and
others acting in a similar capacity are included within the universe of potentially culpable
individuals. This means that these foreign leaders and officials, as they represent their
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respective countries’ actions, should not be benefiting from post-conflict stability efforts,
such benefits being anything contrary to their imputed fiduciaries’ (i.e. the foreign
country receiving the aid) expectations. These observations directly confront and refute
the vast majority of the current and often self-contradictory definitions of corruption, and
directly challenges the motives, morality, and ethics of world leaders providing
superficial aid to post-conflict countries while ensuring that such aid enriches or
politically benefits targeted individuals, parties, or groups. Equally important, a country’s
lack of post-conflict assistance is also herein classified as corrupt, if such lack of
involvement is contrary to world expectations and personally benefiting (i.e. politically
advantageous) to foreign leaders, officials and/or NGO executives.
Research question two. Is zero corruption required for maximizing feelings of
safety during and/or post-conflict while concurrently minimizing associated lethal
violence? Despite my efforts with this dissertation, this question cannot yet be
definitively answered. Chapter Four provided several examples supporting tolerable
levels of corruption in favor of the greater good. However, each of these examples were
provided by a single Participant. By comparison, a number of Participants provided data
supporting a mandate for zero corruption and for zero tolerance. Reducing corruption in
the long term, irrespective of its definition, is clearly critical.
Chapter Four provided significant data showing a direct relationship between
corruption, lethal violence, and feelings of insecurity. This data confirmed existing
literature and demonstrates a direct relationship between corruption and violence. From a
long-term perspective, there is neither an argument nor a suggestion to modify a zerotolerance objective. However, from a short-term perspective, an argument challenging a
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zero–tolerance mandate seems possible, though tricky, and still incomplete. A mandate
for zero corruption in the long term does not necessarily preclude the possibility that
some small, tolerable level of corruption might actually be more beneficial than an
absolute zero level of corruption in the short-term. Said differently, when confronted with
massive corruption and associated lethal violence, a mandate for zero corruption is
intended to reduce corruption from a very high level to the lowest level. Pragmatically,
within a country or region of enormous corrupt behavior, any reduction whatsoever is
beneficial. However, reducing corruption to zero is never likely to occur very quickly.
So, perhaps reductions in corrupt behavior would occur more quickly if some level of
short-term tolerance was allowed?
What is really being questioned is not the mandate of zero corruption in the long
run, but rather, if tolerable corruption might be an acceptable compromise as a path
towards long-term objectives of stability, safety, and accompanied zero corruption.
Alleged benefits, if proven to be valid, would accelerate the establishment of institutions,
such establishment thereby mitigating other types and forms of corruption. In other
words, if we accept the premise that without institutions, stability and safety are
impossible; and, if we also assume that institutions are difficult to build and that such
success takes time; and, if we similarly assume that zero-tolerance mandates might
interfere with the building of these institutions and, thereby delay their formation, then an
argument can and should be made promoting some degree of tolerance for corruption in
favor of building institutions as quickly as possible. Examples supporting moderation of
zero-corruption mandates in favor of building institutions were provided by only one
Participant, with several quotations included in Chapter Four.
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The countering argument was voiced by all Participants except one, and is based
upon general leadership principles associated with personally acting morally, ethically
and setting a proper example for others to follow. On this accord, tolerance for any rule,
law or custom violation dilutes the effectiveness and credibility of both the individual and
the government as well as the associated rule, law, or custom being modified. For
example, if child labor was allowed to occur only in areas of economic hardship, the
credibility and morals associated with child labor regulations would be massively
threatened. The following quotation illustrates the Participants’ collective voice most
succinctly.
I think that corruption is corruption, and it is an evil for the society. But I say ‘no’
[to corrupt behavior]. I didn't succumb to that. I didn't succumb to that. I think
corruption is absolute. There's no way corruption can be accepted by another
person. There is no corruption which is better than the other. I personally agree
that there must be zero tolerance to corruption. I will say that. Zero tolerance to
corruption. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
This topic is further discussed within Research Question Three, below. Although
Research Question Two remains unanswered, future research is strongly recommended.
Research question three. Is there an optimum positive level of tolerable
corruption associated with maximizing feelings of safety from violent death and/or
minimizing lethal violence? Responding to this Research Question is unfortunately
premature without having some type of closure for Research Question Two. Chapter Four
provided data supporting the benefits of being flexible on corruption standards in order
for institutional factors such as rule-of-law, infrastructure, and political leadership to
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mature. Chapter Four also provided data whereby the pursuit of the greater good
outweighed any short-term violations and harm of a lesser population. However, the
countering argument is that pragmatism dilutes any position based upon ethics, morality,
human rights, and civil liberty. For example, can we imagine a situation where slavery
was only partially abolished, with slavery permitted in special circumstances? Or having
a law that allows women to vote in some elections, but not others? Corruption may very
much fall into this category of moral or ethical categorization, wherein any degree of
tolerance significantly degrades associated credibility of the individual, statute, and
organization. If so, then such toleration would not be recommended, since this
degradation might further prolong the establishment of institutions.
What does seem applicable, regardless of tactics involving purposeful, selected
areas of corruption toleration, is the effect of strong leadership. Despite some allowance
for tolerable corruption among the masses, if leadership guides by example and
demonstrates the highest ethical standards as well as an associated zero tolerance for his
or her own corrupt behavior personally, then the behavior of individuals, groups,
communities, governments, and countries may/might/should follow suit. The following
quotation poignantly illustrates this leadership principle.
They don’t teach us how to be good to people; how to . . . whenever you are in
command, to do something . . . good to people. When you are in control; when
you are a president or you are a commander somewhere, you should be fair with
everybody. (Jeremy from Iraq)
Corruption, defined within the universal context, clearly allows cultural
variations, and is always defined from the perspective of an individual’s constituents.

213
However, despite a culturally diverse world, there are some standards of behavior that
are, themselves, inviolate. Corruption may, in fact, be one of these particular standards,
despite its definition have some variations across cultural boundaries. If so, then any
tolerance whatsoever may mitigate and/or prevent long-term goals of stability. This
particular topic and facet of my research remains both controversial as well as
incomplete.
Universal Definition of/for Corruption
My research, as queried by Research Question One, intended to clarify the
application and use of corruption beyond the current financial limitations imposed by
political scientists, foreign policymakers, and the general public. I did not, and do not,
intend upon changing the established structure of the English language and grammar.
Instead, I aimed to clarify current contradictions and misunderstanding. In this context,
we start with the Oxford Dictionary’s definition for corruption:
Corruption: dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically
involving bribery: ‘the journalist who wants to expose corruption in high places’
Synonyms: dishonesty, unscrupulousness, double-dealing, fraud, fraudulence,
misconduct, crime, criminality, wrongdoing, bribery, venality, extortion,
profiteering, payola, graft, grift, crookedness, sleaze.
Antonyms: honesty (Oxford University Press, 2017).
Although widely misused in general syntax, the definition provided by Oxford
Dictionaries clearly shows that corruption is neither a concise culture, nor a definitive
legal characteristic. Tanzi (1998) may have captured this elusive issue by stating, “Like
an elephant, while it [corruption] may be difficult to describe, corruption is generally not
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difficult to recognize when observed” (p. 564). And, in the words of a Participant:
"Corruption means . . . that you attempt to gain advantage . . . to take something that’s
not yours . . . through means that are improper" (Daniel from Sudan).
At its core, and from an academic perspective, it’s critically important to
understand that corruption is not a group behavior, but instead, is an individual behavior,
action, propensity, desire and/or intention. Governments can act corruptly as a result of
the combined behavior of government employees. A country can act corruptly as a result
of the combined behavior of political leaders and their key advisors acting corruptly.
However, the government, itself, is not corrupt. This does not mean that we cannot assign
corruption metrics to various government entities, regions, or sovereignties as measures
of their collective behavior, such behavior to include engagement as well as the lack
thereof.
Manifestations of corrupt behavior. Table 8 presented the primary categories of
corruption’s manifestations among this dissertation’s eight Participants. These categories
are: Financial Remuneration, Obligatory Gratitude, Non-Confrontation, and Power. Each
of these four primary areas also include several sub-factors, which are shown in Table 9.
It is important to note that financial remuneration is clearly an important manifestation of
corruption behavior. However, it is by far not unique. Other forms of corruption occur, in
the aggregate, nearly as frequently.
These observations are based upon the interpretations, opinions, feelings, and
thoughts of just eight Participants. This is a small data set, so their aggregated opinions
may not be sufficient to provide exceptionally high credibility for what may be the best
representation and/or description of corruption.
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Table 9
Primary and Sub-Categories of Corrupt Behavior
Primary Categories
(of Corrupt Behavior)
Financial Remuneration

Obligatory Gratitude
Power

Non-Confrontation

Subcategories
(of Corrupt Behavior)
Bribery
Extortion
Kickbacks
Illegal land sale
Illegal hiring practices
Asymmetric law enforcement
Judicial favoritism
Tribal gratitude
Family gratitude
Political objective
Foreign policy objective
Military objective
Unjust or immoral promotion of war or violence
Reallocation of gov’t resources
Amassing non-financial resources
Acceptance
Status quo maintenance
Toleration

However, and critically important, this dissertation’s eight Participants do, in fact,
provide exceptionally high consensus and credibility vis-à-vis the current definition of
corruption being misleading, inaccurate, and self- contradictory. As a result of this
research, I can now state with confidence that the current definition of corruption, as
notionally limited to improper financial remuneration within only public servants and
elected officials, is inadequate, insufficient, and by many measures, misleading.
Options include creating a new word to define corrupt behavior, and thereafter
educating the entire world on the grammatically correct methods for speaking and writing
this new word akin to “corruption”; or, redefining corruption to ensure that its general
meaning corresponds with what is currently occurring in the real world. This dissertation
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has attempted the latter, and suggests the compilation in Table 9 be considered as
representative manifestations of corrupt behavior, as exhibited by an individual.
Reconciled definition of corruption. Corrupt behavior is typified by an
individual possessing responsibility or authoritative power, either formally or informally,
pursuing personal positive utility at the expense or disadvantage of another party, and
contrary to the fiduciary and moral expectations of this individual’s constituents.
The proposed definition reconciles all of the past inconsistencies and
contradictions associated with corruption, while also incorporating the thoughts, feelings
and notions conveyed by people living and working in regions of extreme conflict where
lethal violence and feelings of insecurity are common. The key aspects of this universal
definition are:
1) Corruption remains an individual behavior, and not a non-individual characteristic
of groups, regions, countries, or societies. This is very important, as the various
dictionaries would not necessarily need to drastically modify the formal definition
of corruption. However, clarification over time is clearly desired, as well as
inevitable.
2) Corruption is defined as anything that benefits an individual as a result or at the
improper, immoral, and/or unfair expense of another individual.
3) Rule of law and regulations are important, but are not necessary to define
corruption herein. Instead, a moral, ethical, religious, or other compass can be
utilized.
4) An individual’s benefit is utility driven, and thus, can be in the form of financial
as well as non-financial rewards. Corrupt behavior manifests itself through:
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Financial Remuneration, Obligatory Gratitude, Non-Confrontation, and Power.
Each of these can be expressed as positive utility, and thus fit within this universal
definition. However, personal financial betterment is the most common form of
corruption, so this remains squarely within the new definition’s realm.
5) Corrupt behavior must be at the expense of a fiduciary, somebody for whom an
individual was responsible, either formally or informally. This differentiates
corrupt behavior from theft, extortion, and simple criminal acts. The individual
may be a/an: elected official (e.g. president, mayor); political appointee (e.g.
minister, police chief); government employee (e.g. government worker,
policeman, military); social leader (e.g. priest, community leader); influential
leader (e.g. former elected official, powerful businessman); or foreigner having
influence over foreign policy, aid, and post-conflict reconstruction (e.g. foreign
elected official, NGO executive, senior foreign government official).
For example, the nature of a country’s involvement (or lack thereof) in various
areas of conflict, as well as post-conflict reconstruction, can and should be closely
examined. If a foreign political leader is benefitting (e.g. large contracts awarded to firms
supporting this leader) by such involvement at the expense of his constituents’ livelihood,
lives, and well-being, then these leaders may fall within the definition of corrupt if their
respective actions were purposefully manipulative. Equally important is the absence of
such foreign involvement by foreign leaders because of a corresponding lack of personal
positive utility.
One fact, is that while it is true that international community sends aid to
countries like South Sudan, . . . amidst corruption and all those kinds of things . . .
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you can’t stop actually sending aid to a country, which is said to be corrupt and all
that, because you are actually exactly affecting the poor people and all that. (Kyle
from South Sudan and Uganda)
Theoretical Models and Framework
John Burton promoted problem solving as a conflict resolution technique, but also
as an overall approach to more fundamental issues. Burton’s approach, as influenced by
Maslow Need’s Theory, Systems Theory, and Burton’s recognition of “the differences
between needs and interests,” “overcome[s] blockages to second-order learning, thereby
becoming a central element . . . which moves beyond episodic conflict resolution”
(Ramsbotham et al., 2001, p. 49). This Burtonian approach was utilized by this
dissertation to further develop several new theories and models that reconcile the
ambiguity and confusion associated with the world’s current definition of corruption.
This sets the stage for the reader and this dissertation to exercise objectivity and an open
mind when reviewing this dissertation’s suggested syntax, theory, and foundations for
redefining corruption.
Corruption hierarchy model. Two existing theories dominated the incremental
development of new corruption theories. These are Maslow’s Hierarchy of
Motivations/Needs (Maslow, 1943) and Galtung’s “Violence/Conflict/Peacebuilding
Triangle” (Galtung, 1969; Galtung, 1990; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011, pp.
11-13).
Maslow’s Hierarchy is widely acclaimed, though it has been further modified
since its initial development nearly 100 years ago. A graphical interpretation of Maslow’s
Hierarchy is described by Figure 11.
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Figure 11. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Note. (Dickson College, 2012)
Maslow’s Hierarchy is based upon a “humanistic approach” to describe an
individual’s needs throughout an individual’s lifetime (Maslow, 1943). Maslow claims
that an individual’s needs are hierarchically categorized within five categories. Over the
years, scholars have added three additional categories. However, this dissertation will use
Maslow’s original five categories as the basis for new theory development. These five
categories range from “physiological needs” and the desire to obtain the elements for
survival, to, at the other extreme, the “need for achieving one’s full potential; selfactualization” (Maslow, 1943; Dickson College, 2012).
Figure 11 also shows how Maslow’s hierarchical categories are further refined
into “Deficiency needs (D-Needs)” and “Being Needs (B-Needs)” (Dickson College,
2012). For most people, the Deficiency Needs must be satisfied before Being Needs can
be addressed. Here, it is key to recognize that Maslow, as well as subsequent scholars,
also acknowledge that some people may shift the order and/or priority of these needs as a
result of personal, extenuating circumstances (Dickson College, 2012). For this
dissertation, protracted lethal conflict, war, insurgency, and civil unrest are potential
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examples of such extenuating circumstances that might justify modifying the priority
dictated by Maslow’s Hierarchy. The potential for reprioritizing notwithstanding,
Maslow’s hierarchy was steadfastly maintained without modification throughout the
development of the Corruption Hierarchy. Subsequent research may likely prove this
approach suboptimum, which is expected as a new theory is tested, probed, and
incrementally improved.
The application of Maslow’s Hierarchy is universal and robust, but is
concurrently limited to individual behavior. This latter caveat is fortuitous since
corruption, at its core essence, is an individual behavior. Hence, any and all new theories
involving corruption must recognize this nuance, despite the world’s current propensity
for grammatical mis-use extending corruption’s inference to non-living and nonindividual entities. By maintaining this constraint, any new refinement of the definition
for corruption stays within the current confines of corruption’s current grammatical
intent.
It is also important to note that corruption is currently defined with a degree of
flexibility. Specifically, current definitions dictate that corruption is generally, but not
specifically, defined within a financial context. Hence, an extension or refinement of the
current grammatical definitions is not seen as grammatically significant. By comparison,
the ramifications of such a refinement from other perspectives, such as foreign policy,
foreign aid, diplomatic relations, and associated conflict resolution are, in fact, potentially
enormous. These ramifications will be further discussed in the following sections.
Corruption manifests itself both financially as well as non-financially. Maslow’s
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Hierarchy supports both the past, as well as this dissertation’s refined, definition for
corrupt behavior. This is shown in Figure 12, below.

Figure 12. Maslow’s Hierarchy and Corrupt Behavior
However, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, on its own, would fall short of
describing and/or explaining corrupt behavior. Corrupt behavior, regardless of context or
motivations, has been, and will continue to be, superficially defined as unacceptable
behavior, and is never something that an individual would typically be proud of. It is on
this note that corruption theory and Maslow’s Hierarchy diverge since, by comparison,
Maslow focused upon the positive and beneficial aspects of people. “Instead of focusing
on psychopathology and what goes wrong with people, Maslow formulated a more
positive account of human behavior which focused on what goes right. He was interested
in human potential, and how we fulfill that potential” (McLeod, 2016, n.p.).
The B-Needs and D-Needs established by Maslow (1943) provided an appropriate
framework from which to develop a Corruption Hierarchy of Human Factors.
Specifically, the 13 Human Factors of Corruption, as previously discussed and listed in
Table 7 were overlaid and aligned with each of Maslow’s B-Needs and D-Needs, which

222
were shown by Figure 11. Hence, each of these Human Factors of Corruption has some
degree of correspondence with Maslow’s Hierarchy, and so a new model and concept, the
Corruption Hierarchy, is posited and depicted by Figure 13 below. Each category’s
position in the hierarchy is important. Like Maslow’s Hierarchy, I suggest that corruption
is motivated by needs, drivers, and issues with some degree of priority/precedence.

Self Actualization

Rationalization (Greater Good)
Religious/Moral Conviction

Esteem

Pride, Revenge

Love/Belonging
Family, Peer Pressure

Safety

Naiveté, lack of perspective, Job Security, Protection of Interests, Fear

Physiological

Selfish Betterment, Greed, Temptation, Seduction, Extreme Poverty,
Resource Scarcity, Fatigue, Resignation

Figure 13. Corruption Hierarchy
Although my research provides strong support for establishing these 13 Human
Factors and sub factors, I admittedly have no empirical data whatsoever confirming their
hierarchical precedence. However, it stands to reason that if human behavior has a natural
tendency to seek improvement to higher levels or classifications, as is described by
Maslow, then corrupt behavior may follow in a lockstep fashion. For example, once an
individual has satisfied Physiological and Safety Needs, Maslow would predict that needs
associated with Love/Belonging would dominate behavior. Concurrently, if an individual
was engaging in corruption to simply feed himself and his family, but later became so
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sufficiently enriched that these needs were no longer relevant, then it stands to reason that
the individual may ascribe to justifying corrupt behavior with the need and responsibility
to enrich family and/or to satisfy needs of affection.
The corrupt behavioral relationships suggested herein stem from a commonsense
perspective, but also because corruption is a human-centric behavior. Maslow’s
Hierarchy is similarly based upon human-centricity, and so it seems appropriate to base
the Corruption Hierarchy, at least initially, with a hierarchy analogous to Maslow. Future
research must be performed to confirm this general notion and to further probe
specificities.
Although Maslow’s Hierarchy provided academic inspiration for the development
of the Corruption Hierarchy, there are significant differences between the two theories
that are not yet resolved. First, Maslow’s Hierarchy is Humanistic and is predicated upon
the belief individuals will, through natural proclivity, try to progressively better
themselves (Maslow, 1943). Maslow’s (1943) foundational premise is described by the
following:
It is quite true that man lives by bread alone — when there is no bread. But what
happens to man’s desires when there is plenty of bread and when his belly is
chronically filled? At once other (and “higher”) needs emerge and these, rather
than physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when these in turn are
satisfied, again new (and still “higher”) needs emerge and so on. This is what we
mean by saying that the basic human needs are organized into a hierarchy of
relative prepotency. (p. 375)
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By comparison, the Human Factors of Corruption are neither noble, nor
necessarily hierarchical. It is not clear that people are naturally inclined to be corrupt or
to act corruptly. This proclivity is an interesting theory, but has not been addressed by my
research. Although a natural proclivity for acting corruptly may later be proven, at this
point, all that is suggested is that these 13 Human Factors of Corruption appear to drive
corrupt behavior.
The Corruption Hierarchy makes a small, yet significant assumption that corrupt
behavior, though arguably immoral, can be internally justified through the pursuit of
other, higher-reaching goals and objectives described by the Corruption Hierarchy, as
aligned with Maslow’s Hierarchy. The Corruption Hierarchy assumes a direct analogy
with Maslow’s Hierarchy because corruption is defined as individual, human behavior,
and so, too, is the behavior described by Maslow’s Hierarchy. Hence, there seemed to
exist the possibility for a direct relationship defining corrupt behavior, and that this
relationship might already exist within Maslow’s Hierarchy.
Again, this is not to say that corruption occurs naturally, nor is it to say that some
types of corruption are better, or less heinous than others, though each of these statements
represent an outstanding topic for future research. Rather, I suggest that the Corruption
Hierarchy is a notionally and directly correct next step explaining the nature of
corruption, and that it may provide a platform from which additional research can be
performed.
Corruption pyramid model. Corruption, like conflict, is dominated by human
behavior, but it is also affected by its environment. Brainstorming and academic
innovation cedes credit to Galtung’s widely accepted Violence Triangle as a source of
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inspiration. Galtung’s Violence Triangle is graphically shown in Figure 14 below, and is
widely acclaimed as a foundational theory for conflict and violence. Existing literature, as
well as this dissertation, demonstrate a clear relationship between corruption, conflict,
and violence. So, obtaining inspiration from Galtung was appropriate.

Figure 14. Galtung’s Violence Triangle. Note. (Askapacifist.com, 2014)
Galtung asserted that peace is the absence of violence, and that violence is
affected by the combined, interrelated effects of Structural Violence and Direct Violence
(1969). Galtung (1969) further stated a relationship between Structural and Direct
Violence as:
Violence with a clear subject-object relation is manifest because it is visible as
action . . . Violence without this relation is structural, built into structure. Thus,
when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal (e.g. Direct)
violence, but when one million husbands keep one million wives in ignorance
there is structural violence. Correspondingly, in a society where life expectancy is
twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if
there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when
one person kills another (p. 171).
Galtung’s theory was expanded in 1990 with the addition of Cultural Violence,
which, “makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right; at least not wrong.
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(For example) . . . ‘murder on behalf of the country as right, (but) on the behalf of oneself
wrong’” (pp. 291-292). Cultural Violence affects the lenses through which Direct
Violence is interpreted, while Structural Violence is an actual violent action built into the
structure of government or macro-system. Galtung’s Violence/Conflict Triangle provides
a fairly robust, two-dimensional representation for conflict and violence, both
individually (i.e. Direct Conflict/Violence), as well as from non-individual entities such
as structure and culture.
The Violence Triangle is viewed from the perspective of the resultant action upon
society, group or individual. Galtung’s (1969) model also fails to explain why the
violence occurred in the first place, and instead states a relationship between the Direct
and Structural Violence and culture. By comparison, corruption is limited to an
individual’s behavior, but such individual behavior is affected by other factors, including
institutions as well as culture. Corrupt behavior is not necessarily punitive upon all other
people, groups, or society. Instead, corrupt behavior, by the nature of its definition, is
applicable only within the context of an individual’s constituents. These differences
notwithstanding, Galtung’s Violence Triangle provided an appropriate foundation for
brainstorming and subsequent corruption theory development. Some aspects of Galtung’s
triangle are not directly useful, but will be modified to incorporate the nuances of
corruption being individual-behavior centric.
Chapter Four identified and discussed the three primary drivers of corruption as:
1) Human Factors of Corruption, 2) Institutional Factors of Corruption, and 3) Cultural
Factors of Corruption. The alignment and inter-related nature of these three categories are
superficially analogous to Galtung’s (1969) Violence Triangle. However, unlike
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Galtung’s Violence Triangle, the manifestations of corruption are completely
individualistic, but also affected by other environmental variables. Galtung’s violence
triangle refers to individual, structural and cultural forms of violence. Each of the indices
of Galtung’s Violence Triangle represent behavior or action. By comparison, the three
primary Factors of Corruption are akin to drivers, catalysts and/or promotors of
corruption.
A new concept, the Corruption Pyramid, is proposed as a three-dimensional
model to more accurately model corruption and reconcile past contradictions,
inaccuracies, and inconsistencies. The Corruption Pyramid model is shown in Figure 15,
and explains the causes, drivers, and factors for corruption. The Corruption Pyramid ties
directly to this dissertation’s other new model, the Corruption Hierarchy, which is shown
by Figure 13. The Corruption Pyramid has a triangular base with three vertices: Human
Factors of Corruption, Institutional Factors of Corruption, and Cultural Factors of
Corruption. The Corruption Pyramid reconciles the role that culture and institutions play
with respect to affecting, mitigating, and/or amplifying individual corrupt behavior.
Unlike the action-based perspectives associated with Galtung’s Violence Triangles, the
Corruption Pyramid focuses upon corruption occurring as a result of individual human
behavior, with such behavior affected by culture and institutions as well as internal
human psychology. Hence, the vertices of the pyramid’s triangular base are annotated as
Cultural Factors of Corruption, Institutional Factors of Corruption, and Human Factors of
Corruption.
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Corruption Pyramid
Effective corruption is blended
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Figure 15. Corruption Pyramid
The Corruption Pyramid theory has four foundational assumptions. These include:
1) All aspects of what we currently define as corruption are within the causal control
of the acting party. Corruption is assumed to be behavioral and thereby assigned
to an individual’s specific behavior. By comparison, Galtung’s (1990) definitions
for Cultural Violence and Structural Violence are aligned to non-human and nonbehavior attributes of the structural and/or cultural environment that, for whatever
reason, are causing violence/conflict. (pp. 291-292). Corruption can be
conversationally applied to an entity, unit, community, group, and/or nation only
as a result of the aggregated behavior or individuals.
2) Corruption, as posited within this dissertation, is defined as: Corrupt behavior is
typified by an individual possessing responsibility or authoritative power, either
formally or informally, pursuing personal positive utility at the expense or
disadvantage of another party, and contrary to the fiduciary and moral
expectations of this individual’s constituents.
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3) Corrupt behavior is manifested within four primary categories: Financial
Remuneration, Power, Obligatory Gratitude, and Non-confrontation.
4) Corrupt behavior is motivated by three inter-related groups of drivers, or Factors
of Corruption. These include 13 Human Factors of Corruption, 8 Institutional
Factors of Corruption and 3 Cultural Factors of Corruption. Each of these Factors
affects the other two Factors, culminating with the exhibition of corrupt behavior.
The Corruption Pyramid was inspired by Galtung’s Violence, Conflict, and
Peacebuilding triangles. Galtung’s triangles describe the relationships of Conflict,
Violence, and Peacebuilding through the interaction of metrics identified at each of the
triangle’s three points (Galtung, 1969; Galtung, 1990). By comparison, the Corruption
Pyramid, as proposed herein, depicts the overall interaction of the three Corruption
Factors more graphically succinct than does a triangle. Specifically, a triangle fails to
account for how all three types of corruption interact with, and affect, each other. The
triangle is two-dimensional, and each of Galtung’s triangular model’s three metrics can
be singularly evaluated as a separate type of violence or conflict. The Corruption
Pyramid, by comparison, takes the magnitude of each of the Corruption Factor’s three
metrics and uses this individual magnitude as the slant height for each respective vertex.
The overall tendency and/or propensity for corrupt behavior, manifested as either
Financial Remuneration, Power, Obligatory Gratitude, Power and Non-Confrontation is
then represented by the pyramid’s height. The pyramid provides a three-dimensional
metric, with all three variables affecting each other.
Although Galtung’s two-dimensional foundation was extremely useful for
brainstorming, the pyramidal concept is considered more appropriate for describing
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corruption. This is primarily because corruption is defined to occur only within, and by,
an individual. By comparison, violence/conflict can occur in a variety of independent
ways. Specifically, Direct Violence is related to Structural Violence, but each can occur
independent of each other. This is not the case for corruption. All three Corruption
Factors are inter-related, but corruption only occurs by an individual as a result of the
combined effects of these three primary categories of behavior drivers.
A new model was needed that blended the inter relationships of the three primary
drivers (i.e. Factors) of corruption. The Corruption Pyramid satisfies this requirement, as
the individual magnitude of each of these three Corruption Factors, when combined,
describes an individual’s propensity to act corruptly, which is graphically depicted by the
overall height of the Corruption Pyramid.
Universal corruption theory. The aggregations of the key points, revelations and
suggested made within this dissertation form a Universal Corruption Theory. These key
points are summarized below.
1) Corrupt behavior occurs as a result of the interaction between three primary
behavior drivers, defined as the Human, Institutional, and Cultural Factors of
Corruption. These factors affect each other as enhancers, mitigations, catalysts, and
obstacles for corrupt behavior. See Table 7.
2) Corruption, restricted to individual human behavior, is motivated by the 13 Human
Factors of Corruption. See Table 7.
3) The Human Factors of Corruption can be aligned with Maslow’s Hierarchy of
Needs, from which all human behavior is motivated. This is described by the
Corruption Hierarchy in Figure 13.
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4) The hierarchy of corrupt behavior is inextricably linked to the Basic Human needs’
categories, as notionally described and defined by Maslow. See Figure 12.
5) The effective, or overall propensity for corrupt behavior is described by the height
of a triangular prism or pyramid having a triangular base defined by the Human,
Institutional and Cultural Factors of Corruption. See Figure 15.
6) Corruption is defined as an individual behavior and is primarily manifested through
four categories of behavior: Financial Remuneration, Power, Obligatory Gratitude,
and Non-Confrontation. See Tables 8 and 9.
7) Corruption is universally defined as: Corrupt behavior is typified by an individual
possessing responsibility or authoritative power, either formally or informally,
pursuing personal positive utility at the expense or disadvantage of another party,
and contrary to the fiduciary and moral expectations of this individual’s
constituents.
I suggest that a Universal Corruption Model be considered as the coordinated and
inter-related connection between the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, the Corruption
Hierarchy, the Corruption Pyramid, the Manifestations of Corruption, and the Universal
Definition of Corruption. The Universal Corruption Model is shown by Figure 16 below.
This universal relationship explains how and why corruption occurs, and reconciles past
contradictions and inconsistencies in the nature and manifestation of corrupt behavior.

Figure 16. Universal Corruption Model
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War, Genocide, Terrorism and Corruption
To this point, genocide and war all appear to be special, or limited forms of
corruption because of the individual positive utility associated with the attempted
extinction of, or lethal violence extended to, a race, people or culture, as well as when
these actions occur as a result of somebody otherwise responsible for these individual’s
well-being and welfare choosing not to do so.
Genocidal behavior might, in some cases, be represented as a form of corruption.
Specifically, an individual responsible for the well-being of others, but instead choosing
to intentionally commit genocidal acts because of personal desires and satisfaction,
contrary to the responsibilities associated with this person’s position or job, satisfies the
universal definition of corruption. Financial reward may or may not be involved. The
universal definition does not differentiate, as long as the basic tenets are satisfied.
Classifying genocide as a form of corruption is supported by:
The government used that money to pay the Dinkas, or this [other] group in order
to do their functions and all that. And the Dinkas have become like an institution;
an institution in the presidency that decides whatever they wanted to do in the
country; whatever they wanted to do and don’t. And, all these people have all
their families outside the country. (Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda)
“Which one, which types of corruption do you think are most related to increase
violence?” [asked by Principal Investigator] Finance. Yeah. Finance, because with
[support from Ministry of Finance], . . . a Dinka will buy guns with, with
money…to kills other ethnic groups. And, they are using money; they give it to
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their Dinka’s in other places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly
what is happening now in South Sudan. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
War can be similarly argued as a form of corruption and includes instances where
the objectives are to gain territory, resources, and/or assets to satisfy the desire for
personal, individual positive utility of the political or elected leadership responsible for
authorizing or engaging in such conflict. So, war, state-sponsored terrorism, and other
forms of violence are themselves expressions of positive utility for those people, groups,
and entities that support such actions, where these individuals are acting contrary to the
objectives associated with their position of authority. This is potentially occurring in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Sudan today. Classifying war as a conditional form of
corruption is supported by:
The war has been; yeah, the war is a man-made creation. When you want to
control resources and when you don’t want to be accountable, what do you do?
You create a problem and this problem will give you a set of emergencies and
give you a state of emergency will give you control over all the government
wealth. (Matt from Sudan & South Sudan)
So, then, each general in the army is a certain ethnic group and underneath him
are all his people. For instance, the Shilluk have the army. The Equatorians, they
have their army. The Dinka have their army. They were [separate armies before]
but [are] now becoming rebels. Now they’re all rebels, so now officially all of
these other armies are rebels. Officially, there is only one army and it happens to
be the Salva Kiir army, which is the government of South Sudan army…and it
happens to be all Dinka, and all these ethnic armies are fighting Salva Kiir
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because of his corruptions. The army is inflaming the situations throughout. It is
only, it is because the army, sometimes they act on their own. Basically, the rules
and regulations as I said are not, are not in force. (Simon from Sudan and South
Sudan)
The President, himself; Salva Kiir Mayardit; is the one leading the war against
other ethnic groups. (Simon from Sudan and South Sudan)
Defining Terrorist activities as corrupt on the basis of utility-driven motivations
seems impossible. Further complicating this issue is identifying utility-based corruption
within the mind of a terrorist, since terrorism, by definition, is associated with violence
purposefully designed to evoke fear. Also, by definition, terrorists do not, and cannot,
represent a sovereign state or country. They represent individual groups that, by their
very nature, condone and endorse activities intended to promote a particular antigovernment and/or political argument. Hence, terrorism categorized as corruption would
need to involve a terrorist acting less violently or with sporadic degrees of compassion.
This is not realistic.
Alternatively, the terrorist could be acting contrary to the desires of his/her group,
such contrary actions resulting in his or her own personal, positive utility. Although an
interesting intellectual discussion, it stands to reason that the only application of
corruption to terrorism and individuals committing terror would be among those terrorists
that happen to be insane. Terrorists are, in fact very sane (Post, 2007, p. 15; Crenshaw,
2012, p. 11), so this particular argument is not really likely to ever be relevant. Hence, an
application of corruption to terrorism is deemed inappropriate.
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Challenges and Limitations
Past research on this dissertation’s topic was very limited. In fact, at the onset of
this dissertation, and throughout a good portion of the literature review, relevant past
research was negligible, at best. Instead, the vast majority of past research focused on the
benefits of low corruption with respect to societal benefits, failing to focus upon lethality,
feelings of security and/or the possibility of corruption have positive benefits. Past
research rarely focused on or addressed corruption’s potential for optimizing feelings of
safety and minimizing lethal violence. Instead, nearly the entirety of past research
excluded the effects of context and, instead, assumed that low corruption was desired as a
de facto mandate. This made the literature study very difficult.
Existing research utilized financially-centric, and often self-contradicting,
definitions for corruption. The lack of a robust, concise, and universally applicable
definition for corruption effectively blocked research refinements since the syntax,
findings, and data were often impossible to understand without superimposing context
ex-post. Further exacerbating the issue was that context was often unknown and/or not
documented. Put another way, imagine trying to study mathematics when the subject and
nomenclature associated with mathematics is not clearly defined. The syntax and
terminology associated with an ill-defined topic such as corruption is easily interpreted
out of context. This resulted in nearly all past research being suspect. It also made a
controversial, yet initially straightforward, research project extremely challenging. I had
to take two steps backward in order to hopefully take three steps forward.
This study was not initially intended to develop a new model for corruption.
Instead, the preliminary focus was on identifying and subsequently quantifying some
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tolerable degree of corruption that would, from a greater good mentality, reduce lethality
and enhance stability in regions of extreme conflict. The dissertation’s literature study
and preliminary research exposed the inconsistencies with corruption’s syntax,
application, and interpretation. Additional research could not be effectively performed
without first reconciling this key deficiency. So, the focus of my research was modified,
and hopefully takes a significant step toward reconciling these inconsistencies. As a
result of these sequential, rather than parallel, objectives, the general orientation of the
interviews and analysis could clearly have been performed more precisely had the issue
of redefining corruption not been a necessary prerequisite.
Phenomenological methodologies are time consuming, and so the number of
Participants is typically limited. Nonetheless, a more comprehensive study with 20 or
more Participants would have provided a much stronger basis on which to draw
conclusions.
Although significant justification for tolerating moderate levels of corruption was
not found, one Participant was both vocal, as well as eloquent, in his support of such
behavior. This did not, and does not, allow confirmation of such a position. However, it
does provide some moderate impetus for revisiting this issue, perhaps with an expanded
group of Participants.
The interviews involved eight individuals from Afghanistan, Uganda, South
Sudan, Iraq, and Sudan. The mix of subjects between two countries was initially
unknown and difficult to control, since the desired inclusion characteristics were very
challenging. Ideally, all of the subjects should have self-identified from a single country.
Although this mix of five countries provided diversity, it unfortunately also introduced
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country, culture, regionalism, and other additional variables, which in turn, created
additional elements of uncertainty. Diversity and variety is generally desired, but is
normally accompanied by much larger sets of data. Future phenomenologically-based
interviews should consider restricting Participants as being from a single country or
region.
Performing interviews face-to-face is always preferred. However, security
concerns mandated that the majority of the interviews be performed via Skype. This issue
is somewhat problematic, since the key focus of this research was to explore the effects
of corruption upon lethal violence . . . in regions of extreme conflict. So, it was not
coincidental nor surprising that the ideal phenomenological subjects were those living
within a harsh, conflict ridden environment. A suboptimal option existed involving
subjects who may not have self-identified as being from regions of lethal conflict, but
instead may have recently lived and/or worked within such lethal, conflict-ridden
environments. This option was discarded, since it elevated the likelihood of perceptions
and opinions being skewed. I was acutely aware of the challenges associated with Skype
interviews, thus I took great care to ensure that connectivity was enhanced and that both
audio and video quality was adequate, giving me the best possible chance of establishing
rapport and having a good interview.
Context and the nuances of interpretation are essential. Research is flawed from
the onset unless or until objectivity can be imposed, and unless or until unbiased analysis
is executed. The phenomenological subjects and associated questions were carefully
chosen so that the analysis of the subjects’ responses accurately discerned the nuances of
corruption within each individual’s perspective to the greatest extent possible. This being
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said, any and all qualitative interpretation is, by definition, somewhat subjective. Future
studies should consider using quantitative methodologies as soon as metrics and variables
are sufficiently well defined and concise. This was not possible for here, and so a
qualitative methodology was effectively mandated.
The Corruption Factors identified by this research were initially assumed to have
equal magnitude and impact. This assumption was later modified to instead align the
various Human Factors of Corruption with Maslow’s Hierarchy, as explained by Human
Needs Theory. Aligning the human-centric drivers of corruption with the corresponding
needs within people that motivate our behavior makes sense. This explanation may
support the empirical behavior described by the Corruption Hierarchy; however, rigorous
research is needed, since the nature of this dissertation did not provide the depth and
specificity needed to properly address corrupt behavior being potentially hierarchical.
The primary nomenclature assigned for the Corruption Factors as well as the
Manifestations of Corruption are fairly strong. Still, there are likely better ways to
combine and/or describe the associated sub-factors and sub-manifestations. Although
existing nomenclature assigned for each of these models is directionally correct, the
models and theories can benefit by simplifying and/or aggregating categories.
Implications and Recommendations
The Corruption Factors and the associated Corruption Pyramid are, if even
partially oriented in the direction of truth, potentially enormous in their academic
domestic and foreign policy implications. The current definitions of corruption are
financially centric and often self-contradictory. This research provided the basis for a
refined and more robust definition of corruption that transcends financial activities and
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includes a number of non-financial manifestations of corrupt behavior. As a result of this
expanded definition of corruption, the execution of these programs is, itself, ironically
now alleged and categorized as corrupt by design. Specifically, the pursuit of power and
tribal favoritism is defined as corrupt within the context of this dissertation. Yet, the
United States and other world leaders today would fail to classify such behavior as
corrupt. They should consider doing so. Stability programs should keep this expanded
definition of corruption in mind when mandating such zero-tolerance requirements. The
implication for failing to do so is likely continued failure with post-conflict stability and
reconstruction programs. This failure is not necessarily because of corruption, nor would
correcting inconsistencies with corruption result in success, per se. Adopting and
understanding corruption and its drivers might, instead, mitigate the failure of programs
while enhancing the success of others.
Although my research was focused upon regions of extreme conflict, the resulting
Universal Corruption Model also has common application in areas of relative stability.
For example, in the United States and Europe, we can clearly see how many civic,
community, and elected officials are acting corruptly (i.e. using the new definition of
corruption), oftentimes in the course of their daily business. It can easily be argued that
the United States Government is currently acting extremely corruptly, with Congress and
others continually putting other motives ahead of their constituents, and in each case
benefiting by positive utility, as exhibited by one of the four forms of corruption noted
herein. Alleged corruption notwithstanding, their actions will necessarily lead to
violence. In fact, a case is easily made that such violence is already occurring, with
alarming levels of internal conflict, strife and civil discord. Considering and using an
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expanded definition of corruption as an inadvertent driver of such behavior is directly
applicable, and should strongly be considered by the general media in an attempt to curb
such undesired behavior by our elected officials.
It is also important to note that the activities currently performed and/or condoned
by the United States and other nations as acceptable with respect to foreign policy can, in
many instances, be classified as corrupt within the context of this dissertation, its
suggested Universal Corruption Model, and by the associated proposed definition for
corruption. This realization can, could, and should result in world leaders behaving less
corruptly. This alleged corrupt behavior by the United States’ elected leadership includes
a wide spectrum of examples and situations over the past 200 years. For example, we
rarely discuss, nor have we publicly accepted responsibility for, past atrocities and
potential genocidal activities in South Sudan, Rwanda, Serbia, Syria, Palestine, and other
areas where our official policy and attitude often refuses to acknowledge the existence of
a problem, and/or defers corrective action to the United Nations and their policy of nonintervention. Rather than point out the gross failings and inadequacies of this
organization, we have chosen to avoid confrontation in favor of preserving personal
political capital. Although money may not have changed hands, any and all United States
officials avoiding such declarations of the United Nations’ shortcomings and need for
massive reorganization can be claimed as potentially corrupt.
Zero tolerance for corruption is currently a common objective within foreign aid
and stability programs, so the implications of zero tolerance mandates negatively
affecting stability and lethal violence would be enormous, if proven, supported, or
conditionally suggested. I failed to derive relevant data supporting this postulate. This is
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neither good, nor bad, per se. I have no personal desire to condone tolerable levels of
corruption. Instead, I was just looking for ideas and methods that might help resolve
conflict.
A theoretical argument can be made supporting the pursuit of “greater good” and
tolerating short-term levels of corruption that allows institutions to be more efficiently
established, with the presence of such institutions dramatically reducing lethal violence.
The countering argument is that effective leadership requires setting a proper example,
and so any public tolerance for corruption dilutes societal values and ironically delays,
rather than accelerates, the establishments of institutions and culture, thereby
jeopardizing long-term objectives of zero tolerance. Future research should consider
focusing on these issues. I think that this particular concept is still potentially relevant,
but only within a much narrower application. Specifically, I believe formal and informal
leadership must adopt an attitude and public stance supporting zero corruption. NGO’s
and aid organizations providing oversight must exercise some leniency when corruption
inevitably occurs, but this leniency must include public declarations and specificity. In
other words, the leniency cannot be hidden. Keeping everybody informed of how
programs are doing with respect to corruption will lead to much greater success, since
instances of failure will be immediately publicized; such publicity will allow the local
constituents to pressure government and leadership to act properly.
Instances of corruption should be handled on a case by case basis, but the
decisions for tolerance should be made by the organization providing funding. This
would exclude NGO’s and foreign aid organizations, as these organizations never provide
financial support. Instead, they provide massive amounts of funding for their own
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personnel to travel, live, and work within areas of post-conflict and austerity while
distributing food, medical aid and other programming services are provided. These
organizations, which include the United Nations, never provide direct monetary aid to the
targeted countries. Hence, they should be removed from the entire equation of corruption
monitoring and tolerance. To be frank, based upon extensive personal experience, these
aid organizations are often more oriented with the problem than with a solution. Their expatriots are often paid hundreds of thousands of dollars per year in exchange for living
within the target country. These individuals are not incentivized to rock the boat, cause
trouble and/or point out problems. Again, individuals that have claimed to be above
reproach are, by virtue of this dissertation, now claimed as potentially corrupt.
Toleration should never, ever be exercised by leadership within a post-conflict
society, since any public acceptance of corruption will degrade credibility and lead to
distrust with the general public. This thesis needs to be further developed and proven, and
I am hopeful that future research will consider doing so.
As a new Ph.D., I am clearly inexperienced with the nuances and mannerisms of
more sophisticated and seasoned academics. I have not previously published any articles.
Similarly, I have never worked for an NGO or government agency promoting anticorruption policies and programs. Instead, I have lived and worked in each of the five
regions studied and have experienced the corrupt behavior, lethal violence, and feelings
of insecurity myself on numerous occasions. I have not been beholden or captive to any
government’s, military’s or NGO’s vision. Instead, I was living and working in these
areas on my own accord, on my own budget, and because of my own motivations. While
living and working in these regions of extreme conflict, I have personally seen employees
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and leadership of the U.S. Army, United Nations, USAID, and numerous NGOs act
corruptly. To be fair, I have also seen acts of heroism, extreme compassion and
unbelievable humility. At the core, I believe that people are good, but that some people
act badly as a result of poor leadership.
Past and current research would not need to be discarded. However, nearly all
past research would need to be refined in the interest of clarifying past ambiguities and
establishing a common perspective. This is done in this dissertation’s design. I took great
care to avoid any model or definition that grossly contradicted past definitions, syntax
and/or perspectives. The new corruption models were intended to be inclusive and to
incorporate past understanding while also clarifying existing contradictions. Said
differently, nearly all past models, theories, and statements concerning corruption are
applicable and relevant, but only in certain situations, and only within a limited context.
By comparison, the Universal Corruption Model suggested by this dissertation
incorporates context and culture, while clarifying past ambiguities.
Although my research focused upon corruption and lethal violence, the existential
phenomenological process utilized herein may also have application to other sectors
typified by syntax stagnation, status-quo maintenance, or long-term policy
ineffectiveness.
Next Steps
Developing a theory from the inside out is always most strongly desired, and so,
perhaps, this could have been done from the onset. On the other hand, this was deemed
impossible without a more robust definition of corruption. The models and observations
developed in this dissertation represent the impressions of eight individuals and thus have
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a good chance of being directionally correct. Similarly, so too does the definition of
corruption developed and suggested herein.
Next steps should be oriented to: 1) further confirm my results and the proposed
definition of corruption; 2) more robustly generalize the Factors of Corruption and the
interactivity effects within the Corruption Pyramid; and 3) confirm or dispel the proposed
hierarchy of corrupt behavior suggested by the Corruption Hierarchy.
My research involved perspectives from eight participants but did not focus upon
corruption, or lack thereof, being exhibited by these particular individuals. It is
interesting, but not surprising, to note that “There are not many studies on actual,
individual corruption cases” (De Graaf, 2007, p. 39). Also, “Many current studies lack
contingency,” and instead look at the situation from a parochial, black and white
perspective (De Graaf, 2007, p. 76). By comparison, a more holistic approach is
described by Bourieu’s Theory of Action, which is based upon “social divisions
[structure] and mental schemata [structures]” being inextricably linked, whereby “we
should “focus on the categories of perception, appreciate and lived experience of corrupt
officials” (De Graaf, 2007, pp. 70-72). The implications of lived experience imply a
phenomenological methodology. Hence, Case Study, with significant interviews and
interactions of an individual allegedly acting corruptly within regions of lethal violence,
is strongly recommended for future research.
Quantitative approaches are likely to be discarded in favor of other qualitative
methodologies for the indefinite future. Studying corruption is like studying love;
applying quantitative metrics may, by their very nature, destroy any and all appreciation
of the underlying concepts. That being said, Mixed Methods approaches can be

246
eventually used to more concisely confirm the magnitude of the effects and
interrelationships of the Corruption Factors identified, but only after a quorum of
researchers has agreed upon the syntax and definition of corruption.
Final Thoughts
Corruption has plagued the stabilization of conflict in many parts of the world.
Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars in aid, and the millions of lives lost, many
communities, societies, regions, and countries are experiencing protracted conflict,
egregious lethal violence, and extensive corruption. To be fair, not all regions have the
same levels of corruption. However, the regions of extreme and protracted conflict all
have significant, massive amounts of corruption occurring in concert with lethal violence.
As Jain (2011) rightly points out, “Although corruption may make one transaction easier,
it gives rise to a demand for more corruption; almost like adding sand to machine [that
for whatever reason helps the machine work better in the short term, but in the long term]
will require more grease” (p. 5). Corruption incites violence, and violence, in turn, allows
corruption to remain unchecked, since the formation of institutions is continually
delayed. Foreign policy and assistance programs all identify and include zero-corruption
as a long-term objective. This is good; yet, the very nature and definition of corruption
has been universally misunderstood, misapplied, erroneously categorized and/or
incorrectly discussed by academics, program managers, senior statesmen, and world
leaders. This is bad, and has resulted in billions of dollars, as well as countless lives,
needlessly wasted. Furthermore, the very people, agencies, and countries supporting zero
corruption are, themselves, corrupt to a great extent.
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Corruption is an evil to society. It represents the worst of ourselves. Yet, it will
always be among us, as we are human, and corruption is nothing more than a
manifestation of our own human frailty. An isolated, non-coordinated, one-directional
mandate and objective of zero tolerance has been required, but has not worked.
This dissertation alleges that world leaders and their organizations have all acted
corruptly from time to time. Specifically, world leaders often mandate zero tolerance to
corruption, but then act corruptly themselves. This includes the United States, too.
Although short-term tolerance has been suggested, a better approach seems to involve
maintaining a zero-tolerance mandate while accompanying this objective with similar
behavior from our leaders. Nobody is perfect, and we all have an inherent degree of
corrupt tendencies. However, it is also true that in many cases, we are acting far from our
full potential: “For the leaders of societies who engage in corruption, the temptation to
succumb to corruption far exceeds any moral constrains or compassion for those who
may suffer as a result. Constrains on their behavior may have to come from the outside”
(Jain, 2011, p. 8). Hence, the United States and other developed countries should
emphatically insist that standards of behavior be upheld by other world leaders, and we
must also provide such an example for others to follow, too. Failure for us to do so
should be accompanied by our democratic processes replacing these leaders. Our
common voice and lack of tolerance for corruption can, and should, prevail.
This paper and my research takes a small step in better defining corruption, its
drivers, and its academic foundations. I hope that this research serves as a catalyst for
others. By better understanding corruption we can also better understand ourselves, too,

248
and by so doing, reduce lethal conflict and feelings of insecurity in regions of extreme
conflict around the world.
Tribute, with Reflective Quotations
This dissertation has clarified some issues while inadvertently further confusing
others. Irrespective of the reader’s personal opinion, the following represent the most
introspective observations and statements of this research project’s amazing group of
eight Participants and provide the basis for focused reflection:
Kyle from South Sudan and Uganda. If you get the military to be corrupt, (and
then) if you get the police to be corrupt (and then) if you get the legal or the judicial
system to be corrupt . . . then, you are done as a country. The end of corruption always is
violence.
Jeremy from Iraq. You can build your own future. I build a lot of stuff by
myself, without school. And, from my early life, corruption was everywhere. So, I was
desperate about my country. I’m desperate about my country. You’ve got to be strong in
my country. If you are weak, they will take you.
Joshua from Uganda. Corruption is a very big word. [There are] many types of
corruption.
David from Afghanistan. The amount of money was so much, that they would
be like, ‘You know, I can’t let this go.’ Nobody’s asking me. The government is not like
[the] Taliban [and is not going] to punish me. I don’t go to jail for stealing the money; I
don’t . . . [and I am not] being sued for stealing the money. And this is a big money, so
should I let it go? Maybe not.
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Matt from Sudan and South Sudan. You hear about instability in the area in
South Sudan. [But], it was not because of a problem; it was created by the government
for them to mainly move [illegally take advantage of exchange rates and, thereby, make]
money. So, basically war is a man-made war . . . for them to make more money.
Simon from Sudan and South Sudan. And they [government] are using money
[obtained through corruption]. They give it to their Dinka . . . [friends and allies] in other
places to wipe out other ethnic groups. And, this is exactly what is happening now in
South Sudan.
Bridget from Uganda. Whenever we see anything wrong happening and we keep
quiet about it, we are giving way to corruption; [allowing it] to thrive, and develop . . .
horns, and tentacles . . . and This is how we are going to make corruption [even stronger,
allowing it] to develop horns and teeth. And tomorrow, when anyone talks about it,
people will be killed.
Daniel from Sudan. I think the middle class are the . . . vanguards of values. The
more you have middle class in a society, the more, I think, good values are upheld, and
when you take any measures which reduces the middle class, I think you eventually end
up with more corruption; and I think [this is] what happened to Sudan in the past years. I
can understand some of the justifications for having sanctions, but at the same time, I’m
saying that these sanctions have resulted in the reduction of the middle class. [Our
population, overall, is constituted by] . . . poorer people now, because there’s an out flux
of people from Sudan to the outside. Therefore, we have a shrinkage of the middle class,
and this has resulted, as I said, . . . [in] more corruption.
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“[Society is] wasting time on trying to stop terrorism [and, perhaps, corruption too]?
The underlying concept is much more important” (Campbell, 2015).
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Appendix A: Demographic Questions
1. Sex?
2. Race?
3. Ethnicity (if applicable)
4. Marital Status?
5. Children?
6. Country of Citizenship?
7. Country of Self-Identification?
8. Education?
9. Current Occupation?
10. Religious Persuasion?
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Appendix B: Interview Questions
1. First, I wanted to express my sincere gratitude for you helping me out with this
research. I really appreciate it! Let’s begin by introducing ourselves and
describing the objectives of our time together today, and the associated objectives
of this project. My name is Mark Thaller, and I am the Principal Investigator for
this research focusing on Corruption and its effects upon Lethality and Feelings of
Safety in Regions of Extreme Conflict. I am a U.S. citizen, and have spent a good
part of my life serving careers on Wall Street, nuclear engineering, consulting and
the U.S. Navy. However, over the past fifteen years I have lived and worked
independently and often without government support in regions of extreme
conflict, to include Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Liberia, Uganda and Afghanistan.
This latter experience has compelled me to try to understand what, why and how
such hardship, conflict and lethality is occurring, which is why I am now focusing
my efforts through this PhD, to hopefully better understand what I saw, heard and
felt. So, this is “me” in sixty seconds.
a. Shift to Demographic Questions. If possible, obtain answers to the
Demographic Questions before the interview.
2. Can you tell me a little about how yourself, and where you spent your teenage
years? And then?
3. Please tell me about a time where you experienced fear (of death or severe harm)
for yourself, your family, your friends?
4. Please tell me a little bit about the home, town and country that you are
remembering?
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5. I understand that you lived through a period where many people died. Please tell
me what you think about so many people in your family, town, region, and/or
country being killed.
6. What does corruption mean to you?
7. Please describe why you believe that your country, government, military acts (or
ever acted) corruptly (or not)?
8. Tell me about a time that corruption that made you upset? Why do you think that
this corruption occurred?
9. Tell me about other countries that you think are corrupt? Why do you think that
they are acting the way they do?
10. Please tell me why you think that some countries are more corrupt than others,
and why you feel this way.
11. Please tell me why you think that corruption in your country, your town, in the
military and/or anywhere affected (or did not affect) your feelings of security or
the number of people killed.
12. Have your feelings about corruption changed over your lifetime? Why do you
think they have changed?
13. Please tell me about a time where you felt very safe? Why do you think this
example came to mind?
14. Let’s talk about the people in charge of the government, law enforcement,
military, legal system and their degree of corruption? What comes to mind when
you think of these people?
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15. What has a person, group, or department in your country done, in your opinion,
that has most reduced violent death, and/or most reduced related mortality and/or
most enhanced your feelings of security? Why do you think that these efforts
were so successful? Let’s take some time to ponder this before answering.
16. What has a person, group or department done that has most increased violent
death, and most reduced your feelings of security? Why do you think that these
efforts were so unsuccessful? Let’s take some time to ponder this before
answering.
17. Probing will occur in each instance where the subject refers to death, violence, or
fear with questions like:
a. What you were thinking and feeling when that occurred?
b. Why do you think that this (violence/death/mistreatment) may have
occurred?
c. What do you think the other party was thinking and feeling when this
occurred?
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Appendix C: Recruiting Poster

NOVA
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences

Principal investigator
Mark C. Thaller
8736 Lords View Loop
Gainesville, VA 20155
+001-202-577-6062 (cell)
mt976@nova.edu
You are invited to participate in a PhD research:
Corruption, Context, Culture & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of
Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict
Requirements:
• Be 18 years old, or older
• Have experienced corruption, and have opinions about corruption
• Have lived, worked and/or been raised in a region of extreme, deadly
conflict, such as Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia or Uganda.
o Experienced violent death of at least one friend or family member
o Lived in region of violence for at least 3 years after age 14
o Worked in region of violence for at least 5 years
The purpose of this study is to:
1. Examine if, when and how various levels of corruption within leadership and
governance directly and/or indirectly affect lethal violence and associated feelings
of security among the general populace within regions of extreme violent conflict,
and to
2. Examine contextual, cultural and perspective-based nuances associated with
robustly defining corruption within a global construct.
The goals of this study are to:
1. Identify, outline and describe drivers, indicators and factors of corruption as they
relate to feelings of insecurity and fear of death by lethal violence within regions
of extreme violence.
2. Clarify the definition and syntax of “corruption” within a more robust, global
application. Theories and explanations will be developed and postured, if
possible, and as necessary.
3. Examine and analyze the possibility that the insistence of zero corruption (within
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the current paradigm of corruption) may be inadvertently exacerbating and/or
accelerating the resumption of lethal violence and feelings of insecurity within
regions of extreme violence.
4. Add to the body of knowledge on corruption, with practical applications to
international conflict and post-conflict situations, to include war, terrorism and
genocide.
Where will interviews take place?
Interviews will take place at a mutually agreed upon location, such as the interviewee’s
home, a local hotel, coffee shop and/or any other location of the subject’s choosing,
either in person (face-to-face), or via video conferencing (e.g. Skype, etc.).
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?
You will verbally respond to a series of 10 to 20 questions posed by Mr. Thaller. These
questions will be associated with your opinions, experiences and impressions about
corruption, violence, fatalities and feelings of insecurity. The interview should not take
longer than 90 minutes. You may terminate the interview and withdraw from the study at
any time.
What language will be used for this study?
All questions will be posed in English. Responses will also be in English.
Is there any audio or video recording?
There will not be any video recording. However, this research project will include audio
recording of the interview.
Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything?
There are no costs to you. Payments will not be made for participating in this study.
How will you keep my information private?
The transcripts of the tapes will not have any information that could be linked to you. All
records of the interview will be maintained under lock and key, and held in strictest
confidence.
I am interested. What do I do now?
Please let the person who provided you this Recruitment Flyer know that you are
interested. He/she will advise you on next steps, which will include gathering some very
basic information, such as your name, age, email address (if available), telephone number
and Skype address (if available).
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Appendix D: Recruiting Email
Subject: Research on Corruption and Lethal Violence; Participants needed for
Interviewing
Date: xxxxxxx
From: Mark Thaller <mark.thaller@gmail.com>
Dear (insert potential participant's name):
I am performing research on corruption, and am hoping that you may be available to
assist me by being interviewed. Please take a look at the Recruitment Poster below. It is
also attached to this email in its complete format. Thanks very much for your help, and
for thinking of other people who may also be available to help.
Best Wishes,
Mark Thaller
Principal investigator
8736 Lords View Loop
Gainesville, VA 20155
+001-202-577-6062 (cell)
mt976@nova.edu
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Appendix E: Consent Form

NOVA
College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences

Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled:
Corruption, Context, Culture & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of
Corruption upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict
Funding Source: None.
IRB protocol #: 2017-298
Principal investigator
Mark C. Thaller
8736 Lords View Loop
Gainesville, VA 20155
+001-202-577-6062 (cell)
+001-202-280-1344 (fax)
Mt976@nova.edu

Co-investigator
Jason J. Campbell, Ph.D.
3301 College Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
+001-954-541-6682, ext. 3035
+001-954-262-3035 (cell)
Jc2017@nova.edu

For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact:
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB)
Nova Southeastern University
+001-954-262-5369 or Toll Free at +001-866-499-0790
Email: IRB@nsu.nova.edu
Site Information
Interviews will take place at a mutually agreed upon location, such as the interviewee’s
home, a local hotel, coffee shop and/or private office, or any other location of the
subject’s choosing, either in person (face-to-face) or via video conference using SKYPE
or other similar software.
What is the purpose of this Consent Form?
You are invited to participate in a research study. This Consent Form provides you with
general information about the study, and about how your privacy will be safeguarded.
What are the purpose and goals of this study?
The purpose of this study is to:
3. Examine if, when and how various levels of corruption within leadership and
governance directly and/or indirectly affect lethal violence and associated feelings
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of security among the general populace within regions of extreme violent conflict,
and to
4. Examine contextual, cultural and perspective-based nuances associated with
robustly defining corruption within a global construct.
The goals of this study are to:
5. Identify, outline and describe drivers, indicators and factors of corruption as they
relate to feelings of insecurity and fear of death by lethal violence within regions
of extreme violence.
6. Clarify the definition and syntax of “corruption” within a more robust, global
application. Theories and explanations will be developed and postured, if
possible, and as necessary.
7. Examine and analyze the possibility that the insistence of zero corruption (within
the current paradigm of corruption) may be inadvertently exacerbating and/or
accelerating the resumption of lethal violence and feelings of insecurity within
regions of extreme violence.
8. Add to the body of knowledge on corruption, with practical applications to
international conflict and post-conflict situations, to include war, terrorism and
genocide.
Why are you asking me?
We are inviting you to participate because you have lived within a region of extreme
violence. There will be between 6 and 10 participants in this research study.
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?
You will verbally respond to a series of 10 to 20 questions posed by Mr. Thaller. These
questions will be associated with your opinions, experiences and impressions about
corruption, violence, fatalities and feelings of insecurity. The interview should take no
longer than 90 minutes. However, you may terminate the interview and withdraw from
the study at any time.
What language will be used for this study?
All questions will be posed in English. Your responses will be provided in English.
Is there any audio or video recording?
There will not be any video recording. However, this research project will include audio
recording of the interview. This audio recording will be available to be heard by the
researcher, Mr. Mark Thaller, personnel from the IRB, the dissertation chair, Dr. Jason
Campbell and personnel from a professional transcription service constrained by nondisclosure agreements. The audio recording will be transcribed by a professional
transcription service, with confidentiality maintained as a result of non-disclosure
agreements between Mr. Thaller and the professional service. The recording, if in analog
format, will be re-recorded in electronic format with the analog copy immediately
destroyed. All rough notes will also be converted to electronic format, and stored in an
identically secure fashion. The electronic files will be kept securely in Mr. Thaller’s
home office in a locked cabinet. The electronic recording as well as all written notes (in
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electronic format) will be kept for 36 months from the end of the study. The files
containing the recorded interview as well as all rough notes and data corresponding to
your interview will be destroyed after that time by destroying the external electronic
storage device upon which the data is stored. The professional transcription service will
destroy all files and records immediately upon delivery of the transcription. Because your
voice will be potentially identifiable by anyone who hears the recording, your
confidentiality for things you say on the recording cannot be guaranteed, although Mr.
Thaller will make best efforts to limit access to the recorded interview and data as
described in this paragraph.
What are the dangers to me?
Risks to you are minimal to moderate. These risks range from being no greater than other
risks you experience every day, but could be as great as psychological distress, extreme
sadness, anger and/or other emotions as a result of recalling unpleasant incidents. This
psychological distress can also take the form of being embarrassed by your responses
should your identity and the results of this interview become inadvertently exposed.
Being recorded means that confidentiality cannot be promised. If you have questions
about the research, your research rights, or if you experience an injury because of the
research please contact Mr. Thaller at +001-202-577-6062. You may also contact the IRB
at the numbers indicated above with questions about your research rights.
Should psychological distress occur, the interview will be temporarily halted, or
permanently terminated, with recommended counseling and assistance from mental
health professionals.
Are there any benefits to me for taking part in this research study?
There are no benefits to you for participating.
Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything?
There are no costs to you. Payment will not be made for participating in this study.
How will you keep my information private?
The interview questions will not ask you for any information that could be linked to you.
The transcripts of the tapes will not have any information that could be linked to you. As
mentioned, the audio recording files will be destroyed 36 months after the study ends. All
information obtained in this study is strictly confidential unless law requires disclosure.
The IRB, regulatory agencies, or Dr. Campbell (Chairman of this research committee)
may review research records.
What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study?
You have the right to leave this study at any time, and can refuse to participate at any
time. If you do decide to leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience
any penalty. However, if you choose to withdraw, any and all information collected about
you before the date you leave the study will be kept in the research records for 36 months
from the conclusion of the study and may be used as a part of the research.
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Other Considerations:
If the researchers learn anything that might change your mind about being involved, you
will be immediately informed, with details provided. It is very important that your
decision be voluntary, and that your decision is made with full knowledge of all aspects
of this study.
Voluntary Consent by Participant:
By signing below, you indicate that
• This study has been explained to you
• You have read this document or it has been read to you
• Your questions about this research study have been answered
• You have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions
in the future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury
• You have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel
questions about your study rights
• You are entitled to and have been given a copy of this form after you have read
and signed it
• You voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled: Corruption, Context,
Culture & Killing: A Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of Corruption
upon Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict
Participant's Signature: _____________________________ Date: __________
Participant’s Name: ________________________________ Date: __________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: ________________Date: ___________
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Appendix F: IRB Approval Letter

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Institutional Review Board
MEMORANDUM
To:

Mark Thaller

From:

Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D., Center Representative, Institutional Review Board

Date:

April 27, 2017

Re:

IRB #: 2017-298; Title, “Corruption, Context, Culture & Killing: A
Phenomenological Analysis of the Effects of Corruption upon
Lethality and Feelings of Insecurity in Regions of Extreme Conflict”

I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level. Based on the
information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB
review under 45 CFR 46.101(b) (Exempt Category 2). You may proceed with your
study as described to the IRB. As principal investigator, you must adhere to the following
requirements:
1. 1) CONSENT: If recruitment procedures include consent forms, they must be obtained
in such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the process
affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers from
those directly involved in the research, and have sufficient time to consider their
participation after they have been provided this information. The subjects must be
given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must be placed in a
secure file separate from de-identified participant information. Record of
informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from the
conclusion of the study.
2. 2) ADVERSE EVENTS/UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS: The principal investigator
is required to notify the IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D.,
respectively) of any adverse reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as
a result of this study. Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to,
injury, depression as a result of participation in the study, life- threatening
situation, death, or loss of confidentiality/anonymity of subject. Approval may be
withdrawn if the problem is serious.
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3. 3) AMENDMENTS: Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of
subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to
implementation. Please be advised that changes in a study may require further
review depending on the nature of the change. Please contact me with any
questions regarding amendments or changes to your study.
The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human
subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46)
revised June 18, 1991.
Cc: Jason Campbell, Ph.D. Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D.
3301 College Avenue • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314-7796 (954) 262-0000 • 800-6727223, ext. 5369 • Email: irb@nova.edu • Web site: www.nova.edu/irb

